

Arms control and Nonproliferation in the Middle East

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Issues

- Middle East is unique
- Nonproliferation treaty participation and compliance
 - *Iran*
 - *Israel*
 - Syria
 - Others
- Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

Middle East is unique

- Fundamental ongoing territorial, religious, ethnic and other disputes that underline the reality of WMD.
- Chemical weapons have been used.
- There is no agreed definition of the geographical delineation of the Middle East
- Israel, is presumed to have advanced nuclear weapons capabilities and it is not party to the NPT.
- Several other states were or are pursuing WMD capabilities.
- Some key regional actors do not recognize Israel, let alone share diplomatic relations.
- There is no security framework or organization in the region, much less a regional arms control culture or constituency.
- Civil wars/ unrest in countries that possess WMD capabilities
- Preemptive strikes were used against nuclear facilities

Nonproliferation treaties (lack of) participation

- NPT
 - Israel
- CWC
 - Egypt, Israel, Syria
- BWC
 - Egypt, Israel, Syria
- CTBT
 - Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
- Additional Protocol
 - Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Syria



Nonproliferation treaties compliance

- Out of the 7 violations of the NPT, five are from the Middle East
 - Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, (Egypt)
- No taboo on the use of CW
 - Egypt used CW against Yemen (1950s)
 - Iraq used CW against its own people and against Iran (1980s)
 - Syria used against its own people during the ongoing civil war

Israel

- The only country in the region believed to possess nuclear weapons capability
- “Opacity” policy – Israel have not confirmed nor denied its existence
- Motivations:
 - “Weapon of last resort”
 - Strategic equalizer – lack of strategic geographical depth
 - Deterrence



Israel (Cont.)

- Refused to signed the NPT or any other treaty that may undermine its opacity policy
- Believes in regional tailored solutions to the proliferation problem of the region
 - As part and only after a regional comprehensive peace.
 - Peace comes first, and denuclearization last.
- Until regional arrangement can be reached, Israel also believes in preemptive strike to prevent other regional states acquire NW capabilities and deployed it at least twice (Iraq and Syria).

Iran

- Nuclear program started in 1960s by the Shah
- Iranian Revolution
 - Iran – Iraq war/ CW use
- In 2003, 2 undeclared sites were exposed – one for centrifuges enrichment and another for heavy water reactor; another undeclared centrifuges facility was exposed in 2009.
- Iran holds its program is for peaceful uses
- Negotiations on and off since 2003
- 8 UNSCR since 2006, crippling effect on the economy.
- Enrichment capabilities (Nov. 2013):
 - Natanz and Fordow 18,500 IR-1 centrifuges
 - Natanz 1,000 IR-2m centrifuges

Iran (Cont.)

■ Interim agreement (24 November 2013; 6 months):

■ Iran agreed:

1. Stop all enrichment to 20%
2. Reduce existing 20% enriched stockpile to zero
3. convert all low enriched uranium
4. halt progress on its enrichment capacity
5. Leave inoperable half of its centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of those at Fordow
6. freeze all activities at Arak heavy water facility
7. End any plans to construct a facility capable of reprocessing plutonium
8. Daily inspections of the main nuclear facilities



Source: eaworldview.com

■ The '5 plus 1' agreed:

1. \$7 billion in sanctions relief from frozen accounts
2. Iran to enrich uranium to 5 percent
3. Acknowledged Iran's right to enrich uranium
4. No new nuclear-related sanctions for the period of the six months

Iran (Cont.)

- Comprehensive agreement (commence implementing within a year):
 - Number of centrifuges
 - Level of enrichment
 - Infrastructure dismantlement
 - Arak
 - Plutonium separation facility
 - IAEA safeguards
 - The duration of the agreement
 - UNSCR
 - Ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons
 - Sanctions

Syria (NW program)

- Syria was secretly building a reactor in the Dair Alzour region with assistance from North Korea.
- Israeli jets bombed the facility in September 2007.
- Syria cleaned the bombed site.
- In 2008 Syria agreed to IAEA visit in the cleaned site
- The IAEA requested to visit 3 additional sites, but Syria has so far refused.



Figure 1. Overview of suspected reactor site before September 6, 2007



Figure 2. Overview of suspected reactor site after September 6, 2007

Syria (NW program)

- IAEA reports:
 - “concludes that the destroyed building was very likely a nuclear reactor,”
- Under current political circumstances, the IAEA is not in position to verify the absence of other undeclared activities in Syria
- This case is as much about North Korean proliferation as it is about Syrian violations.

Syria (CW)

- Until recently denied having CW program.
- Suppliers:
 - Initial CW capability was provided by Egypt prior to the October 1973 war against Israel. Then, Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
 - In recent years, Iran has been identified as a supplier of technical assistance and facilities for developing and producing CW-related precursors.


Syria (CW)

- Capabilities: mustard gas, sarin, and possibly also VX nerve agent.

NERVE AGENT	NERVE AGENT	NERVE AGENT	BLISTER AGENT
			
TABUN	SARIN	V-SERIES	MUSTARD HD
<p>Tabun was the first of the nerve agents discovered in Germany in the 1930s. Nazi Germany produced large quantities of tabun but never used it on the battlefield. Tabun causes uncontrollable nerve excitation and muscle contraction and victims die by suffocation. Major General Adnan Sillou, the former head of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal who defected this year, listed tabun as one of the nerve-agent weapons stored by the Assad regime.</p>	<p>Sarin is an agent that causes uncontrollable nerve-cell excitation and muscle contraction. Sarin victims die within minutes from suffocation. Sarin vapour is about 10 times less toxic than VX vapor, but 25 times more toxic than hydrogen cyanide. It was discovered by German scientists attempting to produce more potent pesticides.</p>	<p>In early 1990, it was reported Syria had begun researching the V-series of nerve agents, even more toxic than sarin. It was also throughout the 1990s that Syria had little success in producing these agents.</p>	<p>Mustard is a blister agent. The term mustard gas typically refers to sulphur mustard (HD), despite HD being neither a mustard nor a gas. Victims develop painful blisters on their skin, as well as lung and eye irritation leading to potential pulmonary edema and blindness. However, mustard exposure is usually not fatal.</p>

Syria (CW)

- Syria possesses Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles, artillery shells, and rockets that are believed to be capable of delivering chemical warheads.




Syria (CW)

- Recently Syria admitted of having CW.
- During the ongoing civil war in Syria CW have been used several times, the last known one is in Aug. 21, 2013.
- According to the UN report based on inspections at the Aug. 21, 2013 site, sarin was used in Syria.



Syria: Damascus Areas of Influence and Areas Reportedly Affected by 21 August Chemical Attack



Syria (CW)

- **August 21, 2013:** A large-scale CW attack occurred at the suburbs of the Ghouta region.
- **August 25, 2013:** Syria agreed to let UN inspection team inspect Aug. 21 suspected site.
- **September 9, 2013:** Russian proposal: Syria would dismantle its CW under international inspection and United States would not attack.
- **September 12, 2013:** Assad signed a legislative decree providing the accession of Syria to the CWC.
 - Syria would observe its CWC obligations immediately (30 days from the date of accession according to the treaty).
- **September 14, 2013:** Kerry and Lavrov reached an agreement on a detailed plan for the accounting, inspection, control, and elimination of Syria's CW.
 - Complete initial inspections by November 1, 2013.
 - Destroy certain chemical weapons, production facilities and mixing and filling equipment by November 1, 2013.
 - Destruction of the stockpile of chemical weapons and chemical agents by the first half of 2014.

Syria (CW)

- **September 16, 2013:** UN SG delivered a report citing evidence of the nerve agent sarin both in the environment and present in victims of the attack.
- **September 20, 2013:** Syria submitted a declaration of its CW stockpiles to the OPCW.
- **September 27, 2013:** EC OPCW and UNSC Resolutions adopted.
- **October 1, 2013:** Inspectors arrived in Syria.
- **October 4, 2013:** Syria submitted additional information updating its initial disclosure.
- **October 6, 2013:** Destruction of Syria's stockpiles of CW began.
 - Syrians conduct the destruction work; UN and OPCW team monitor and verify the activities.
- **Nov. 1, 2013:** Syria had met its first goal to destroy the country's chemical-weapons-mixing and -filling facilities in 21 of 23 declared sites.
- **Dec. 6, 2013:** OPCW announced that all of Syria's unfilled munitions had been destroyed.

Syria (CW)



Syria (CW) – Next Steps

- By Dec. 31 - 20 metric tons of mustard gas and more than 1,000 tons of the precursor chemicals and raw materials used to manufacture CW must be removed from the country.
- By Feb. 5 - the remaining chemical components must be neutralized.
- By March 2014 - production facilities are to be leveled.



WMD Free Zone in the Middle East

- Not a new issue (1974)
- 1992-1995 ACRS negotiations
 - So far served as the only official multilateral security dialogue and framework in the Middle East concerning WMD control and nonproliferation
 - Was established as part of the Arab-Israeli multilateral peace process initiated at the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991
 - Important understandings: draft Declaration of Principles and Statements of Intent on Arms Control and Regional Security, draft charter for regional security centers, as well as procedures for pre-notification of certain military activities and exchange of military information.
 - Also revealed the deep disagreements between Egypt (which took upon itself to represent the Arab position) and Israel on priorities, the sequencing of the peace process versus Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone negotiations, threat perceptions, and the nuclear issue.
 - The process also deepened mistrust and rivalries among different Arab states.
- Not much progress since

WMDFZ ME conference

- Mandated by the 2010 NPT Review Conference
- A conference in 2012 "on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction"
- So far, no agreed agenda, rules of procedures and outcome
- May be postponed to 2013...
- Egypt protest during the NPT April prepcom

WMDFZ ME

- Challenging conditions for establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East:
 - Such zone has never been established;
 - Has never been established among states at war;
 - Has never been established between states that do not officially recognize each other and share no diplomatic relations;
 - Has never been established by states in non-compliance with safeguard agreements (like Iran and Syria) or with a state that has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT.

WMDFZ ME

- To go forwards:
 - US will have to get involved seriously
 - Manage expectations
 - States in the region, and especially Egypt and Israel will have to directly communicate
 - U.S. will have to give Israel guarantees
 - Israel will have to take strategic decision
 - Egypt will have to decide what is their strategic objective
 - Iran's position and interests will have to be brought into the conversation
 - Regional security issues are the underlying problem and progress on the zone could not take place without resolving these issues

Questions?