Report on the 2016 Session of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee

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During the 2016 Session of the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, States engaged in substantive discussions on the various cluster items, such as nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, outer space, conventional weapons, other disarmament issues, regional disarmament, and disarmament machinery. The voting results for all of the draft resolutions are contained in Annex A. In certain cases, I refer to the draft resolutions and voting results within the text.

Cluster 1. Nuclear Weapons

1. L. 41

A. General Overview on the 2017 Conference and Ban Treaty

In Cluster 1, the First Committee witnessed a pivotal discussion on nuclear disarmament, which culminated in the adoption of L.41 entitled “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations.” The lead sponsors were Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria and South Africa. 55 states from different regions co-sponsored the draft resolution.

The historic draft resolution stipulates that, “in 2017 a United Nations conference will be held in order for the international community to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.” The Conference will be convened “in New York, under the rules of procedure of the General Assembly unless otherwise agreed by the Conference.” It will take place between 27 to 31 March and from 15 June to 7 July 2017, with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society representatives. The draft resolution builds upon the UN Opened-Ended Working Group (OEWG)’s final report, which recommended that the UNGA should convene the conference.

123 states voted in favor of it, 38 voted against it, and 16 abstained from voting on the draft resolution.

B. Arab and Middle Eastern States’ Views

On behalf of the Arab Group, Tunisia declared that the Arab States “welcomed the recommendation of the working group in Geneva this year that was established in accordance with the mandate of the General Assembly resolution 70/33.”

Algeria expressed its profound regret about the inability of the states parties to the NPT to reach a consensus outcome document at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Algeria believed that the international community has lost a precious opportunity and sadly created doubt over the credibility of the whole regime, due to the lack of political will amongst certain States Parties. Thus, due to the frustrations over the broken grand bargain of the NPT, Algeria welcomed the outcome report of the OEWG and strongly supported the recommendation.

As part of its strong support for the 2017 Conference and the ban treaty, Egypt explained that the NWS have yet to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. It further stated that there is need for a nuclear weapons convention. In this regard, Egypt underscored the importance for the international community to convene “essential negotiations within the context of the fruitful outcomes and unprecedented achievement of the Open Ended Working Group.”

Iraq expressed its support for negotiations on “a legally binding and non-discriminatory international treaty to prohibit the stockpiling, production and use of nuclear weapons.” It welcomed the “results achieved by the OEWG” and voted in favor of L.41.

Kuwait welcomed the recommendation of the OEWG, and it voted for the draft resolution.

Lebanon conveyed its concerns that nuclear weapons “remain the only weapons of mass destruction not yet explicitly prohibited by an international treaty.” It further said that the international community has a unique opportunity at this session of the First Committee “to move forward towards prohibiting the most destructive and inhumane weapon ever created.”
Libya applauded the work of the OEWG. Furthermore, it welcomed the “outcome decision made by the group to convene a conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons” and called on all States “to work in good faith” to achieve this goal.

Morocco expressed uncertainty on whether the 2017 Conference and the ban treaty would positively contribute towards the movement of a world free of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, Morocco abstained on the draft resolution.

It abstained from voting on the draft resolution for the following reasons:

1. If the adoption of this resolution were confirmed at the GA Plenary, Member States would be moving straight to a negotiating conference without any appropriate preparatory work. Such preparatory process could serve once again as a forum for developing a shared understanding on what kind of a treaty or legal measure would help us better achieve our common objective of nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
2. Morocco made it clear from the beginning that neither rejecting the work of the OEWG nor rushing with one specific recommendation was appropriate.
3. Some of the cosponsors of the draft resolution have been consistently denying any possible impact of the proposed treaty on existing mechanisms including the NPT. In Morocco’s interpretation, this could be true if they agree that such treaty would have no impact at all; however, Morocco does not agree with the cosponsors’ views. Morocco has also maintained that this process and the way it is being handled will affect the NPT review process and the possibilities of working together.

B. Caribbean and Latin American States

On behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Jamaica expressed concerns about the current legal gap associated with the implementation of Article VI. As a result, it stated that, “more has to be done to fill the legal gap that currently exists for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.”

In order to fill the legal gap, CARICOM fully endorsed the establishment of the open-ended working group on multilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it expressed its strong support for a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Effectively, the group joined “efforts by the international community to advance towards the negotiation of a universal legally binding instrument prohibiting the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.”

The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) welcomed the report of the UN open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament.” CELAC also reiterated its commitment “to work actively and constructively during the 71st session of the General Assembly towards the fulfillment of the [working] group’s recommendation.” Moreover, CELAC stated that the negotiations for a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons are among its highest aspirations. Additionally, CELAC stated that “the negotiations on a prohibition would not eliminate nuclear weapons, but rather, the absolute prohibition will set a norm, currently lacking, which will constitute the basis of further efforts and negotiations towards the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons as soon as possible.” Finally, CELAC believed that “the ban treaty would have both a political as well as legal impact on nuclear disarmament.” Therefore, CELAC reiterated its strong support for L. 41.

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) strongly endorsed the recommendation of the OEWG to convene the conference in 2017 “to negotiate with the widest possible agreement a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons.” UNASUR also conveyed its deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and reiterated its support for the Humanitarian Pledge, “whereby 127 states pledged to pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.”

i. Caribbean States’ views

Cuba articulated that the vote on L.41 was “the most relevant vote during this year’s First Committee.” Furthermore, Cuba announced that its delegation “cannot remain as a passive spectator.” Moreover, Cuba urged all states to support L.41 because any postponement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons is simply unacceptable for Cuba. Additionally, building upon its urgent call for states to support L.41, Cuba reminded states that “the prohibition of nuclear weapons is
fully justified since their use or threat of use under any circumstances would be a violation of international law; it would be a crime against humanity.” Finally, Cuba stated that the ban treaty should be adopted by 2018, on the occasion of the high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to be convened by the UN General Assembly.

ii. Latin American States’ Views

Brazil, one of the lead sponsors of L.41, mentioned that the OEWG enabled the First Committee to have “the most comprehensive debate on nuclear weapons in the past decades.” Brazil further mentioned that the working group’s recommendation to negotiate the ban treaty is “consistent with the NPT’s nuclear disarmament provisions.” Brazil also announced that “the ban treaty will be thoroughly compatible with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the wider nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.”

Mexico, a lead sponsor of the draft resolution, welcomed the report of the OEWG. Further, Mexico stated that the 2017 Conference is “a collaboration with all the membership is part of the commitment assumed by the 127 states, which have endorsed the Humanitarian Pledge, to fill the legal gap regarding nuclear weapons, to stigmatize them and prohibit them, leading towards their elimination.”

C. African States

i. Statement from Regional Group

The African Group, which represents 54 states, welcomed the report of the OEWG and strongly supported its recommendation to convene “a UN conference in 2017 to commence negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination.” The African Group observed that nuclear weapons are the only WMD not prohibited by an international legal instrument. Thus, the African Group supported L.41.

a. An African State’s View

Nigeria, a co-sponsor, emphasized that it welcomed the extensive work carried out by the OEWG. It recognized that the OEWG’s recommendation, as outlined in L.41, provides the international community “with the opportunity of a lifetime to begin the process of negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.”

It further mentioned that nuclear weapons pose an “existential threat” to the human race.” Considering the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity, Nigeria decided to co-sponsor L.41 and urged states to support it.

D. Southeast Asian States’ Views

Brunei welcomed the outcome of the OEWG and its recommendation as contained in both the report and L.41. It underscored its endorsement of the Humanitarian Pledge to stigmatize, prohibit, and eliminate nuclear weapons.

India abstained on L.41. As part of its explanation about its decision to abstain from the draft resolution, it specified three salient reasons:

1. Disarmament is a Charter responsibility of the UNGA. In exercise of this responsibility the First Special Session on Disarmament of the UNGA established the disarmament machinery with the CD as the single multilateral disarmament negotiation forum. Nuclear disarmament continues to be on the CD’s agenda. We are not convinced that the proposed Conference in 2017 convened under GA rules of procedure can address the longstanding expectation of the international community for a comprehensive instrument on nuclear disarmament.

2. Further, India did not participate in the OEWG, which met in Geneva during 2016 and hence reserves its position on its Report and the recommendations therein.

3. India has supported the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention, which in addition to prohibition and elimination also
includes verification. International verification would be essential to the global elimination of nuclear weapons, just as it has been in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Progress on nuclear disarmament in the CD should remain an international priority.

Indonesia welcomed the OEWG’S recommendation. Additionally, due to its strong recognition about the value of the ban treaty, it decided to co-sponsor L.41. Indonesia further specified that, “the negotiations would not undermine the NPT regime, but rather strengthen it.” It further affirmed that, “a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons would categorically and universally prohibit nuclear weapons and would therefore unarguably contribute positively to nuclear disarmament.” Finally, it argued that the reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines “is inconsistent with legal obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament.”

Malaysia welcomed the recommendations made in “the landmark report” of the OWEG. Malaysia further contended that the OEWG’s recommendation, as contained in the aforementioned resolution, complements the NPT because it reinforces the commitment towards nuclear disarmament as required by Article VI of that treaty. It also contended that, “arguments and fears that the process undermines the NPT are unwarranted and unsubstantiated.”

Pakistan complained that the sponsors of L.41 attempted to “trivialize and exclude vital security considerations from the debate on nuclear disarmament, and to recast the discourse in exclusively humanitarian and ethical terms.” This approach is “not likely to succeed without bringing the major stakeholders on board.” Finally, it stipulated that, “nuclear disarmament cannot progress without addressing the existential security concerns of all states.” Ultimately, it decided to abstain on the draft resolution.

As part of its explanation about its decision to abstain from voting on the draft resolution, Pakistan contended that the sponsors failed to take the following into account:

1. Having nuclear weapons possessing states on board
2. Taking on board the vital security considerations of states
3. Importance of the consensus rule for the conduct of negotiations that would help states protect their national security interests
4. Primacy and centrality of the established disarmament machinery
5. Taking a holistic and comprehensive approach that is indispensable for nuclear disarmament

The Philippines expressed its strong support for the resolution. Moreover, throughout the First Committee, it actively promoted the proposed conference to negotiate a nuclear ban treaty. Its decision to promote the 2017 Conference can be attributed to its recognition that nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to the very existence of the human race. It urged states to support the draft resolution.

Thailand, which chaired the OEWG, underscored “the need for states to support a conference to be convened in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons.” Thus, it was pleased that an overwhelming number of states voted in favor of the draft resolution.

E. Oceanic and Pacific Islands’ States

Australia opposed the draft resolution as evident in its proclamation that, “the ban treaty would not rid us of nuclear weapons.” Australia firmly contended that, “the ban treaty would not change the realities we all face in a nuclear-armed DPRK [North Korea], or tensions among major powers. And without the involvement of states possessing nuclear weapons, the practical value of negotiating a ban treaty is a questionable exercise.” Finally, it claimed that the US nuclear weapons have helped it to remain safe and prosperous. Therefore, it cannot accept the ban treaty approach.

Fiji emerged as a strong proponent for L.41. It believed that, “for the people of Fiji and the Pacific, nothing less than a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, the trade of such weapons, and concrete steps to provide effective redress for those who suffer the effects of nuclear testing, is acceptable.” Thus, it supported “the establishment of a comprehensive legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons to plug the current lacuna as agreed in the open-ended working group meeting held in Geneva.”
New Zealand informed the international community that the OEWG was inclusive in the sense that it invited each and every member of the UNGA to participate in the deliberations and created “a new mainstream.” In essence, during the beginning of the OEWG session, “there were discrete regional voices from Africa, Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, ASEAN, and the Pacific region with different shades and visions for the pathway forward. Eventually, by the end of the OEWG, there was a unified voice with a single vision; this single vision was the recommendation for the UN to convene a conference in 2017 on negotiating a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination.”

New Zealand reminded states that the recommendation is not a novel or revolutionary vision. It is a roadmap to the full implementation of Article VI of the NPT. Additionally, New Zealand asserted that, “any suggestion that the OEWG vision fails to take account of the views and security interests of other states overlooks the promise of Article VI and the near universal membership of the NPT and would seem to overlook, too, the unequivocal commitment already given (in 2000 and 2010) by the Five Nuclear Weapon States to renounce their nuclear weapons.”

It strongly countered any resistance amongst the international community on the grounds that the time is not yet ripe for commencement of discussions on a ban treaty. New Zealand stated that this viewpoint “overlooks the point outlined in a preambular paragraph in the new draft resolution following up on the OEWG that, in fact, the current international climate makes multilateralism and the increased attention to disarmament and nonproliferation issues all the more urgent. In times of international turbulence there is more than usual benefit to building and sustaining rules-based systems and architecture.”

As part of its explanation for its strong support on L.41, Palau mentioned the following:

For 50 years, more than 300 nuclear test explosions occurred in our region. These explosions adversely affected its ecology, physical health, mental and psychosocial well being of its people. Moreover, to this day, the citizens of Palau continue to experience epidemics of cancers, chronic diseases and congenital abnormalities as a result of the radioactive fallout that blanketed our homes and the vast Pacific Ocean. Entire atolls remain unsafe for habitation, for agricultural production, and for fishing. Many Pacific islanders have been permanently displaced from their homes and disconnected from their indigenous way of life.

F. Northeast Asian States’ Views

Japan, the only state that has suffered from atomic weapons, voted against the resolution. Japan stipulated that “practical and concrete nuclear disarmament measures through the constructive cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States is the only effective way to make advances in nuclear disarmament.” Finally, Japan stated that the resolution should have required the conference to operate under the rule of consensus.

The Republic of Korea recognized that, due to the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, there is a new trend in the disarmament diplomacy. However, the Republic of Korean felt that the resolution was hastily cobbled together and would “neither achieve the goals for substantial disarmament nor resolve the current deadlock.” It also contended that the international community does not need a new legal instrument on nuclear disarmament, which could undermine Article VI of the NPT.

G. European States’ Views

The majority of NATO-allied states conveyed their concerns about the draft resolution and voted against it. However, the Netherlands abstained from the draft resolution, which is a significant move for a NATO-allied state. As part of its explanation, the Netherlands explained that it “wants an instrument that takes into account three conditions, which are: it should be verifiable as well as comprehensive; it must not detract from the NPT and Article VI, including the chronology inherent therein; and it should enjoy the support of nuclear-weapon possessors and non-nuclear weapon states alike in order to be effective.” The draft resolution did not address these conditions, which was why the Netherlands could not affirmatively support it. However, it wished to serve as a bridge builder between the NWS and NNWS; and thereby, it would be able to ensure that the NATO allied states can support the ban treaty.

H. Nuclear Weapons States’ Views
During the General Debate, Russia claimed that the ban treaty:

1. Breaks the algorithm of multilateral work, which has been carried out within the NPT. The ban treaty will be discussed at an alternative international forum, which may undermine the discussions about nuclear weapons at the next NPT review cycle.
2. Establishment of two independent legal regimes with mutually excluding provisions regarding the status of nuclear weapons.
3. The ban process would run counter to the 2010 Action Plan on nuclear disarmament because nuclear disarmament “should be carried out in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security.” A ban treaty can only begin when we are at the final stage in building a nuclear-weapon-free world
4. It is doubtful whether a ban process will even succeed. The NWS are not ready to participate in it. Russia will not participate in any event.
5. Any ban process would be a pure propaganda action. Thus, states should support serious joint actions to create conditions that would promote nuclear disarmament, such as the joint statement between Russia and China on strengthening global strategic stability.

Similarly, the US expressed its strong opposition to the 2017 Conference and the ban treaty. In particular, the US criticized states that want to abandon the pragmatic step-by-step approach and adopt “a radically different path that would simply declare a ban on nuclear weapons.” The US declared that it “must evaluate this new approach using the same criteria that we apply to our current one. Will it improve global security and stability or undermine it? Will it build a coalition for disarmament or fracture the international community? Will it lead to real reductions in nuclear weapons or be a treaty for political, not practical effect? How can such an approach be verified? The US has carefully applied these questions to the ban treaty concept, and it concluded that the ban treaty fails to successfully meet the necessary criteria for success.”

The UK expressed concerns that progress on nuclear disarmament has been “mandated by States with no external security concerns.” Reaching Critical Will asserted that UK’s statement implied that only those that are nuclear-armed face security threats. Moreover, the UK referred to its parliamentary decision about its Trident system. The vote indicated that, “a ban would have no effect on parliamentary debates.” Finally, the UK contended that, “advocates for a ban are simply fooling themselves.”

France contended that the ban treaty would undermine the NPT. Specifically, it argued that, “we would be deluding ourselves if we believed that such a treaty, designed without the nuclear-weapon possessing states, could have the slightest concrete impact, particular on the reduction of arsenals.” Additionally, prior to the vote, on behalf of the P3, France explained that nuclear disarmament can only occur within a step-by-step manner and must be guided through the principles of consensus. Finally, it argued that the international community must use the 2010 NPT Action Plan as a guideline.

2. GGE on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

A. L. 57 Rev. 1 Nuclear Disarmament Verification (Voting Result as a whole: 177-0-1, Voting result on OP.1 181-1-1; Decision: Adopted)

Norway, together with Chile, Finland, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, introduced L.57 Rev.1 entitled “Nuclear Disarmament Verification.” The overall intention of this draft resolution is to increase multilateral knowledge and awareness of verification within a UN framework and in an inclusive manner. The draft resolution calls for the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts of up to 25 participants on the basis of equitable geographical distribution to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, which will meet in Geneva in 2018 and 2019 for a total of three sessions of five days each.

Significantly, a separate vote was called for on OP.1, which “calls for further efforts to reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, and reaffirms the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” 181 states voted in favor of it, 1 voted against, and 1 abstained. Op. 1 was retained in the draft resolution.
B. Responses

Russia abstained on the vote from the draft resolution, as a whole, but voted against OP.1. It explained that it is unrealistic for the international community to expect a GGE, which will only meet for 15 days, to make any substantive progress on verification. Moreover, Russia stated that it is dangerous for a resolution to address the IAEA’s role in disarmament. Furthermore, Russia argued that verification requires states to have access to technical information and information about nuclear devices, which are secret and confidential. Russia expressed concerns that if a NNWS were to obtain classified information about nuclear devices, then there could be a risk of proliferation.

Pakistan abstained from the vote on the draft resolution, as a whole, but voted yes on OP.1. It felt that the CD is the appropriate forum for the international community to convene discussions on verification. The CD's rules of procedure and past precedent permit the creation of a subsidiary body for this purpose. We had given an amendment to the sponsors to this effect.

Cuba voted yes for both the draft resolution, as a whole, and OP.1. Nevertheless, it conveyed its concerns about the composition of the GGE.

India voted yes for both the resolution, as a whole, and OP.1. It supports verification mechanisms to help the international community with eliminating WMDs.

2. FMCT Resolution

A. L.65/Rev.1: “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (Voting Result: 177-1-10; Decision: Adopted)

Canada, Germany and the Netherlands introduced A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1 entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The draft resolution aims to build on the report of the recent Group of Governmental Experts and make serious progress toward FMCT negotiations. Specifically, as mentioned in OP.2, the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to establish a High-level Preparatory Group, which will be composed of 25 states, will meet in Geneva for a session of two weeks in 2017 and 2018, to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of a future non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, on the basis of CD/1299.

B. Responses

New Zealand mentioned that it voted in favor of the draft resolution, and it has long supported CD/1299 in order to advance negotiations on the FMCT. However, it expressed its concerns the GGE will only consist of 25 states and operate under the rule of consensus. New Zealand contended that the GGE must be more balanced, inclusive, and transparent.

Pakistan voted against the draft resolution. It stated that the current resolution is aimed at replicating the unsuccessful approach of the ill-advised GGE that worked during 2014 and 2015. As a non-representative body that was essentially duplicating the CD's work, the GGE failed to make any meaningful progress on the issue of fissile materials. Its outcome was a rehash of known positions and self-serving arguments, distracting us from focusing on the real issues and security concerns that are preventing consensus on this issue – and that need to be addressed to facilitate consensus on the commencement of negotiations in the CD.

India informed states about its strong support for the FMCT and support for CD/1299 and the mandate therein. Nevertheless, it stated that the GGE should not replace the CD, and there must be work on the proposed discussions of the FMCT on a basis of an agreed upon mandate. The conduct of the GGE must be based on the rule of consensus.

Iran abstained from the vote on the draft resolution. It mentioned that the FMCT must include past and future production. It does not see any added value in establishing a new GGE with the same mandate that has not worked in the past.
Israel explained that the notion of an FMCT is subsumed in the concept of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, the essential prerequisites for which are far from being fulfilled.

3. Humanitarian Pledge

A. L.24: Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons (Voting Result 135-33-14; Decision: Adopted)

Austria introduced its annual resolution on the humanitarian pledge as enshrined in L.24 entitled “Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.”

B. Responses

Pakistan abstained from voting on the draft resolution. It is not a member of the pledge and did not agree with the conclusions, though it attended both the Oslo and Nayarit Conferences.

India also abstained. It noted that, although it attended the three humanitarian conferences, it does not believe that the pledge was an adequate outcome from the conferences. It further mentioned that India did not sign the humanitarian pledge, and it expressed concerns about the fragmentation amongst states due to the humanitarian movement.

4. Ethical Imperative for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

A. L.36 entitled “Ethical Imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world (Voting Result 135-33-14; Decision: Adopted) South Africa introduced L.36 entitled “Ethical Imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world,” which calls upon all States to acknowledge the catastrophic humanitarian consequences and risks posed by a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design (OP.1). It also declared that “greater attention must be given to the impact of a nuclear weapon detonation on women and the importance of their participation in discussions, decisions and actions on nuclear weapon (Op.3,C). It further acknowledges that the use of nuclear weapons violates the laws of humanity and international law.

B. Responses

Pakistan’s rationale for abstaining from voting on the draft resolution was similar to its rationale for abstaining on the humanitarian pledge.

Sweden and Switzerland issued a joint statement in which they stipulated that they abstained from the vote on the draft resolution because: “the resolution mixes international law and ethical principles in the way it does. It is important to protect international law, as a system of legally-binding rules and not merely as imperatives of morality. Otherwise this system risks being undermined.”

5. Accelerating Nuclear Disarmament Commitments

A. L.35 entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”(Voting Results as a whole: 141-24-20, OP14: 167-5-5; Decision: Adopted and operative paragraph retained)

The New Agenda Coalition introduced L.35 entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments.” The NAC explained that, “the draft resolution welcomes the Open-Ended Working Group established pursuant to UNGA resolution 70/33 of 11 December 2015 entitled ‘Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations’ as well as the report submitted on its work pursuant to this resolution. The draft resolution recalls the reaffirmation of the continued validity of the practical steps agreed to in the Final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, including the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States
parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty.” The resolution also “calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfill their commitment to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, regional and multilateral measures in a verifiable and transparent manner. It also calls upon “the nuclear-weapon States to fulfill their commitment to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, regional and multilateral measures in a verifiable and transparent manner.”

Significantly, a vote was called for on OP.14, which “calls upon all States parties to spare no effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this regard urges India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions, and to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” 167 states voted in favor of the resolution, 5 states voted against it, and 5 states abstained. Thus, Op.14 was retained.

B. Responses

Australia criticized the resolution because it does not support the outcome of the OEWG. In particular, “the reference in the agreed recommendations section of the report of the commencement of negotiations of a Prohibition Treaty in 2017 was problematic. However, it strongly supports a range of legally-binding and non-legally binding effective measures for progressing nuclear disarmament. This includes progressing a FMCT and striving for the entry in force of the CTBT. There are a number of other practical legal and non-legal effective measures discussed at the OEWG that we consider ready for advancing, including on nuclear disarmament verification.

Pakistan was “dismayed by the ritualistic and unrealistic assertion in OP.14 that calls upon Pakistan to accede to NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. As a non-party to the NPT, we cannot be expected to subscribe to the conclusions and decisions of this Treaty. Therefore, it abstained on the draft resolution, as a whole, while voting against OP.14.”

6. United Action with Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Voting Result as a whole: as a whole: 167-4-17, voting result on OP. 5: 176-3-4, voting result on Op. 20: 169-4-7, and voting result on Op. 27: 173-0-9: Decision: Adopted and aforementioned operative paragraphs were retained)

A. L.26 entitled “United Action with Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Japan introduced L.26 entitled “United Action with Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.” This draft resolution provides practical and concrete measures acceptable for most Member States, and this aims at providing the common denominator or a standard on a wide-range of issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Notably, states requested votes on OP.5, OP.20, and OP.27. OP.5 “calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions to achieve its universality and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and to take practical steps in support of the Treaty.” 176 states voted in favor of the resolution, 3 states voted against it, and 4 states abstained on the resolution. OP.20 urges states to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. 169 states voted for it, 4 states voted against it, and 7 states abstained on it. Finally, OP.27 stresses the fundamental role of the IAEA’s safeguards and encourages all states to conclude and bring into force the Additional Protocol. 173 states voted for it, zero states voted against it, and 9 states abstained on the resolution.

B. Responses

Egypt abstained from voting on the draft resolution, as a whole, and it abstained on OP.27. It voted yes on OP.5 and OP.20. Egypt argued that the Additional Protocol is voluntary. Egypt further discussed its concerns about OP.17, which “urges all States possessing nuclear weapons to continue to undertake all efforts necessary to comprehensively address the risks of unintended nuclear detonations.” Egypt contended that the international community should not provide any legitimacy to nuclear possessing states, which are not signatories to the NPT.

Ecuador abstained because the draft resolution failed to include any references to the humanitarian pledge, which has been signed by 127 states. Additionally, the draft resolution contains references to processes beyond the UN, such as the Nuclear Security Summit meetings that were not inclusive. Yet, the draft resolution did not make references to the
OEWG, a body that was inclusive and established by the UNGA First Committee at its previous session. It wishes that the resolution will be modified in the next session of the First Committee

Pakistan voted no on Op.20 and abstained on the draft resolution. It cannot be bound by these decisions in a forum where Pakistan is not present. It also cannot support any references to the NPT. It further felt that the draft resolution only addressed the proliferation of fissile materials.

7. CTBT

A. L.28 entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” (Voting Result as a whole: 183-1-4 Voting Result on PP.4: 172-0-11, and Voting Result on PP.7: 177-0-6; Decisions: Adopted and preambular paragraphs were retained)

PP.4 stresses “the vital importance and urgency of achieving the entry into force of the Treaty, as also expressed by the Security Council in its resolution 2310 (2016) of 23 September 2016, and affirming its resolute determination, 20 years after the Treaty was opened for signature, to achieve its entry into force.” 172 states voted for it, zero states voted against it, and 11 states abstained on it.

PP.7 “recalls also the adoption by consensus of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which the Conference, inter alia, reaffirmed the vital importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and included specific actions to be taken in support of the entry into force of the Treaty.” 177 states voted for it, zero states against it, and 6 abstained from it.

B. Responses

Iran voted in favor of the resolution, as a whole, but it abstained on PP.4, but voted yes on PP.7. It felt that the UNGA needs to assess the CTBT and expressed concerns that NWS modernization programmes have been undermining the CTBT. It also expressed regret that the resolution did not call upon NWS to abstain from their nuclear weapons programs. However, it abstained from PP.4. It contended that the UNGA must express its views independently from other bodies, such as the UNSC. Thus, there is no need for the resolution to refer to the work of other organs.

Brazil voted for the draft resolution, as a whole, but it abstained on PP.4. It voted for PP.7 but felt that the resolution lacked any ambition and failed to reflect any agreed language from the final declarations of Article 14 Conferences from 2013 and 2015. Brazil felt that the draft resolution failed to address any concerns about the NWS’ modernization policies of their nuclear weapons, which constitute the greatest collective threat to the CTBT. Finally, it abstained on PP.4, due to its reference to UNSC Resolution 2310. Guatemala and Ecuador had similar concerns.

8. The Hague Code of Conduct

A. L.5: “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” (166-1-19; Decision: Adopted)

There were also substantive views on L.5 entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.”

B. Responses

Iran was the sole state to vote against the draft resolution. It specified that the HCOC is restrictive and drafted and adopted outside of the parameters of the UN. Moreover, it cannot accede to the HCOC because it is under constant threat from Israel. Therefore, it needs a strong and robust security program in order to adequately respond to any possible Israeli strike.

Syria abstained from the vote on the draft resolution. As part of its explanation of vote, Syria expressed concerns that the Code of Conduct is selective and discriminatory. It further felt that the code undermines the disarmament machinery because it is outside the auspices of the UN. It further expressed concerns that the text does not guarantee that the NWS would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against the NNWS. Essentially, the text does not contain any references to negative security assurances. Finally, it expressed concern that the text did not contain any references about Israel’s WMD and its ballistic missile program.
9. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

A. L.10 entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (128-50-8; Decision: Adopted)

India presented L.10 entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” India expressed its surprise that some states, which are champions of the humanitarian discourse and leading co-sponsors of L.23 entitled “Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons,” have voted against the resolution. India does not understand why they would vote against a resolution that would narrow the credibility gap.

B. Responses

Pakistan, along with a vast majority of states that constitute the NAM, was of the view that the subject of nuclear weapons needs to be tackled through a comprehensive approach, i.e. through the urgent commencement of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

Cluster 2. Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

Discussions from Cluster 1 and Cluster 2: WMDFZ in the Middle East

A. Arab and Middle Eastern States’ Views

During the thematic debates on nuclear weapons and other WMDs, the Arab Group, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon and Sudan voiced their concerns over the lack of implementation of the WMDFZ in the Middle East. Notably, Egypt asserted that both the Arab Group and Egypt actively engaged in all relevant proceedings, including the meetings in Vienna, Glion and Geneva in 2013 and 2014. Unfortunately, the positive Arab interactions “were faced with unjustified exercise of veto power to block the procedures as well as substantive negotiations, in the absence of a clear role by the UN and in contradiction of the 2010 NPT mandate.”

Additionally, Egypt underscored that the ultimate way forward is “highlighted in the working paper adopted by the NAM at the 2015 NPT Review Conference.” The paper called for the following:

The Review Conference to assign the Secretary-General of the United Nations to invite all States of the Middle East to convene a Conference aimed at the establishment of the Zone. The Conference is meant launch a political and technical process to negotiate a regional Treaty, according to which the zone free from nuclear weapons & all other weapons of mass destruction will be established

B. Actions on this topic: Resolution L. 1: entitled Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. 2 Rev.1 entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”

1. Resolution L.1: entitled Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (Decision: Adopted without a vote)

While introducing L.1, Egypt further mentioned that “the convening the Middle East Conference, based on a consensus principle, is considered an opportunity – perhaps the last – to regain the credibility of the NPT and the entire disarmament regime. This is precisely the way forward for Egypt.”

i. Response

Israel mentioned the following: “L.1 is a consensual resolution. In the past, the practice of the authors of this resolution was to share the draft resolution with Israel prior to its submission to the committee in order to facilitate agreement amongst regional parties. It is unfortunate that this practice ceased many years ago. It raises the question- how can a
complex security architecture in the region be agreed upon, when even fundamentally consensual resolutions cannot be coordinated.” Israel also said, “the Middle East is sorely lacking in mechanisms that could foster dialogue and enhance greater understanding between regional parties. Currently, there are no processes in the region that could contribute to the building of confidence, de-escalation of tensions and conflict resolution as a whole. There's no forum in which direct communication between regional States can address core security issues and encourage the attainment of solutions in a cooperative and forthcoming manner.”

2. L.2 “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (Voting result as a whole: 147-6-21, Voting result on PP. 5: 165-2-2, and Voting result on PP. 6: 163-2-2; Decisions: Adopted and PPs were retained)

The Arab Group presented draft resolution L.2 entitled “the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.” As part of its statement, the group contended that it has been submitting this annual resolution to the First Committee for decades, and it has now become part of the literature of the First Committee. It is embedded to the First Committee. Additionally, the Arab Group reiterated that the WMDFZ in the Middle East is the fourth tenet of the NPT regime. Furthermore, the group underscored the importance of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 Action Plan. The group expressed its regret about the postponement of the 2012 Conference. Also, it criticized the fact that one single state (Israel) surprised the international community and resorted to making an illegal and arbitrary decision, which caused the co-conveners to postpone the 2012 Conference. Additionally, the group expressed its regret that the parties at the 2015 NPT Conference could not unanimously support an innovative path to breaking the deadlock. Finally, it reiterated the need for states to uphold their commitments to the 1995 Resolution.

Notably, States requested votes on PP.5 and PP.6. Regarding PP.5, it “recalls the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” 165 States voted in favor of it, 2 States voted against it, and states abstained from the vote on the paragraph. In terms of PP.6, it noted that “recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty, called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty.” 163 States voted for it, 2 States voted against it, and 2 States abstained from the vote on the preambular paragraph.

i. Responses

A. Arab and Middle Eastern States’ Views

Drawing upon its previous comments about the significance of convening a conference on the WMDFZ in the Middle East, Egypt attached great importance to this resolution.

Concerning L.2, Israel contended that the draft resolution diverts attention away from challenges in the proliferation of WMDs. Moreover, it argued that the primary sponsors of the resolution failed to comment about Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya’s violations of the NPT regime. Israel contended that the aforementioned states engaged in clandestine nuclear activities. Moreover, the text overlooked Iran’s ballistic missile tests, which undermine the prospects of the WMDFZ in the Middle East. Furthermore, Israel contended that the text fails to address the territorial lands, which are occupied by non-state terrorist groups and does not address Syria’s chemical weapons. Israel also expressed its dismay that the sponsors failed to mention the five rounds of consultations with H.E. Ambassador Laajava from 2013 to 2014. Thus, Israel called upon states to reject the resolution, and it urged regional states to engage in constructive and direct dialogue with Israel.
B. European States’ Views

During the explanation of vote on L.2, the EU discussed that real dialogue between the parties “must be freely arrived at” as contained in the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s Action Plan. It further highlighted the EU seminars in 2011 and 2012 and its capacity building workshop in 2014. The EU stands ready to support the WMDFZ in the Middle East. Moreover, it underscored the need for Iran to comply with the JCPOA and UNSC Resolution 2231 to ensure regional stability, which will be important to help foster dialogue between states. Finally, it argued that Syria must be held accountable for using chemical weapons.

C. Statement from the three Sponsors of the 1995 Resolution

Russia specified that the three co-sponsors recognized that there must be renewed dialogue amongst the regional states. Furthermore, the co-sponsors mentioned that they will continue to study the issues, which prevented the conference from moving forward, and they will encourage the regional states to adopt the same approach. The co-sponsors further acknowledged the League of Arab States’ decision to create a committee to address the establishment of the WMDFZ in the Middle East.

D. US’ Views

The US believed that L.2 does not advance the movement to establishing the WMDFZ in the Middle East because it creates further divisions between regional states. It further contended that constructive dialogue can only occur amongst all of the “relevant states on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at.” Finally, the US contended that the WMDFZ in the Middle East is an ambitious goal, but it is achievable goal, once the necessary conditions are in place.

General Overview on the Syrian Chemical Attacks

Throughout the First Committee, States condemned the use of chemical weapons and called for the perpetrators to be held accountable for their egregious crimes.

A. European States’ Views

The European Union condemned the recent Syrian chemical attacks. It mentioned that, “while the EU welcomed the complete destruction of the chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, it found the gaps and discrepancies in its declaration unacceptable and the continued use of chemical weapons in the country deeply shocking and disturbing.” The use of chemical weapons contravenes international law. Moreover, the EU strongly supported the work of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) and the Fact Finding Mission (FFM) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). Finally, the EU underscored the JIM’s third report, which identified “the responsibility of the Syrian Government in at least two cases of chlorine attack incidents and Da'esh in another attack incident involving sulfur mustard gas. This warrants appropriate action as decided by UNSC Resolution 2118.”

The vast majority of European States reaffirmed the JIM’s assessments. Significantly, the UK declared that Syria “violated UNSC resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015), as well as Syria's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).”

The UK further urged the international community to take immediate action. It warned that, “unless the international community responds robustly, we are likely to see the retention of these capabilities and the continued use of toxic chemicals as weapons.”

Switzerland and Ireland contended that the UNSC must refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in order for the international community to prosecute the perpetrators.

i. Overview

In this cluster, Poland introduced the draft resolution entitled the “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.” Poland underscored that the resolution was accurate and factually based reflection of the current state of implementation of the CWC and the result of an open and transparent consultative process. Poland urged states to not ignore the recent situation in Syria. Poland further proclaimed that Syria undermined the fundamental international norm against the use of chemical weapons, which is the bedrock of the convention. Consequently, Poland concluded that, “it’s the absolute responsibility of the UN community today in a situation when the use of a chemical weapons became a reality again, to renew and sustain commitments towards this goal. In other words, to demonstrate its leadership and resolve on the path to a world free of chemical weapons.”

The draft resolution contains significant revisions as compared to the 2015 resolution. For example, PP.3, PP.4, and PP.5 on universality, welcoming progress on Syrian chemical weapons destruction, and the cooperation between Syria and the UN-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Joint Investigatory Mechanism (JIM), respectively, have been deleted. PP.6 was amended and became PP.3. The PP.3 reflects and commends the JIM’s mission. PP.4 is a new and controversial paragraph, which contains references to the JIM’s mandate as described in UNSC 2235 (2015). PP.7 and PP.8 from the 2015 resolution were changed. Specifically, PP.8’s references on condemning any use of chemical weapons and calling the international community to hold perpetrators accountable became OP.1 in the 2016 draft text. Significantly, a new OP.2 has specific references to the JIM’s conclusions in which the JIM concluded that Syria used chemical weapons. It also calls for all perpetrators to “immediately desist” from any further use.

OP.13 is an updated version of OP.10 of the 2015 resolution. It contains references to the decision of the OPCW Executive Council, regarding the report of the Director-General. It directly refers to “the gaps, inconsistence and discrepancies that remains” with Syria’s chemical weapons and production facilities. The new OP.9 welcomes the OPCW’s Executive Council’s decisions about the destruction of Libya’s remaining chemical weapons stockpiles. Finally, the revised L.61/Rev.1 amended OP.2 to include a reference about the fourth JIM report about Syria’s decision to use chemical weapons in Omenans on 16 March 2015.

ii. Responses

Algeria, Belarus, Cuba, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, the Russian Federation, Sudan, Syria and Venezuela expressed their disappointment about the “politicized” language of the draft resolution. Notably, Belarus contended that the resolution has been diverted from its original intent, which has historically addressed the technical implementation of the Convention. Iran argued that the 2016 resolution is an instrument for certain states to blame Syria.

Several states, including China and Pakistan, stipulated that the lead sponsor ignored Syria’s progress in dismantling its stockpiles and complying with the UN and OPCW. As a result, the text does not provide a balanced perspective about the situation. Additionally, Iran, Nigeria, Russia and Syria disputed the findings of the JIM. They asserted that the JIM’s findings are “inconclusive and unconvincing” and based on “far-fetched assumptions.”

Cuba, South Africa and Venezuela also argued that the UNGA is not an appropriate venue to discuss the JIM’s findings. China, India and South Africa cautioned that the UNGA should not prematurely support the language contained in the JIM’s findings because the UNSC is still reviewing the investigations.

Algeria, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Venezuela lamented the loss of previously long-standing consensus on CWC resolutions. They requested Poland to reconsider its position when formulating subsequent resolutions.

Syria adamantly rejected the JIM’s findings. It stipulated that there is no credible proof that Syria used chlorine gas. Moreover, it asserted that, “no medical reports have proven that chlorine gas inhalation has caused any fatalities.”

On behalf of 39 states, the US praised the draft resolution. According to this group, the resolution reflected the current reality and maintained the legitimacy of including language on the JIM findings. The US also praised both the OPCW
Declaration Assessment Team and the JIM, and it also strongly supported the notion of extending the JIM’s mandate. The group also asserted that there is “no greater challenge to the CWC than a state party that violates its obligations under the Convention. The group specified that that Syria’s “repeated use and inadequate declarations” constitute such violations. The group also called upon states to “squarely confront the reality before us and hold Syria and the so-called ISIL accountable for their use of chemical weapons.” They further recalled the CWC’s preamble, which stipulates that “States must “determine for the sake of all mankind to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons” They underscored that the Syrian situation is a test of the goal. France and Israel aligned themselves with the US joint statement.

Both France and Israel emphasized the fact-based and impartiality of the JIM findings. France also demanded States to refrain “from accepting violations of the universal norm on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.”

After the First Committee voted on the resolution, Syria issued its right of reply in which it accused the US of supplying chemical materials to non-state actors and providing assistance to terrorist groups. In response, the US denied the charge and accused Syria of attempting to divert attention away from its activities.

**Cluster 3. Outer Space**

**A. Arab and Middle Eastern States’ Views**

Speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, Tunisia underscored the importance of maintaining outer space as an area free from conflict. It underscored the need to prevent an armed race in outer space.

Algeria further argued that the international community must engage in discussions about PAROS within the CD. It further welcomed the PPWT. It also “underscored that voluntary measures are beneficial, but they cannot be utilized as an alternative to legally binding measures.”

**B. Russia and China’s Views on Outer Space**

Russia underscored its joint work with China on outer space. Specifically, it discussed the significance of the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) as contained in CD/1985, which was submitted in June 2014. The PPWT contains relevant definitions and lays the foundations to create the necessary conditions for PAROS to be achieved. China endorsed Russia’s views and mentioned that there is a need to engage in multilateral negotiations on TCBMs in order to eliminate any discrepancies amongst states on compliance with the PPWT.

**C. Actions in this Cluster:** L.3 entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” L.18 entitled Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” and L.19 entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures on outer space activities.”

1. **L.3 entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”** (Voting Result: 178-0-4; Decision: Adopted)

   The draft resolution L.3 entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (PAROS) invited the CD to create a working group on the topic. 178 supported it and four states (Israel, Palau, South Sudan, and the US) abstained on the resolution.

2. **L.18 entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”** (Voting Result: 126-4-49; Decision: Adopted)

   During its presentation on L.18, Russia provided a passionate argument about the importance of PPWT, as the only viable option for states to support. It further highlighted the importance of the No First Placement Pledge (NFP). It informed states that more than 14 states have already endorsed the pledge. The NFP is a political obligation that would help ensure that states do not weaponize space. Hence, it is a critical tool towards the PAROS movement. Russia expressed serious concerns about the EU, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Austria and New Zealand’s annual decisions to not support Russia’s annual resolution on NFP. Russia asked states what was the basis for them to not support the annual resolution. It simply does not understand why these states, which proclaim to be advocates of PAROS, would block any attempt from
making progress on PAROS, especially when they cannot provide any tangible alternatives. Russia adamantly inquired whether these states are afraid or ashamed for their actions. In this context, Russia argued that the actions of these states contradict what we do here in the First Committee and contravenes the UN Charter. Finally, Russia made a passionate assertion that the NFP and PPWT represent the highest form of transparency and mutual trust. The PPWT could become the most important legal instrument towards the establishment of PAROS.

Response to L.18

A. European States’ Views

The European Union explained L.18 does not adequately address the second or third placement of weapons in outer space. It is ambiguous on whether states would simply engage in an armed race, and then wait to place their own weapons in space, after an initial state deploys its own weapons into outer space. Furthermore, the resolution and NFP do not provide any type of definition about an outer space weapon. This means that that satellites, which are capable of orbital maneuvers, could become weapons. Moreover, both L.18 and NFP fail to take into account the problems of terrestrial-based weapons in deploying offensive attacks against others in outer space. The EU further contended that the PPWT does not represent the substantive work in the CD on PAROS.

B. US’s Response

Significantly, the US criticized the Russia’s initiative for states to support the NFP. The US believed that the “NFP initiative's proponents have failed to adequately explain how it would enhance stability in space when it is silent regarding the most pressing threat to outer space systems: terrestrially based anti-satellite weapons.”

3. L.19 entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures on outer space activities” (Decision: Adopted without a vote)

Russia, China and the US introduced L.19 entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures on outer space activities.” The resolution addresses the implementation of the proposed measures in the 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts. It was adopted by consensus.

Cluster 4. Conventional Weapons

A. Cross-Regional Support on the CCM

Burkina Faso, Canada, Ecuador, Fiji and Sweden encouraged all states to join the CCM, joining the 15 states that had made a similar call in previous weeks. Sweden argued that, “for the ban to become truly effective, it is important that also the […] manufacturers and users of cluster munitions join the Convention.” Cuba, Ecuador and Sweden expressed deep concern about or condemned the use of cluster munitions and Cuba said the use of the weapon was incompatible with international humanitarian law (IHL). The Holy See and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) delivered similar remarks, while 14 additional states condemned the use of cluster munitions and the European Union called on conflict actors to respect IHL.


i. Overview

In terms of L.22, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 134 States voted in favor, a small decrease from last year’s 139 supporters at the General Assembly, which can be attributed to the absence of some states during the voting session. 2 states voted against it and 40 states abstained from voting on the draft resolution. The draft resolution includes technical updates to last year’s text, and urges states to address issues arising from recently implemented UN accounting practices. The draft resolution contains a new reference to the goal of full implementation of the convention by 2030, which was adopted by the states parties at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties.
Both Algeria and Kazakhstan, which abstained last year, voted in favor of the draft resolution this year. Jordan and Rwanda, which both voted in favor of the draft resolution, abstained this year. 30 states that are not parties to the convention supported the draft resolution, which indicates their resolve to end the inhumane effects caused by cluster munitions.

Rwanda was the only state party to abstain on the draft resolution. Both Cyprus and Uganda were the only signatories to also abstain on the resolution. On behalf of a number of abstaining states, Poland stated that, while the group supports the humanitarian goal of the convention, they contend that cluster munitions are important for defense. The Republic of Korea had a similar view.

Additionally, other States, which abstained on the draft resolution, felt that the CCM does not give appropriate weight to the security needs of States. Cluster munitions are, according to these states, better suited to discussion in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Both Brazil and Pakistan contended that the multilateral framework of the Convention on Certain Convention remains the appropriate form to discuss the issue of cluster munitions.

The United States expressed the view that the draft resolution was only applicable to the States Parties.

Similar to last year, Russia and Zimbabwe voted no. Both Russia and Zimbabwe did not explain their votes.

SALW

A. Cross Regional Perspectives on SALW

France delivered a substantive statement on behalf of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay and France.

The cross-regional group recognized that the largest challenge to SALW is “multifaceted and requires action on, inter alia, illicit transfers, destabilizing accumulation, physical security and management of stockpiles, illicit reactivation, marking and tracing, trade regulation and licensing, border control, as well as conflict prevention and resolution.”

The group also stated that the international community must fight against the spread of SALW to terrorist groups. The group committed itself to identifying means to further intensify and accelerate international cooperation in this area.” Finally, the group explained that states have “the primary responsibility for preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. To this end, the group underlined the necessity to intensify efforts to define the origins of such illicit trade and find ways of addressing them.”

B. Arab and Middle East States’ views

In terms of SALW, Morocco welcomed the upcoming presidency of France to the UN Programme of Action (UN POA) on SALW’s next review conference. Morocco further mentioned that, based on concerns about transnational non-state actor’s illicit activities, especially in the Sahel, it underscored the importance for states to support the UN POA and the international tracing instrument. Additionally, Morocco informed stated that it hosted the inaugural conference of the joint United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) – Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Border Security Initiative (BSI) in El Jadida, Morocco.

Algeria reiterated its strong support for the UN POA and specified the following:
As stated in the UN POA, sub-regional, regional and international cooperation, and assistance are essential to ensure effective borders control and therefore to achieve the eradication of the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this respect, Algeria remains strongly engaged in favor of all forms of assistance and cooperation initiatives undertaken at regional level. Within this framework, Algeria engaged further with the Sahel countries in security cooperation measures as well as through technical assistance programs, including training of the security personnel and customs services in order to allow these countries to develop their technical and operational capacities in the field.

C. Actions on this Topic: Resolutions L.32 entitled “Assistance to the States for Curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and lights weapons and collecting them,” L.37 entitled Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and L.46 entitled “Relationship between disarmament and development” were approved.

1. L.32 entitled “Assistance to the States for Curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and lights weapons and collecting them” (Decision: Adopted without a vote;)

Mali, on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), introduced draft resolution L.32 entitled “Assistance to the States for Curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and lights weapons and collecting them,” remain largely unchanged from the 2015 resolution. The 2016 resolution calls upon the international community to provide technical and financial support to strengthen action to combat the illicit trade in SALW. The resolution also encourages cooperation amongst the states organs, organizations and civil society. It further invites states and organizations to help provide additional assistance to other states to stymie the illicit flow of SALW.

2. L.37 entitled “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control (Decision: Adopted without a vote; Voting Result on PP. 10: 145-0-34;)

Trinidad and Togo introduced L.37 entitled “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.” The resolution contains a new provision to encourage States to “seriously consider” increasing funding for policies and programs that address the difference impacts of illicit small arms and light weapons on women, men, girls and boys.

A separate vote was held on preambular paragraph 10 (PP.10) of draft resolution L.37, which specifically recalls the ATT and the implementation of export risk assessments on gender-based violence. PP.10 was retained with a vote of 146 States in favor, zero States against, and 24 States abstained from the vote.

In its explanation of vote, Cuba stated that it supported the draft resolution but is concerned at the imbalance of focus, with too much stress placed on a certain type of weapon (small arms and light weapons). India, Fiji, and Venezuela explained their abstentions from the vote on PP10, with the stance that since they have not yet signed or ratified the ATT, they could not vote in favor.

Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty is supposed to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons and help alleviate concerns amongst states on SALW. Thus, due to its prominence and relatively new inclusion in the disarmament machinery, 44 states and regional groups discussed the ATT in the thematic debate.

A. Non-Aligned Movement’s Views

Regarding the Arms Trade Treaty, the Non-Aligned Movement discussed that the ATT, which aims to regulate SALW, entered into force on 24 December 2014. Additionally, the NAM called for its “balanced, transparent and objective implementation, in strict accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, and the inherent right of each State to security and to individual or collective self-defense.” The NAM further highlighted that the implementation of the ATT “should not infringe upon the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms and their parts and components for their self-defense and security needs.”

B. Arab and Middle Eastern States’ Views
Egypt informed states that it would abstain on L.29 entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty” because it does not consider the ATT to be either universal or inclusive.

Iran raised concerns about the transfer of arms to states parties that are continuously violating international humanitarian law and exacerbating the crisis in Yemen. Thus, in this context, Iran mentioned that, during the negotiations of the ATT, “Iran had been insisting on the inclusion in the Treaty of prohibiting the export of arms to aggressors and foreign occupiers. It was however rejected by certain States, which claimed to be responsible arms exporters, and now are making the largest ever arms deals with those who disregard international humanitarian law and are engaged in shedding the blood of innocent Yemeni children.” Syria expressed similar concerns that the ATT fails to take into account the illegal occupation of foreign territories by other states.

C. African States’ Views

Several African states, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Guinea and Senegal, which have been affected by the illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition, conveyed their desires that the ATT will curb the proliferation of SALW.

D. European States’ Views

Ireland was pleased with the outcome of the Second Conference of States parties to the ATT. The Czech Republic shared similar sentiments. Switzerland and France underscored their strong support for the ATT.

Finland, as the president of ATT, emphasized its strong views about the ATT. In particular, Finland described that the ATT includes “the concept of serious acts of gender based violence, as well as human rights and the respect of humanitarian law, as factors to be taken into account when making export assessments.” It also stressed that it will focus its work on the implementation of the ATT and encouraging additional states to ratify the ATT. Ukraine, and Italy expressed their support for the ATT.

Spain and Sweden expressed their strong support for the treaty. Norway emphasized that ATT was “designed to provide norms for responsible trade in conventional arms, but the ATT does much more. If applied to its highest potential, the ATT could contribute substantially to global security and stability.”

Turkey explained that, together with UN Security Council Resolution 2117 (2013), the ATT could reinforce the UNPoA.

Italy further highlighted the importance of the gender-based violence (GBV) provision in protecting vulnerable groups from armed violence.

E. Southeast Asian, Oceanic and Pacific Islands States’ Views

Bangladesh mentioned that it remains the only regional signatory state to the ATT. Malaysia emphasized the importance of the ATT. New Zealand reminded states that it has been one of the strongest proponents of the ATT.

F. Latin American and Caribbean States’ Views

Costa Rica raised its concerns that the ATT does not address the illicit transfer of arms to terrorist groups in North Africa and Middle East. Additionally, Ecuador believed that the ATT contains several flaws on import and exports of arms, and it fails to contain explicit text about the transfer of arms to terrorist groups.

G. Canada’s Views

Canada informed the international community that its government is “working on ensuring domestic compliance with all articles of the ATT and the government hopes to join the treaty within one year.”

H. Opposition to the ATT
Russia argued that the treaty is weak. Further, Russia asserted that its export regulations are significantly stronger than the provisions contained in the ATT.


1. **L.37**

As noted previously, Trinidad and Togo introduced L.37. CARICOM welcomed preambular paragraph (PP) 10, which contains references to the ATT and provisions on gender-based violence and violence against children. This draft resolution was adopted by consensus after a specific paragraph vote on PP.10 (which recalled the entry into force of the ATT) and which was retained with 146 votes in favor, no votes against, and 24 abstentions.


Finland, Mexico and Nigeria introduced L.29 entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty.” Indonesia, Egypt, Armenia, Iran and Cuba expressed their abstentions to the draft resolution.

As noted earlier, Egypt abstained on the draft resolution.

Armenia abstained from voting on the draft resolution. It described that the ATT should have been adopted by consensus in an inclusive and effective manner. It further expressed concerns that the current state of the ATT contains legal loopholes.

Iran also abstained from voting on the draft resolution. However, it will continue to welcome the adoption of the ATT, which it views an instrument in which political and commercial interests of states takes precedence. Iran further lambasted the US for continuing its SALW trades with Saudi Arabia. The weapons have been used in attacks against civilians, which violates the Geneva Conventions.

Cuba took the floor and informed states that the ATT was adopted prematurely. As a result, the treaty contained legal gaps and lacked tangible definitions. Moreover, the treaty fails to address the regulation of arms transfers to non-state actors.

There were six additional draft resolutions, which contained references to the Arms Trade Treaty, including:

1. L.9 entitled “Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities,” (Voting result as a whole 179-1-1, Voting result on PP8: 159-1-13; Decision: Adopted and preambular paragraph was retained), The draft resolution recognizes the importance of ATT states parties to regulate brokering taking place in their jurisdiction, in accordance to Article 10 of the Treaty.
3. L.58, “National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology,” (Voting Result as a whole: 174-0-3, Voting result on PP.7: 143-0-7; Decision: Adopted and both preambular and operative paragraphs were retained
4. Resolution L.32 entitled “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them,” (Decision: Adopted without a vote). The draft resolution welcomes the inclusion of SALW within the scope of the ATT.
5. L.25 entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,” (Decision: Adopted without a vote). The draft resolution also welcomes SALW in the context of the treaty.

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6. L.52 entitled “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures,” (Decision: Adopted without a vote). The draft resolution commends the establishment of the VTF and encourages ATT States Parties to financially contribute to it if they are in a position to do so.

Landmines

This topic was pertinent because the 15th Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty will open in Santiago, Chile on 28 November 2016. The majority of states explained their support, progress on mine clearance, assistance to victims, and their destruction of stockpiled mines. States also discussed their intention to achieve the full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty by 2025.

A. The Non-Aligned Movement’s Views

The NAM informed the international community that, “it continues to deplore the use, in contravention of international humanitarian law, of anti-personnel mines in conflict situations aimed at maiming, killing and terrorizing innocent civilians.” NAM called for states to provide the “necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance to landmine clearance operations, the social and economic rehabilitation of victims as well as to ensure full access of affected countries to material equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance.”

B. Arab and Middle Eastern States’ Views

Algeria expressed its frustrations about the harm, which has been caused by anti-personnel landmines. Algeria reaffirmed that it stands fully committed to meeting its 2017 mine clearance deadline. Egypt conveyed its concerns about the remnants of landmines in territories of affected states.

C. European States’ Views

The EU expressed its concerns about the consequences and use of mines other than anti-personnel mines. The Netherlands emphasized that the international community has been making great strides on the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention.

Ireland was gravely concerned about Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) and questioned the limited provisions on MOTAPM in the Amended Protocol II. Ireland and the Czech Republic reaffirmed their strong commitments to the Ottawa Convention. The Czech Republic shared similar concerns about MOTAPM. It also looked forward to the Santiago meeting.

France and the UK proclaimed their strong support for the Ottawa Convention. Additionally Finland announced that it “will support humanitarian mine action during 2016-2020 with 12 million euros in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Ukraine.” Ukraine announced that it is a strong supporter of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Italy informed the First Committee that it has been a strong supporter of the 2014 Maputo Action Plan and 2015 Dubrovnik Action Plan. It has also provided resources to mine action programmes in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Colombia, Gaza, Iraq, Jordan, Somalia and the Syrian Arab People. Austria expressed its grave concerns about the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines.

D. Southeast Asian, Oceanic, and Pacific Islands States’ Views

Regarding landmines, ASEAN informed the First Committee that it is looking forward to the upcoming 15th Meeting of the State Parties to the Mine Ban Convention to be held in Santiago, Chile from 28 November to 2 December 2016. Additionally, it underscored the inaugural meeting of the Steering Committee of the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC) at its Headquarter in Phnom Penh on 21 September 2016. Cambodia further praised the Centre. Cambodia expressed its concerns about the mines, which are still located on its soil.

Bangladesh was the first South Asian state to join the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. In addition, Bangladesh informed its colleagues that it is looking forward to the “the 15th Meeting of State Parties of the Ottawa Convention later this year to review progress with implementing the Cartagena Action Plan.”
Singapore underscored its concerns about the indiscriminate effects of anti-personnel mines. New Zealand attached great importance to the Ottawa Convention and the 2025 target set in the Maputo Declaration.

Australia expressed its support for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

E. Latin American and Caribbean States’ Views

Mexico informed the international community that it shares the principles set forth in the Ottawa Convention. As the host state for the 15MSP, Chile elaborated upon the upcoming conference in Santiago.

F. US’ Views

The US stated that, since 1993, it “has provided more than 2.5 billion dollars to more than 96 countries for conventional weapons destruction, including the cleared of landmines and unexploded ordnance, disposal of excess SALW and munitions and improved security for conventional weapons storage.”

G. Opposition to Concerns on Landmines

Russia was the only state that expressed its interest in maintaining and using its anti-personnel mines as tools to defend itself from other actors.

H. Action on this topic: Resolution L.7 Rev.1 entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” (Voting Result as a whole: 161-0-16; Decision: Adopted)

i. L.7 Rev.1 entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”

Chile introduced L.7 Rev.1 entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” 35 states remain outside of the Mine Ban Treaty. However, half of them (17) supported the draft resolution. Cuba, Egypt, India, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, and the United States explained their abstentions to the draft resolution. The draft resolution addressed technical updates to last year’s text. It also contains a new call on States to address issues arising from recently implemented UN accounting practices.

ii. Responses

Libya acknowledged the humanitarian and environmental impact of anti-personnel mines. Singapore reiterated its aforementioned statement.

Explosive Weapons in Populated Area

A. Cross-Regional Perspectives

On 4 October 2016, Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Mozambique met with 20 states on the margins of the First Committee to discuss possible elements of an international political declaration.

B. European States’ Views

Austria announced that it would soon start work to develop an international political declaration to prevent civilian harm from the use of EWIPA. Austria highlighted its international expert meeting, which it hosted in Vienna in 2015. The event included 20 states and addressed “the importance of awareness-raising on the basis of continuing collection and dissemination of data as well as the sharing and promotion of states’ good practices in using explosive weapons.” Austria announced that it intends “to issue an international political declaration to prevent civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.”
Austria informed states that the UN Secretary-General has recommended for all states to engage constructively on developing an international political declaration.

The Holy See issued a strong statement to members of the First Committee. The Holy See mentioned that an “increasingly more powerful and sophisticated conventional weapons are devastating entire communities, hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure” and said that this “must now be treated with the same condemnation we attach to weapons of mass destruction.”

San Marino underscored the suffering, displacement and death of civilians from both state and non-states’ actions to use explosive weapons in populated areas. Additionally, Austria stated that the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is “a major cause of civilian harm in many countries” and a “humanitarian problem of extreme gravity.” Moreover, it expressed its regret that many people are desperate to find shelter abroad precisely because of the violence and the use of explosive weapons in their countries of origin and the lack of breakdown of protection for civilian populations.”

Ireland stated that it views the use of explosive weapons in populated areas as “one of the most serious challenges facing us with regard to conventional weapons questions at this time.” Ireland said it “welcome[d] the attention being given to this question.” The Netherlands expressed support for the discussions on the adverse impact of the use of explosive weapons and contended that these discussions should “focus on concrete and practical measures in order to limit casualties and damage.” The United Kingdom expressed similar views.

C. Southeast Asian, Oceanic and Pacific Islands States’ Views

New Zealand expressed its strong support for the international community to develop a meaningful and effective political declaration that would be “part of an international effort to address the immediate and long-term harm being caused to civilians by the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated areas.”

D. UN Agency’s Views

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reminded States that the UN Secretary-General has repeatedly raised concerns over the use of EWIPA since 2009, and has called on States to “engage constructively in continuing efforts to develop a political declaration to address the issue, and to refrain from the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas.”

E. Action on this Topic: L.68 Rev.1 entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices” (Decision: Adopted without a vote)

Resolution L.68 Rev1. entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices” was adopted without a vote. The draft resolution expresses “grave concern over the devastation caused by the increasing use” of IEDs “by illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients.” The draft resolution encourages states to undertake a range of measures to prevent the use of and mitigate the effects of IEDs.

In a joint statement, Ireland and New Zealand, noted that they are concerned about these weapons’ indiscriminate effects, and that “an approach whereby emphasis is placed on one or more categories of users, as opposed to the actual weapon, does not in our view accurately address the problem.”

Iran affirmed that it strongly supports measures to counter the threat posed by the use of IEDs by illegal armed groups and terrorists. They further contended that the prevention of and combating the use of IEDs by terrorists and illegal armed groups is the exclusive purpose of this draft resolution.

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)

A. Cross-Regional Views

Egypt discussed that the international community and agencies must address the threats posed by these weapons. The international community must address the legal, ethical and humanitarian dimensions of LAWS to order to regulate them.
The Czech Republic further contended that the states parties to the CCW should discuss LAWS. Croatia discussed its concerns about LAWS and their potential impact on human rights and compliance with international human rights law. Switzerland, France, Finland, Italy and Ireland expressed views. Additionally, Bangladesh conveyed the importance of LAWS.

B. Upcoming Year

In the upcoming year, one will have to pay close attention to the political “Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” The US, with the support of 48 other states, issued the declaration. The Netherlands noted that there will be a meeting about this declaration.


The draft resolution requires the international community to implement the recommendations of the GGE on the UN Register on Conventional Arms. In its 2016 Report, the GGE issued a recommendation that “unmanned combat aerial vehicles” should be included in the categories of reporting for the Register.

States requested votes on PP.4, PP.7, PP.8, OP.3, OP.4, OP.6C, and OP.7. PP.4 “welcomes also the consolidated reports of the Secretary-General on the Register, which include the returns of Member States for 2012, 2013 and 2014.” 145 States voted for it, none voted against it, and 27 States abstained from voting on it. PP.7 “welcomes also the adoption by the General Assembly and the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty on 2 April 2013 and 24 December 2014, respectively, and noting that the Treaty remains open for accession by any State that has not signed it.” 132 States voted in favor of it, zero States voted against it, and 34 States abstained from voting on the draft resolution. PP.8 welcomes “the adoption by the General Assembly and the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty on 2 April 2013 and 24 December 2014, respectively, and noting that the Treaty remains open for accession by any State that has not signed it.” 132 States voted for it, zero States voted against it, and 34 States abstained from voting on the draft resolution. OP.3 “decides to adapt the scope of the Register in conformity with the recommendations contained in the 2016 report of the Secretary-General.” 139 states voted for it, none voted against it, and 27 states abstained from voting on it. OP.4 “calls upon Member States, with a view to achieving universal participation, to provide the Secretary-General, by 31 May annually, with the requested data and information for the Register.” 141 states voted for it, none voted against it, and 26 states abstained from voting on the draft resolution. OP.6C “requests the Secretary-General to continue to assist Member States to build capacity to submit meaningful reports, and encourages States in a position to do so to provide assistance for this purpose upon request, including capacity to report on small arms and light weapons using the seven plus one formula, inter alia, by circulating to Member States the reporting forms, category descriptions and guidance on using the online reporting tool.” 147 States voted for it, zero voted against it, and 21 States abstained from voting on it. OP.7 “requests the Secretary-General to implement the recommendations contained in his 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016 reports on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register.” 141 States voted for it, none voted against it, and 24 States abstained from voting on the draft resolution.

Depleted Uranium (DU)

A. Cross-Regional Perspectives
In terms of depleted uranium, Belgium offered to provide assistance to states that wish to develop their own precautionary domestic legislation banning DU was welcomed. Japan observed that the views of civil society should be taken more fully into account.

B. Action on this Topic: L.63 entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium” (146-4-26)

Indonesia introduced resolution L.63 entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.” Significantly, the UK, US, France and Israel opposed the draft resolution.
C. Responses

The P3 maintain stocks of the weapons. Additionally, as recently, as last November, the US used weapons in Syria. Additionally, during its explanation of the vote, the P3 issued a joint statement in which they contended that “no studies have detected health effects, which can be attributed to depleted uranium.” Israel, representing the fourth no, was one of the first states to seek DU weapons, but it maintains an ambiguous posture over the question of use.

Notably, Germany a country that the supported DU-related resolutions until 2014, raised concerns and criticized the draft resolution. Germany has guidelines to provide protection for its own troops from DU exposure. However, in the First Committee, Germany questioned the WHO’s findings on depleted uranium. Germany strongly objected to preambular paragraph 7 and described it as “cherry-picking.”

Sweden and Switzerland voted in favor of the draft resolution and affirmed that they were concerned about the persisting uncertainties regarding the long-term environmental impact of depleted uranium, particularly with respect to the potential groundwater contamination. They also understood the concerns of affected communities as stressed in PP.11 and that they should be appropriately addressed. However, they expressed concerns that the draft resolution selectively referred to the 2010 UNEP report. The report clearly states that “even in areas with widespread depleted uranium contamination, the overall levels of radioactivity were low and within acceptable international standards, with no immediate dangers from either particle-based or waterborne toxicity.”

Norway, in the meantime, once a leader on DU issues, joined in a statement with the Netherlands to argue that DU exposure is possibly, but not necessarily, a health risk.

Cluster 5. Other Disarmament Issues

Throughout the discussions on other disarmament issues, the First Committee heard statements on cyber security, conventional disarmament, and the nexus between disarmament and development.

GGE in the Field of Information and Telecommunications

A. Cross-Regional Views

UNASUR, Arab Group, Pakistan, and Switzerland highlighted the GGE. Switzerland mentioned that the next two sessions of the GGE will take place in Geneva. Additionally, as mentioned by Switzerland, the GGE “has already developed the groundwork for a substantial consensus outcome and will further advance its work until next summer.” Switzerland also contended that it is important that the GGE also considers ways of how to universalize and operationalize the recommendations of past GGE reports and those that may be agreed upon this year in order to generate a sustainable impact at a global level.” Russia expressed similar views. Australia informed states it is set “to return to the group in 2016.” Singapore attached great importance to the GGE. Iran underscored the importance of the GGE.

Gender Dimensions

In addition to addressing cyber security, Pakistan and the Netherlands addressed gender dimensions in this cluster. Pakistan spoke on the importance of equal and effective participation in disarmament from men and women, noting that a number of women hold disarmament and security positions in Pakistan. The Netherlands is linked its joint statement to various security, disarmament, and development instruments, including the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the women, peace and security agenda (WPS). The statement highlighted the role of women in relation to small arms and light weapons (SALW), and drew attention to synergies between disarmament and development from a gender perspective.

The Netherlands focused particularly on SDGs 5 on gender equality and 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions, as well on as the criteria on gender-based violence in the ATT, as found in Article 7(4) of the Treaty text: “The exporting
State Party, in making this [export] assessment, shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered... being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.”

B. Actions on This Topic: Resolution L. 17 entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security,” and L. 46 entitled “Relationship between disarmament and development.”

1. L. 17 entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” (177-0-1; Decision: Adopted)

An overwhelming amount of states voted in favor of L. 17 entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.”

1. Responses

Ukraine was the only state to abstain from it. Ukraine’s abstention is rooted in its experience of cyber conflict with Russia. In its explanation of vote, Ukraine welcomed the most recent GGE report and signaled support the role of information and communications technology (ICTs) as a tool for development, and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, it was concerned about States using computer system to attack and hack. It further mentioned that ICTs have been central to the hybrid war between Russia and Ukraine.

In response to Ukraine’s allegation, Russia criticized Ukraine’s abstention. It also commended the sponsors of the draft resolution and noted it is indicative of the importance of this subject at the UN.

On behalf of 35 states, Sweden delivered a general statement in which it underscored that “the same right that individuals have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and the right to privacy.” States welcomed the adoption of resolution 20/8 at the 20th session of the UN Human Rights Council in 2012, which advocates for the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, as well as related follow-up resolutions passed by the Council in 2014, 2015, and 2016 that include additions pertaining to internet access for global development and the Sustainable Development Goals. Finally, as part of its closing remarks, Sweden noted that the “UN Human Rights Council will request the High Commissioner to prepare a report on ways to “bridge digital divides between and within countries, including between women and men.”

Sweden also underscored the UN’s Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)’s central role on the subject as a space for the international community to develop common understanding on norms of responsible behavior, confidence building measures, capacity building, and the applicability of the international law.

In contrast, Pakistan expressed disappointment at having not been included in the current GGE. Pakistan recommended moving the work being done in the GGE to broader multilateral and more representative forums.

Cuba mentioned that the GGE has important responsibilities and that there should be rules and regulations to put an end to the “covert and illegal use of cyber systems” of other countries to attack third countries.

2. Overview: L.46, “Relationship between disarmament and development,” (Voting Result as a whole: Decision: adopted Without a vote;)

Indonesia introduced Resolution L.46, “Relationship between disarmament and development,” which was adopted without a vote in First Committee. However, the US, UK and France delivered contentious remarks on the resolution. For instance. The US explained that disarmament and development are two distinct issues, pointing out that it has not moved from its position in 1987 at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The UK delivered a joint statement on behalf of its own state and France in which they conveyed their concerns on preambular paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, which reads as follows: “Stressing the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the important role of security in this connection, and concerned at increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs.” The UK and France underscored that the relationship between disarmament and development is complex, not automatic, and do not
feel that this is duly reflected in the language of the draft resolution. Moreover, the UK and France called for greater nuance in the idea that military spending takes away from development spending because security also plays an important role in development. This aforementioned position corresponds with the UK’s National Aid Strategy of 2015, where international development is “at the heart of national security,” but with no mention of disarmament.

Cluster 6. Regional Disarmament

A. Middle East

Concerning the Middle East, the Arab Group announced that the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference to agree on the final outcome document that contained provisions on the WMDFZ in WMDFZ has eroded the credibility of the NPT regime. The NAM expressed similar views.

In terms of Israel, the Arab Group lamented that Israel has yet to accede to the NPT and does not allow the IAEA to inspect its facilities. The NAM, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates shared similar sentiments.

Egypt further shared several practical steps that the international community could adopt in order to make progress with the WMDFZ in the Middle East. The practical steps are derived from the NAM working paper at the 2015 Review Conference. These steps include the following:

1. Reaffirming the 1995 Resolution on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, being the basis upon which the NPT was indefinitely extended without a vote, and that it remains valid until it is fully implemented.

2. Calling upon Israel, the only State in the Middle East that remains nonparty to the NPT (as well as all other WMD international treaties), to immediately sign and ratify the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and to place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Calling upon the UN Secretary-General to convene a conference at the earliest time aimed at launching a technical and political process to conclude a legally binding Treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. This process shall be based on consensus, and all States of the Middle East region (i.e. Members of the League of Arab States, Israel, and Iran) will be invited to attend and participate in such Conference. The Secretary General throughout the process, shall exert all organizational efforts and take all necessary measures with a view to ensuring the success of the conference.

Notably, Iran discussed the Israeli regime’s possession of conventional weapons. It explained that “given the dark record of this regime in invading all its neighbors, waging over 15 wars and, invading even countries beyond the region, its accession to all treaties banning weapons of mass destruction is the main and urgent prerequisite for preserving peace and security in the Middle East.”

B. European Regional Concern: Ukraine

In terms of its situation with Russia, Ukraine expressed its profound concerns that Russia has continuously rejected several proposed bilateral proposals. It further regretted that Russia has been “putting into an ongoing state of impasse sub-regional military cooperation and confidence-building arrangements between the Black Sea littoral states, in particular the BLACKSEAFOR and the Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea where Ukraine took part.” Moreover, it conveyed its frustrations that, after Russia ended its participated in the CFE Treaty in 2007, it made a decision to avoid any information and verification control, especially regarding the Southern Military District of Russia. Finally, it expressed regret that, due to the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine “conventional arms control and CBMs regimes do not currently apply on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.”

C. Southeast Asian Regional Concerns
ASEAN discussed the importance of the SEANWFZ in creating a peaceful Southeast Asian region. It further discussed the inauguration of the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre Headquarters (ARMAC) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in May 2016. Additionally, ASEAN discussed its Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy known as ASEANTOM, which “undertakes various activities on nuclear safety, security, safeguards, as well as, emergency preparedness and response.” Finally, it discussed the 8th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) on Non Proliferation and Disarmament, which Canada, New Zealand and Malaysia co-chaired.

Fiji also stated that the Rarotonga Treaty illustrates the “commitment of 14 Pacific island States to keeping our region nuclear free.” Fiji also discussed that the “treaty not only bans the use, testing or possession of nuclear weapons, but it is also a clear commitment by state parties to regional peace and security.

Action on this Cluster: L. 27 entitled United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and L. 50 entitled United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, L. 60 entitled United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, and L. 69 entitled “Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (DRAFT DECISION).”

1. L.27 entitled United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (Decision: Adopted without a vote)

Resolution L.27, entitled “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific” highlighted the centre’s important work in providing technical assistance for States to implement the ATT.

2. L. 50 entitled “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa” (Decision: Adopted without a vote)

3. L.50, “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa” highlighted the centre’s work in assisting States with implementing the ATT. It also contains language around the promotion of the role and representation of women in disarmament affairs.

4. L.60 entitled “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean” (Decision: Adopted without a vote)

The draft resolution encourages the regional centre to support member states in the region to implement relevant instruments, including the UNPoA and the ATT. It explicitly recalls the relationship between disarmament and development, and the promotion of sustainable development by disarmament initiatives. It also underscores the inclusion of women in disarmament affairs.

5. L.69 entitled “Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (DRAFT DECISION),” (Decision: Adopted without a vote)

The draft resolution notes the synergy between regional disarmament initiatives and development and both were adopted without a vote.

Cluster 7. Disarmament Machinery

A. Presentation: UN SG’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

During the discussion on the Disarmament Machinery Cluster, the Chair of the UN SG Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters contended that the 2020 NPT Review Cycle should focus on actionable recommendations that can be implemented within the time frame of the review cycle. Additionally, in terms of the WMDFZ in the Middle East, the Chair reported that the members recommended that the Secretary-General should take the lead in presenting ideas and facilitating discussions with the relevant bodies.
Conference on Disarmament

A. Cross-Regional Support

Regarding the CD, the NAM, CARICOM, UK, Russia, India, UNASUR, Arab Group, Pakistan, Kuwait, Poland, Switzerland, Egypt, China, Iran, Spain, Republic of Korea, and Portugal underscored that the CD is the world’s sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and called upon the CD to adopt a balanced and comprehensive program of work.

IGOS, Paraguay, and Portugal argued the CD must expand its membership. Moreover, Poland complained that the presidents’ short-term limits have prevented the presidents from adequately making any progress on the CD’s agenda items and convincing the CD’s members to agree upon a program of work.

Growing Frustrations about the CD

A. Arab and Middle Eastern States’ Views

Algeria expressed its deep concerns about the CD’s lack of involvement on the items contained in its agenda list.

Egypt maintained that, “in order to break the impasse, the CD members must be able to address all the issues on the agenda of the conference through an integrated approach that includes most importantly negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances, as well as on a treaty to ban fissile material including existing stockpiles for military purposes, and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).” Iran and Spain expressed concerns that the lack of political will amongst certain states prevents the CD from addressing its program of work.

B. Cross-Regional views from Latin American and Caribbean, Southeast Asian and African States

Mexico strongly expressed its disappointment about the inaction of the CD. Mexico stated that the minority groups and civil society groups have lost their faith in the CD. Thailand and South Africa expressed similar frustrations.

China urged the international community to develop creative thinking on breaking the impasse.

SSOD-IV

A. Cross-Regional Views

The Arab Group expressed the NAM’s position on SSOD IV. Algeria mentioned that it stands ready to engage and supports recommendations related to SSOD-IV, Bangladesh welcomed the two substantive sessions. France welcomed the sessions and announced that it will monitor and engage in substantive discussions about SSOD-IV. The NAM also stressed the need for the international community to convene SSOD-IV and it welcome the OEWG’s two substantive sessions in 2016.

OEWG on Taking Forward Nuclear Disarmament

A. Cross-Regional Views Southeast Asian and African States

In terms of the OEWG on Taking Forward Nuclear Disarmament Negotiation, ASEAN, Thailand and South Africa welcomed the conclusions and the 2017 Conference.

Notably, China warned that new measures would de-stabilize the international disarmament machinery.

Action on this Cluster: L. 6 titled “Report on the Conference of Disarmament” (Adopted without a vote; Decision: Adopted)
In this cluster, the Republic of Korea introduced L. 6 entitled “Report on the Conference of Disarmament,” which was adopted without a vote.
Annex A. Resolutions

At the 2016 Session of the UNGA First Committee, the following resolutions were adopted:

A/C.1/71/L.1
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East
Lead sponsor: Egypt
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.2/Rev.1
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East
*Original: A/C.1/71/L.2*
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt*, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and State of Palestine

Voting result in First Committee on PP5: 165-2-2
Voting result in First Committee on PP6: 163-2-2
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 147-6-21

A/C.1/71/L.3
Prevention of an arms race in outer space
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, El Salvador, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malawi, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zimbabwe

Voting result in First Committee: 178-0-4

A/C.1/71/L.4
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
Lead sponsor: Sri Lanka

*Adopted in First Committee without a vote*

A/C.1/71/L.5
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
Lead sponsors: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

Voting result in First Committee: 166-1-19

A/C.1/71/L.6
Report of the Conference on Disarmament
Lead sponsor: Republic of Korea

*Adopted in First Committee without a vote*

A/C.1/71/L.7/Rev.1
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
*Original: A/C.1/71/L.7*
Lead sponsors: Austria, Belgium and Chile

Voting result in First Committee: 161-0-16
A/C.1/71/L.8
Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms
Lead sponsors: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.9
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities
Lead sponsors: Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
Voting result in First Committee on PP8: 159-1-13
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 179-1-1

A/C.1/71/L.10
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Lead sponsors: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam
Voting result in First Committee: 128-50-8

A/C.1/71/L.11
Reducing nuclear danger
Lead sponsors: Angola, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, India, Libya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam
Voting result in First Committee: 127-49-10

A/C.1/71/L.12
Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
Lead sponsors: Angola, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.13
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Voting result in First Committee: 129-0-58

A/C.1/71/L.14
Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context
Lead sponsors: Angola, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Syrian
Arab Republic and Ukraine
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.15
Regional disarmament
Lead sponsors: Angola, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Turkey
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.16
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels
Lead sponsors: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Italy, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine
Voting result in First Committee on PP6: 164-1-2
Voting result in First Committee on OP2: 133-1-34
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 176-1-2

A/C.1/71/L.17
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security
Lead sponsors: Angola, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Chad, Chile, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe
Voting result in First Committee: 177-0-1

A/C.1/71/L.18
No first placement of weapons in outer space
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mali, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe
Voting result in First Committee: 126-4-49

A/C.1/71/L.19
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities
Lead sponsors: China, Russian Federation and United States of America
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.20
Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status
Lead sponsors: Australia, Austria, China, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Viet Nam
Adopted by First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.21
Transparency in armaments
Lead sponsors: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
Voting result in First Committee on PP4: 145-0-22
Voting result in First Committee on PP7: 132-0-34
Voting result in First Committee on PP8: 133-0-34
Voting result in First Committee on OP3: 139-0-27
Voting result in First Committee on OP4: 141-0-26
Voting result in First Committee on OP6c: 147-0-21
Voting result in First Committee on OP7: 141-0-24
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 151-0-28

A/C.1/71/L.22
Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions
Lead sponsors: Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland
Voting result in First Committee: 134-2-40

A/C.1/71/L.23
Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons
Lead sponsor: Algeria, Angola, Austria, Bahamas, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe
Voting result in First Committee: 143-16-24

A/C.1/71/L.24
Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Austria, Bahamas, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Samoa, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe
Voting result in First Committee: 135-33-14

A/C.1/71/L.25
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects
Lead sponsors: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.26
United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons
Lead sponsors: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay and Vanuatu
Voting result in First Committee on OP5: 176-3-4
Voting result in First Committee on OP20: 169-4-7
Voting result in First Committee on OP27: 173-0-9
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 167-4-17
A/C.1/71/L.27
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific
Lead sponsors: Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, El Salvador, India, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.28
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Lead sponsors: Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United States of America and Uruguay
Voting result in First Committee on PP4: 172-0-11
Voting result in First Committee on PP7: 177-0-6
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 183-1-4

A/C.1/71/L.29
The Arms Trade Treaty
Lead sponsors: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay and Zambia
Voting result in First Committee: 152-0-28

A/C.1/71/L.30
Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chad, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.31
Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas
Lead sponsors: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Mongolia, Namibia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Samoa, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Voting result in First Committee: 179-4-1

A/C.1/71/L.32
Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Croatia, Czech, Denmark, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Guyana, Haiti, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay
Adopted in First Committee without a vote
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems
Lead sponsors: Angola, Argentina, Austria, Burkina Faso, Chile, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Sweden and Switzerland

Voting result in First Committee on PP8: 168-0-10
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 174-4-4

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
Original: A/C.1/71/L.34
Lead sponsors: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Malawi, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments
Lead sponsors: Angola, Austria, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Swaziland and Thailand

Voting result in First Committee on OP14: 167-5-5
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 141-24-20

Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Mexico, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Samoa, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Uruguay and Zambia

Voting result in First Committee: 131-36-17

Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control
Lead sponsors: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Zambia

Voting result in First Committee on PP10: 145-0-34
Adopted in First Committee as a whole without a vote

Report of the Disarmament Commission
Lead sponsors: Vanuatu on behalf of the members of the Bureau of the Disarmament Commission
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme
Lead sponsors: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, Thailand and Uruguay
Adopted in First Committee without a vote
A/C.1/71/L.40
United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education
Lead sponsors: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Czech, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay

Adopted in First Committee without a vote
General statement: Mexico

A/C.1/71/L.41
Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations
Lead sponsors: Austria, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia

Voting result in First Committee: 123-38-16
General statement: Cuba, Austria

A/C.1/71/L.42
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
Lead sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe

Voting result in First Committee: 137-24-22

A/C.1/71/L.43
Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
Lead sponsor: Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries

Voting result in First Committee: 179-0-2

A/C.1/71/L.44
Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control
Lead sponsor: Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries

Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.45
Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation
Lead sponsor: Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of
Non-Aligned Countries

Voting result in First Committee: 124-3-50

A/C.1/71/L.46
Relationship between disarmament and development
Lead sponsor: Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries

Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.47
Nuclear disarmament

Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cuba, El Salvador, Fiji, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zambia

Voting result in First Committee on OP 16: 172-2-5

Voting result in First Committee: 122-42-20

A/C.1/71/L.48
Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (DRAFT DECISION)
Lead sponsor: Brazil

Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.49
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
Lead sponsors: Australia, Austria, Georgia, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Nigeria* and Portugal

Adopted by First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.50
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
Lead sponsors: Australia, Georgia and Nigeria

Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.51
United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services
Lead sponsors: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Switzerland, Thailand and United States of America

Adopted in First Committee without a vote
A/C.1/71/L.52/Rev.1
Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures
Original: A/C.1/71/L.52
Lead sponsors: Angola, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mongolia, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.53
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
Lead sponsors: Angola, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, France, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malta, Mongolia, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uzbekistan
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.54
Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (DRAFT DECISION)
Lead sponsor: India
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.55
Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources
Lead sponsors: Angola, Australia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.56
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
Lead sponsor: Hungary
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1
Nuclear disarmament verification
Original: A/C.1/71/L.57
Lead sponsors: Angola, Australia, Austria, Chile, Colombia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
Voting result in First Committee on OP1: 181-1-1
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 177-0-7

A/C.1/71/L.58
National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology
Lead sponsor: Netherlands
Voting result in First Committee on PP7: 143-0-7
Voting result in First Committee on PP8: 143-0-24
Voting result in First Committee on OP1: 144-0-20
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 174-0-3

A/C.1/71/L.59
Missiles
Lead sponsors: Egypt and Iran (Islamic Republic of)

A/C.1/71/L.60
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
Lead sponsor: Peru on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.61/Rev.1
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
Original: A/C.1/71/L.61
Lead sponsor: Poland
Voting result in First Committee on PP3: 136-8-19
Voting result in First Committee on PP4: 133-8-20
Voting result in First Committee on OP2: 125-12-23
Voting result in First Committee on OP13: 122-9-23
Voting result in First Committee as a whole: 149-6-15

A/C.1/71/L.62
United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament
Lead sponsor: Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.63
Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium
Lead sponsor: Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
Voting result in First Committee: 146-4-26
A/C.1/71/L.64
Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament
Lead sponsor: Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
Voting result in First Committee: 143-28-15

A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1
Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
Original: A/C.1/71/L.65
Lead sponsors: Canada, Germany and Netherlands
Voting result in First Committee: 177-1-10

A/C.1/71/L.66
Open-ended Working Group on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (DRAFT DECISION)
Lead sponsor: Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
Voting result in First Committee: 175-0-5

A/C.1/79/L.67
Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa
Lead sponsor: Central African Republic on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Economic Community of Central African States
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.68/Rev.1
Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices
Original: A/C.1/71/L.68
Lead sponsors: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia
Adopted in First Committee without a vote

A/C.1/71/L.69
Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (DRAFT DECISION)
Lead sponsor: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Adopted in First Committee without a vote