

The UNDP Role in the Comprehensive Approach to Security in Fragile States: An Assessment

Edward J. Laurance
Version 5.1 10 June 2010

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In this the 21st century, a standard approach to providing development assistance and statebuilding has evolved and is the basis for development programming. No development effort should go forward without a plan that is gender-responsive and includes capacity development, peace architectures, good governance at all levels within a state, and natural resource management. Such efforts must also provide the necessary “security” for such development work to proceed. This latter requirement is especially relevant for states emerging from conflict, fragile states, and is the subject of this study.

Providing a secure environment was not always connected to development. As the Cold War ended, efforts to provide security within states most often focused on specific security problems, unconnected to other security challenges and the development work itself. For example, land mine removal and the collection of small arms and light weapons (SALW) (often by security forces) in developing communities focused on removing the tools of violence, leaving the development of these communities to the development organizations. Furthermore, both of these removal efforts were done in isolation from each other.

This is not the case today, where it is recognized that approaches to security must be comprehensive in nature, and must be inexorably linked to the economic, political and social development of the state concerned. This study traces how one organization, the United Nations Development Organization (UNDP), transformed itself into the prototype of this new approach to international development.

This study focuses on how UNDP programming improves security at both national and sub-national levels. It takes a broad view of current efforts to support the (re)establishment of security and instability from a human security perspective by strengthening institutional capacities to cope with conflict and security risks.¹

This study has two main objectives. First, it will describe and evaluate UNDP programs that address state and human security in fragile states. These programs include:

- Small arms and light weapons
- Mine action

¹ . A thorough history of UNDP’s security programming for the past 20 years is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, examples are drawn from documents and country programmes which adequately illustrate the organizational changes that have resulted in UNDP’s programming and approaches which now integrate security and development.

- Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration;
- Security sector reform
- Rule of law, access to justice and justice sector reform;
- Conflict prevention and management
- Gender-related violence.

The study utilizes data from programmes in the following fragile states:

- Afghanistan
- Central African Republic
- Haiti
- Kosovo
- Sierra Leone
- Burundi
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- Iraq
- Liberia
- Somalia

The study is guided by a set of questions which will describe how well UNDP efforts reflect the international community's effort to more effectively link security and development. These questions are:

How does UNDP contribute to promoting stability and security in the immediate aftermath of conflict?

1. What is UNDP's leverage to support consultations and programs in the security sector?
2. What are the risks associated with close engagement with this sector?
3. How does UNDP link up with other UN agencies and missions in supporting a comprehensive approach to security in post-conflict environments?
4. How does UNDP work with civilian institutions to support the civilian oversight of security forces?
5. What is the role of security governance and capacity development in reestablishing and sustaining stability and security in a post-conflict environment?

How does UNDP restore security at the local level?

6. Is institutional development and service delivery integrated into conflict prevention and conflict management programmes?
7. Is conflict prevention and management integrated into DDR, SALW, and mine action programmes? Community policing?
8. Are UNDP's programmes in Rule of Law, DDR, SALW, conflict prevention, etc. integrated?
9. How have capacity development approaches contributed to:
 - Strengthening institutional capacity and resilience in the security sector?
 - Strengthening the legitimacy and responsiveness of the security sector?
 - Strengthening gender responsiveness in the security sector?

- Methodology

The study begins (Section 2.0) by describing the evolution of global security from state-centric national security and external threats, into human security, as violence shifted from an

interstate to a people-centered intrastate context. It describes how each of the seven UNDP security program areas (e.g., small arms and light weapons control (SALW) became linked to development in the 1990's and beyond, providing an abundance of evidence that this shift to human security made UNDP a natural and critical participant, i.e., well-leveraged to assume this role. The second part of the study (Section 3.0) presents Overall Findings and Lessons Learned based on the assessment of each of the seven security sectors. Section 4.0 The UNDP Comprehensive Approach To Security: Findings And Lessons Learned describes the recent effort by the United Nations, OECD DAC and donor states to integrate the twin tasks of providing security and fostering development by focusing on a multi-sector and whole-of-government approach which emphasizes capacity-development for statebuilding. The fourth part of the study (Section 5.0) brings together evidence of UNDP's approach to security in the selected fragile states, guided by the questions outlined above. The final part of the study summarizes the lessons learned from UNDP's experience in advice, technical assistance and programs in the seven security areas.

2.0 THE GROWTH OF UNDP SECURITY PROGRAMS

The rise of UNDP involvement in developing, implementing and funding security programmes coincides with the advent of the post-Cold War period and a new emphasis on human security.² This paradigm shift has been well-documented. This trend, which started in the early 1990's, revealed to the global public that many people were not free from want or fear, and it could no longer be pushed under the Cold War rug. Development and humanitarian relief organizations began to realize that they had to address both want and fear simultaneously.

Secondly, the 1990s saw a major decrease in traditional interstate conflict and the rise in intrastate conflict fought between rival factions, where the interstate mechanisms of the previous era became less relevant, as well as a surge in the incidence of inter-personal violence associated with a loosening of state-control through often volatile transition periods. A high percentage of the casualties in these new conflicts were civilians, who were not only pawns but often the targets of rival armed groups. It made no sense to build schools, feed people and attempt to work for development in an environment of armed violence. This led to the development community tackling the insecurity of its clients head-on, outside of the traditional peacekeeping functions of the previous era. The UNDP was one of the first development organizations to do this. This section of the study focuses on the security programmes developed by UNDP.

2.1 Small arms and light weapons (SALW)

The negative effects of small arms and light weapons (SALW), e.g., innocent people wounded and killed, were one of the first security issues to become global in the new era of tackling human security. These weapons were being used to create the insecurity hampering development. It quickly became clear that addressing this violence meant attacking two major causes of violence at the same time. One target was the root causes of intrastate armed violence, suppressed or managed during the Cold War: ethnic differences, relative deprivation, inequality,

² . The phrase "human security" was first used by UNDP in its inaugural 1994 Human Development Report

corruption, identity and the inability or unwillingness of states to meet their responsibilities toward their people. A second major phenomena accompanying these already challenging root causes was the rise of security challenges such as corrupt or inefficient state security structures the lack of the rule of law, landmines leftover from previous wars, ex-combatants without jobs or purpose, and an unprecedented availability of small arms and light weapons to both the population and armed groups.

UN peacekeeping operations in Central America at the start of the 1990s (ONUCA and ONUSAL) were the first to deal with SALW, with the disarming of armed groups and weapons collection as a part of the mandate of the peace agreements This experience was used by the UNDP in Mali, where major development work had ground to a halt due to armed violence perpetrated on the population by the Toureg minority. Under a 1994 UN General Assembly Resolution, which called for states suffering from this new SALW to ask for assistance, a new Malian government did so and a fact-finding mission was dispatched from the UN. This led to the collection of over 3000 weapons by the UNDP in March 1996.³ This was the first such collection outside of a formal peace operation and set the stage for many more to come. UNDP was able to do this because of the leverage that stems from being on the ground assisting in development. Weapons are collected from people who have to be convinced to do so.

In January 1995, then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. He called on the international community to “concentrate on what might be called ‘micro-disarmament’”. By this I mean practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.⁴ By 1998 two UN expert panels had defined the problem and pointed the way to an international conference on SALW to develop a plan of action. However, all of the deliberation was taking place in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, a committee focusing on arms control, disarmament and the traditional state-centric approach to security. Attempts by development organizations to bring development into the debate were singularly unsuccessful.

It was at this point that UNDP established the UNDP Trust Fund for Support to Prevention and Reduction of the Proliferation of Small Arms. A project for ‘weapons in exchange for development’ in Albania was initiated that same year with support from UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) and UNDP. From this starting point, UNDP support for small arms programmes was gradually expanded both in number and scope, particularly as curbing the availability and misuse of small arms emerged as one of the key priorities in the area of crisis prevention and recovery. This expansion was also accompanied by an evolution in the conceptual scope and definition of program strategies, which increasingly recognized small arms control as a component within a broader armed violence reduction approach to addressing human security issues.⁵

³ . For an account of the Mali case see Mugumya, G. *Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: Weapon Collection Programmes Assessed by Local People* UNIDIR, 2004.

⁴ . *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. A/50/60-S/1995/1 of 3 January 1995, paras. **60–61.

⁵ . UNDP. *Securing Development*. (New York: United Nations, July 2005), 23.

The aforementioned 1998 Weapons Exchange for Development in Albania marked a major move by UNDP to link security and development, which has been replicated ever since. This project recognized that as long as weapons collection programs focused on individuals (such as the case of DDR), the contribution toward enhancing security and enabling development would be minimal. In this project the concept was to focus on a collectivity, a social unit (in this case a town) turning in its weapons in exchange for development projects. This first pilot project focused on roads. Later programmes in Albania included a wider range of development projects.⁶

A 2002 UNIDIR assessment of the Albania projects revealed the importance of combining weapons for development with security sector reform. Thus, what started out as one-off voluntary collections of SALW was turning into a more encompassing approach by UNDP that began to link several types of the security issues to development.⁷ This approach then led to similar Arms for Development programmes in Liberia, Sierra Leone and other places. It should be noted that these programmes were separate from those associated with formal peace agreements. The programmes were addressing SALW left over AFTER the peacekeeping mission, the weapons deterring development. It was the beginning of the focus on the larger effort to prevent and reduce armed violence, not just collect weapons (see Armed Violence Prevention below).

Much of the global work on SALW remains focused on creating norms, standards and capacity at the state level; access of civilians to SALW, exporting, stockpile security, destruction, record-keeping, etc. This top-down approach can be seen in the 2001 UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNPoA), which was a much-needed norm-setting document.⁸ There continues to be a state-centric approach to improve the UNPoA and make it legally-binding, in the form of the proposed Arms Trade Treaty.⁹ There is also a complimentary effort to establish global standards for small arms control (ISACS).¹⁰ Since regional and global standards are a key part of security governance, UNDP has been very active in and supportive of the above efforts by the international community.

Broadening the focus on SALW

UNDP began to formally conceptualize the link between SALW control and development in a 2002 publication by Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor, which detailed the negative effects on

⁶ . Sami Faltas 'You Have Removed the Devil From Our Door' *An Assessment of the UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (SALWC) project in Albania*. . UNIDIR, SEESAC APD 20 1st Edition 2003-10-30.

⁷ . Geoffrey Mugumya. *From Exchanging Weapons for Development to Security Sector Reform in Albania: Gaps and Grey Areas in Weapon Collection Programmes Assessed by Local People*. UNIDIR/2004/19

⁸ . United Nations. *UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/SALW/Html/SALW-PoA-ISS_intro.shtml

⁹ . *Towards an Arms Trade Treaty*. UNODA.
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/html/ATT.shtml>

¹⁰ . *Project on International Small Arms Control Standards*. http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/e-Portfolio/Docs/International_Small_Arms_Control_Standards_ISACS.pdf

development from armed violence.¹¹ The 2005 publication *Securing Development*, summarized the movement from a strictly arms control treatment of the SALW problem to one of linking small arms availability, diffusion and misuse to human development, the primary mission of UNDP.

“This type of approach, with an explicit focus on small arms-related insecurity, consists of four main types of activities that are implemented within a framework of community empowerment and ownership:

- Public awareness raising and community sensitization with all stakeholders;
- Voluntary weapons collection with public destruction;
- Community development assistance as disarmament incentives and alternative livelihoods; and
- Capacity-building support to local authorities (notably police) in addressing community

security.”¹²

As of 2005 UNDP was addressing the SALW problem in over 40 countries. By 2008 this number had been reduced to 27 countries, indicating that UNDP had begun to adopt the larger concept of armed violence as a major obstacle to development. This has taken several forms.

After two years of deliberations, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, with UNDP being a co-chair, produced the document *Armed Violence Reduction (AVR); Enabling Development*,¹³ bringing the steady movement of broadening the SALW focus to the next level. This document outlines what had been growing for years. In order to reduce armed violence and enable development the development community must focus on not just the instruments of violence (i.e., SALW) but also three other factors that development practitioners (as opposed to arms control practitioners) had discovered were just as important. These include the perpetrators of armed violence (the demand factor), the institutions where violence is practiced or promoted (e.g., gangs, armed groups), and the victims.¹⁴

In 2006 UNDP and the NGO Small Arms Survey played key roles in developing the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (GD), signed on 7 June 2006. Now endorsed by 108 states, this initiative reflects and enhances the evolution away from pure weapons collection to the holistic approach first called for in the Brahimi Report. In addition to controlling SALW this initiative calls on signatory states to

- uphold full respect for human rights, promote the peaceful settlement of conflicts based on justice and the rule of law, and address a climate of impunity;
- foster effective and accountable public security institutions;
- promote a comprehensive approach to armed violence reduction issues, recognizing the different situations, needs and resources of men and women, boys and girls.¹⁵

¹¹ . Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor. *Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development: A Preliminary Study Of The Socio-Economic Impacts And Development Linkages Of Small Arms Proliferation, Availability And Use*. UNDP and Small Arms Survey. July 2002

¹² . UNDP. *Securing Development*, 2005, p. 25.

¹³ . OECD-DAC. *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*.

¹⁴ . Burundi is one of the focus countries.

¹⁵ . <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/>

UNDP is a Core Group member of the Geneva Declaration as well as one of the Principals, along with the NGOs Small Arms Survey and the Quaker UN Office, who meet regularly with the Swiss government. The GD has three pillars: Advocacy, Measurability and Programming. UNDP relies on the GD first and foremost to advocate for the importance of reducing armed violence to foster development. The second pillar promotes the need for evidence-based assessments and policy development. For example, assessments of armed violence have been completed by the GD for Yemen, Lebanon, Burundi, Sudan and Timor Leste. This pillar has also produced armed violence indicators, another UNDP focal point. UNDP's major connection with the GD is the third pillar, Programming. The Armed Violence Prevention Program (Phase II) is embedded in this pillar.¹⁶

This movement toward a more inclusive set of causal factors does not mean that dealing with the tools of violence (e.g., SALW) has diminished in importance. For example, the aforementioned project on International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS-footnote 11) is the result of an agreement among 17 UN bodies active in policy development and/or programming related to SALW, the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA).

“In October 2007, CASA members endorsed the goal of developing a set of International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) along the lines of the standards already developed by the United Nations in the areas of mine action (International Mine Action Standards) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Integrated DDR Standards). The purpose of this initiative is to develop a set of internationally accepted and validated standards that will provide comprehensive guidance to practitioners and policymakers on small arms control.”¹⁷

The World Health Organization (WHO) was an early and active participant in the effort to tackle the negative effects of SALW. This was a natural outgrowth of their empirical work documenting casualties from land mines as well as their mandate to uphold international humanitarian law. But as with UNDP, they realized that there were broader issues related to violence in public health terms. In 2002 WHO published the first-ever *World Report on Violence and Health*¹⁸. They also have published

The two agencies' first formal partnership was the Armed Violence Prevention Program in 2005, with UNDP managing the project.²⁰ The Project Document contains an excellent description of the two organizations and their approach to reducing armed violence.

“While many actors have been involved in supporting various “project” initiatives, UNDP has taken a comprehensive, multi-faceted “programme” approach, placing the issue of armed violence squarely within

¹⁶ Interview with UNDP/BCPR staff.

¹⁷ . Project Document ISACS , October 2009.

¹⁸ . WHO. *World report on Violence and Health*. 2002.

http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/

¹⁹ . WHO. *Preventing violence and reducing its impact: how development agencies can help*. 2008

http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/publications/about_vip/newsalerts/Alert_5.pdf

²⁰ . *The Global Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP). PHASE I Support for the Development of a Framework to Address the Impacts of Armed Violence on Human Security and Development* Programme Document 2 JUNE 2005.

http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/activities/armed_violence/en/index.html

an overall framework of security and development. The experience acquired by UNDP in addressing armed violence, as well as related small arms control, security sector reform, justice and governance issues in a number of different contexts, together with its extensive field presence, provides it with the necessary capacity to support the present programme....The WHO recently launched the first ever *World report on violence and health* and has declared violence a leading global public health problem. In May 2003 Member States adopted a World Health Assembly resolution calling among other things for the support of evidence-based approaches for the prevention of violence and evaluation of model violence prevention programmes.

Phase I involved researching armed violence, its causes and treatment in El Salvador, Brazil, and Mozambique. Based on this experience, Phase II of the AVPP was launched with the signing on 1 March 2009 of an MOU²¹ by UNDP, WHO, UNODA, UNICEF and UNODC. The MOU assigned UNDP as the administrative interface between the donors and the participating organizations. The MOU expires on 28 February 2011. Accompanying the MOU was a project document.²² The focus of AVPP 2 “is on those forms of armed violence prevalent at the inter-personal, community and national levels which are not mass-based or institutional in nature but that still pose a significant development and human rights challenge.”

The major objectives of AVPP Phase 2 are:

1. To promote the development of policy guidance, strategies and effective partnerships on armed violence prevention at the global and regional levels, and the integration of armed violence prevention into development cooperation frameworks and mechanisms;
2. To contribute to strengthening national capacities to address armed violence including strengthened data collection and monitoring mechanisms, and to formulate and implement evidence-based armed violence prevention policies, strategies and programmes; and
3. To promote a methodologically rigorous approach to, and undertake several evaluations of, violence prevention programmes.²³

These most recent efforts by UNDP and its partners—AVPP 2 and the Geneva Declaration—are marked by the extensive use of evidence-based research and programming. By the early 2000s, practitioners realized that anecdotal evidence was not sufficient to develop and implement the programming necessary to reduce SALW violence. As a result UNDP’s work became increasingly evidenced-based. For example, UNDP and its partners (e.g., Small Arms Survey, Oxfam, BICC, Saferworld, SEESAC) began a series

²¹ . *Memorandum of Understanding between Participating UN Organizations and the United Nations Development Programme regarding the Operational Aspects of a Global Armed Violence Prevention Programme. (AVPP 2 MOU)* 22 July 2009.

²² . *Annex A to AVPP 2 MOU*

²³ . *Ibid*

of baseline surveys on community violence, prevalence of SALW, etc.²⁴ This has created the potential for empirically evaluating progress in reducing armed violence.²⁵

2.2 Mine Action

Like SALW, landmines that are widely distributed in fragile states have a major humanitarian impact. With area denial as part of the strategy of both governments and armed groups in conflict, once the conflict is over the mines remain, especially anti-personnel landmines (APL). While landmines of all types have been used for centuries, it is only recently that landmines left over from wars have been the focus of international action. The oldest demining organization, Halo Trust, has been demining in former war zones for 21 years. Handicap International started its work in Cambodia in 1992.

The impetus for global action started with six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These demining and humanitarian organizations had seen first-hand the humanitarian impact and eventually with 40 like-minded countries began a campaign to ban APLs. The campaign eventually led to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. What emerged from the Convention and action on the ground afterwards was the development of the five pillars of Mine Action.²⁶

The Five Pillars of Mine Action

- Removing and destroying landmines and explosive remnants of war and marking or fencing off areas contaminated with them.
- Mine-risk education to help people understand the risks they face, identify mines and explosive remnants of war and learn how to stay out of harm's way.
- Medical assistance and rehabilitation services to victims, including job skills training and employment opportunities.
- Advocating for a world free from the threat of landmines and encouraging countries to participate in international treaties and conventions designed to end the production, trade, shipment or use of mines and to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities.
- Helping countries destroy their stockpiles of mines as required by international agreements, such as the 1999 anti-personnel mine-ban treaty.

The APL ban movement, both before and after the Convention was signed, maintained a single-minded focus on these five pillars. It was all about getting as many mines out of the ground in as many places as possible, assisting the victims and preventing further victims (MRE). This is not to say that the movement did not connect this work to development. The demining organizations recognized, in a general way, the overall impact of APLs on development. For example, “Our work directly saves lives, and allows a return to normal rural livelihoods in some of the poorest

²⁴ . For an example of such surveys see <http://www.seesac.org/publications/salw-surveys/1/>. Also see *Symptoms and causes :Insecurity and underdevelopment in Eastern Equatoria*. Small Arms Survey, April 2010. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-16-symptoms-causes.pdf>

²⁵ .For the latest achievements in this area see *Measuring and Monitoring Armed Violence: Goals, Targets and Indicators*. Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. April 2010. http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Indicators/Metrics_Paper.pdf;

²⁶ . United Nations Mine Action Service. http://www.mineaction.org/section.asp?s=what_is_mine_action

countries in the world....demining to save lives, prevent accidents and provide safe land for resettlement, agriculture and redevelopment”²⁷ And “During and after conflicts, these weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmer’s fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people carry out their daily activities. They can deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement, limiting people’s ability to participate in education or access medical care.... More generally, development and post-conflict reconstruction are hindered when access to resources is limited and when people sustain serious, long term injuries due to mines and ERW.”²⁸

The first preambular paragraph in the Convention concerns development: “Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,”²⁹

It is clear that demining and the other elements of the five pillars of mine action create the *potential* for development. However, there is sparse evidence that mine action is connected in an operational way to enhancing economic, political and social development. Victims may recover and be able to work but may not do so if there is no work being generated by the private or public sector. Once an area is demined, it returns to its previous state. This is akin to the early days of DDR and SALW control. Weapons are collected, ex-combatants and communities are disarmed, and what remains is corrupt government and security providers, poor infrastructure, poverty, etc.³⁰ The five pillars do not formally address what happens after the mines are cleared.

As with SALW, UNDP stepped into the breach and began applying its development focus to landmines. First, in 2001 it funded a study by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining: *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*³¹. This study, while recognizing the potential for linking mine action to development, concluded that mine action organizations were just beginning this process. This study and the 2004 *Guide to Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action Planning and Management* provided important tools to actuate this linkage. “The true test for a mine action project is not whether it produces outputs (demined land, “mine-aware” people, and so on) efficiently, but whether these outputs are then used by local households, communities and organisations to enhance the well-being of the intended beneficiaries. Local social and economic structures will strongly influence whether this is achieved.”³²

²⁷ . Halo Trust Website. <http://www.halotrust.org/>

²⁸ Landmine Monitor : “The Issues Impact of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War.” <http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/LM/The-Issues/Impact>.

²⁹ . Text of Convention. <http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Treaty-Text-in-Many-Languages/English>

³⁰ . In the spring of 1998, the author conducted a workshop in Pretoria for African members of the ICBL who were also likely candidates to get involved in the SALW work. There was a general tone of dissatisfaction based on the fact that “we have the treaty but nothing is being done after the mines are cleared.”

³¹ . *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*. <http://www.gichd.org/publications/subject/socio-economics-aspects/a-study-of-socio-economic-approaches-to-mine-action-1>

³² . *Guide to Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action Planning and Management*

<http://www.gichd.org/publications/subject/socio-economics-aspects/a-guide-to-socio-economic-approaches-to-mine-action-planning-and-action-1>

UNDP also published in 2004 *Mainstreaming Mine Action Into Development* in 2004.³³ Finally, in 2005 the Mine Action Team of UNDP/BCPR published *Mine Action: Capacity Development for a Safer World*.³⁴ As of 2005 UNDP was assisting three fragile states: Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan.

UNDP was performing the following functions in linking mine action to development as of 2005.³⁵

- establish and sustain national mine-action institutional and legal frameworks
- ensure effective management and quality assurance of mine-action operations
- coordinate training programmes for national managers, staff, and technical teams
- implement landmine impact surveys and utilize their results to develop national strategic plans
- establish information management systems and develop national capacities for their use in prioritizing mine-action operations
- explore cost-effective alternatives to clearance operations based on impact analysis
- advocate for the inclusion of mine action in national development frameworks
- meet their legal obligations under relevant international conventions

The 2008 BCPR Annual Report shows that, in addition to promoting the link between mine action and development, UNDP also provides support to the five pillars of mine action.

In 2008 UNDP provided technical assistance to national mine action centers in **Cambodia, Jordan and Lao PDR**. Support focused on developing national mine action information databases and improving the coordination of mine action activities. In **Angola**, UNDP facilitated the completion, launch and dissemination of a nationwide Landmine Impact Survey. In **Albania, Egypt, Somalia and Yemen** local communities benefitted from mine risk education. In **Libya and Thailand** UNDP helped establish new comprehensive programmes that strengthen national planning and management of effective mine action efforts. In addition to these activities, UNDP Provided extensive support to Member States to meet their obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty. For example, it helped **Malawi** successfully meet its obligations to clear all anti-personnel mines on land under its jurisdiction and control within ten years of the treaty's entry into force. It also assisted **Burundi and Sudan** in meeting their obligations to destroy stockpiles of anti-personnel mines within their respective four-year deadlines.”³⁶

The 2008 BCPR Annual Report also showed the continuing push for linking mine action and development. “Efforts to eliminate cluster munitions and landmines have made the greatest headway when articulated in terms of their economic and social impact on a country's development; they must therefore be integrated into these broader national development frameworks and associated budgets.”³⁷ In the UN policy document, UNDP's role is further defined

³³ . *Mainstreaming Mine Action Into Development*
http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/mine_action/development/UNDP_Brochure_B_-_Mainstreaming_Recommendations.pdf

³⁴ . http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/mine_action/training/Brochure_Reference.pdf

³⁵ . Mine Action BCPR.

³⁶ . UNDP/BCPR 2008 Annual Report p. 20.

³⁷ . UNDP/BCPR 2008 Annual Report p. 21.

110. Because landmines and ERW pose a serious obstacle to sustainable development, UNDP is mainstreaming mine action into its broader development programmes in mine affected developing countries, and is the principal United Nations agency promoting the mainstreaming of mine action into national and sector development plans and programmes, such as agriculture, infrastructure, health, education, and water supply.³⁸

The Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) continues to push states to integrate mine action and development. The initial effort was to publish the series Demining and Development, with advice to NGOs, governments and international development organizations. More recently GICHD has replaced this effort with a more robust Landmine and Development section of the organization. The result has been a significant increase in publications on linking mine action and development, as well as an Open Forum currently involving 200 plus development and mine action practitioners.

While UNMAS is under the direct management of UNDPKO, there are other UN actors involved in mine action, including UNDP. The work of each organization is guided by a common UN mine action strategy and policy. There are four strategic objectives:

- 1: Reduction of death and injury by at least 50 percent.
- 2: Mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80 percent of the most seriously affected communities.
- 3: Integration of mine-action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and budgets in at least 15 countries.
- 4: Assist the development of national institutions to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the same time prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries.³⁹

The UNSG's annual report on mine action in August 2009 provides some examples of mine action directly related to development. The United Nations assisted 26 countries and territories in integrating mine action into their national development plans and budgets and to mobilize national resources to finance mine action activities. These included Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Kosovo, Somalia, and the Sudan. In Lebanon, UNDP and UNMAS partnered and were able to clear mines near a factory that then opened and led to jobs.⁴⁰

To promote the better link between mine action and development, GICHD funded a study entitled *Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen*.⁴¹ This field study conducted a "Preliminary assessment of complementary development initiatives for surveyed villages and requirements for support, evaluating factors affecting the potential for successful development in landmine affected communities, development opportunities for the cleared land, opportunities for the whole community, and women's discussion of development opportunities and priorities." It appears that the partnership between UNDP and GICHD has been useful. The format of this and similar studies could be widely used as a way to generate more interest in linking development projects and mine action at the local level.

³⁸ . *Mine Action And Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy*. 2005.

<http://www.mineaction.org/doc.asp?d=40>

³⁹ . *United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010*.

http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MAEC_8_2_6_%20final%20PDF.pdf

⁴⁰ . UNGA. *Assistance in mine action: Report of the Secretary-General*. A/64/287. 12 August 2009

⁴¹ . *Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen*. <http://www.gichd.org/links-information-database/research-and-evaluation-reports/country/linksdb/evaluations/departure-of-the-devil-landmines-and-livelihoods-in-yemen-linking-mine-action-to-development/>

In general, however, the initial conclusion of this study is that integrating mine action and development projects has a long way to go. There is scant evidence of successful collaboration between the development plans at the national level and mine action communities on the ground. In a recent article in *The Journal of ERW and Mine Action*, experienced deminer Charles Down put his finger on the challenge.

Mine-action programs often proclaim the importance of mine action for development. Most are quite forthcoming with information when asked, and some have made their entire database readily available, whether on CD-ROM (Angola) or posted online (Colombia, Croatia). Often missing from this approach, however, is direct outreach to individual development actors in order to identify and eliminate the specific obstacles that landmines and ERW may pose to their development projects. For mine-action programs to support development successfully, national mine-action programs and demining organizations must understand the specific needs of development organizations. . . . Mine-action support to economic development is most effective when it is provided in direct support to development actors that are prepared to promptly carry out their project when the landmine obstacle is removed. “⁴²

UNDP’s other success in mine action has been funding the capacity-building aspect of mine action. An example is the development and use of the Information Management System for Mine Action. It “is a globally used and internationally accepted database and software system that allows mine-action programmes to efficiently correlate and evaluate information. . . . capable of receiving, analysing and displaying many types of data ranging from minefield locations, clearance operations and mine-risk education activities to agricultural development plans and movements of internally displaced persons.”⁴³ This system could be very useful in the expansion of mine action to other dimensions of development.

The information-management section is working closely with United Nations Mission in Sudan, the World Food Programme, the International Organization for Migration, the U.N. Joint Logistics Centre and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to develop a common system (not IMSMA, but compatible with it) that can facilitate integrated planning for humanitarian interventions in Sudan. In particular, this system could assist with tracking internally displaced persons/refugees and anticipating their movements and proximity to known/suspected mined or dangerous areas.⁴⁴

Another opportunity for synergies exists for SALW and landmines. These weapons have been impeding development since the early 1990s. Yet very few synergies have developed between these two dimensions of security. Both involve weapons collection, storage and destruction. Both require data collection, storage and analysis. While there have been various proposals over the years to look into how these two efforts could at a minimum reduce costs through joint efforts, little has been done. In the most recent study funded by the U.S. State Department and conducted by GICHD,

The conclusions and findings of the case studies and the supporting analysis of other relevant information have proposed several areas where common approaches to mine action and SALW might be valuable. Issues of storage and destruction, “risk education”,

⁴² . Charles Downs. “Linking Mine Action and Economic Development.” *The Journal of ERW and Mine Action*. Issue 14.1, Spring 2010. <http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/development/14.1/Notes/downs.htm>

⁴³ . *Information Management System for Mine Action in Sudan*.
<http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.2/notes/kabir/kabir.htm>.

⁴⁴ . *Ibid*

the “ammunition” component of explosive remnants of war all suggest more areas of possible synergy than is obvious from a traditional mine clearance perspective. This is also true of the perceived central role for the police in strategies based in integrated community action.⁴⁵

There are many mine action governance actors and roles. That of UNDP has been described as follow; “Supports development of national and local mine action capacity, promotes coordination between mine action and wider development community at country level.”⁴⁶ As indicated in this section, the *promotion* role has yet to translate into mine action that significantly impacts on peacebuilding and development. UNDP has a great deal of leverage in delivering comprehensive security, one main reason being that they focus on people and are on the ground. However, at this stage it appears that UNDP’s involvement in linking mine action and development consists mainly of assisting states to integrate demining into their national development plans. In this case they need to take advantage of this leverage and become more active at the local level.

2.3 Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)

DDR is the classic security and development program. It involves creating a secure situation, normally as a result of a peace agreement, which allows ex-combatants to come to a location and turn in their tools of violence, be demobilized and become a civilian, and then reintegrate into civil society. Ex-combatants are a threat to development because “demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) will tend to return to a life of violence if they find no legitimate livelihood, that is, if they are not “reintegrated” into the local economy.”⁴⁷ “DDR programs are situated squarely at the intersection between peace-building, security sector reform and socio-economic recovery, and as such, are a central element in integrated strategies for addressing the complex and multi-dimensional nature of conflict and post-conflict recovery.”⁴⁸ DDR is tailor-made for UNDP and has been part of its portfolio since the El Salvador peace agreements of 1992.

As we have seen with mine action and SALW control, UNDP has implemented programs at the operational level, providing technical assistance and working directly with insecure populations, and alongside organizations and personnel with specific security expertise, e.g., weapons collection and destruction, demining, etc. The same is true for UNDP’s role in all three phases of DDR. UNDP’s SALW expertise allows it to support “strengthening national capacities for weapons collection, stockpile management and destruction in the context of disarmament, as well as support for institutional and legal regulation of civilian weapons possession. UNDP also supports community disarmament as part of broader human security and armed violence reduction programmes.”⁴⁹

⁴⁵ . *Identifying Synergies between Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining. http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/MA_and_SALW_Oct2006.pdf

⁴⁶ . Alan Bryden. “Optimising Mine Action Policies and Practice.” In Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 159- 184.

⁴⁷ . Brahimi Report, para. 42.

⁴⁸ . UNDP. *Securing Development*. P. 27

⁴⁹ . UNDP. *Securing Development*. P. 28

In the demobilization phase “UNDP support includes establishment of discharge and registration facilities, registration and profiling of ex-combatants, needs assessments and mapping of economic opportunities, supporting special and vulnerable groups, administering transitional subsistence support services and providing limited training and employment referral services.”⁵⁰

Reintegration of the demobilized and disarmed ex-combatants is less of a security issue and more of a development issue, the phase most suited to UNDP’s capabilities and mission. UNDP supports “all aspects of reintegration, including rapid employment and professional/vocational training opportunities, ex-combatant-focused reintegration schemes (micro-enterprises, employment referral), and broader community-based reintegration frameworks. UNDP places a priority on ensuring that reintegration for ex-combatants is integrated into broader community recovery and reintegration processes, focusing particularly on area- based development frameworks and measures to strengthen community absorptive capacities.”⁵¹

It is important to note that there are two basic types of DDR programs; those associated with peace agreements (traditional DDR) and post-conflict, and those not associated with peace agreements (nontraditional). DDR programs emanating from peace agreements address the disarmament of warring parties (governments, armed groups). In that way they are more structured and have the potential of measuring and determining when the D and D phases have been completed. UNDP has played a major role in traditional DDR, working in collaboration with UNPKO.

For example, in integrated missions such as in Sudan, the collaboration between DPKO and UNDP is formal.

“In peacekeeping contexts such as Sudan, UNDP collaborates closely with the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the development of a common UN approach to DDR within ‘integrated’ peacekeeping missions. Such collaboration strengthens the DDR capacities and expertise of PKOs, provides greater strategic and programmatic depth, improves management of financial and UN system inputs, and provides a seamless interface between the security and military functions of DDR, as well as broader transition and reconstruction processes. UNDP’s participation also ensures an efficient mission exit strategy and follow-on.”⁵²

Current DDR In Peacekeeping Missions:

Haiti (MINUSTAH)
Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)
Sudan (UNMIS)
Darfur (UNAMID)
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)
Burundi (BINUB)

In non- peacekeeping DDR, UNDP plays a much larger role. First, such programs are funded

⁵⁰ . Ibid.

⁵¹ . Ibid

⁵² . UNDP. *Securing Development*, p. 28.

with voluntary contributions, not assessed contributions that characterized those programs led by UNDPKO. Secondly, most of these non-traditional DDR programs occur after the UN Mission has departed or has declared the DDR completed. The insecurities arising from incomplete DDR programs (and they are always incomplete) fall into the development basket and at the local level, where UNDP is normally situated. The following list indicates that this is not a trivial role for UNDP in DDR.

<p><u>DDR In Non-Peacekeeping</u> <u>Environments:</u> Afghanistan Burundi Central African Republic Chad (partially) Colombia Comoros Guinea Bissau Indonesia Iraq Kosovo (non-UN) Liberia Namibia Nepal Niger Nigeria OPT Papua New Guinea Philippines Democratic Republic of Congo Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan (East) Timor Leste Uganda Zimbabwe</p>

Traditional DDR programs do not address the diffusion of SALW which occurred during the conflict. In most cases hundreds of thousands of SALW remain in civil society. In many cases the reintegration of ex-combatants does not succeed completely and these (normally) men have little trouble finding these weapons and either reignite the armed political struggles of the past or form criminal gangs, armed with military weapons. It is in this post-traditional DDR environment that the UNDP has played a major role. UNDP's direct involvement on the ground allows them to make the assessments that reveal who has these weapons and why, and then develop strategies and plans to reduce the armed violence that stems from this situation. The Arms for Development programs discussed under SALW are such an example. In non-peacekeeping contexts such as Republic of Congo, however, UNDP takes on a larger share of the programmatic, coordination and operational functions in DDR owing to the absence of a mission. UNDP supported a micro-credit project in the Republic of the Congo to help reintegrate women combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups. By the end of 2008, micro-projects in food crops, animal husbandry

and small businesses were supporting these women and over 1,000 indirect beneficiaries.⁵³

At the strategic level, UNDP funds the Coordinator of the Inter-Agency Working Group in New York, shared with UNPKO. Their main task has been the development of International DDR Standards. Many of these standards are based on traditional DDR and reflect UNDPKO experience. However, UNDP has played a major role in the expansion of the IDDRS to cover more than male ex-combatants, connect it with security sector reform, rule of law, transitional justice, HIV-AIDS, etc.⁵⁴ In the current financial climate, the "joint" part of this work has been

⁵³ . *BCPR Annual Report 2008*, 22.

⁵⁴ . See www.unddr.org/iddrs/

cut. UNDP has been the major contributor to this work, while the other 16 members of the DDR community have cut back their contributions.⁵⁵ The individual members of the DDR community have become mainly interested in responding to the donors of their individual DDR work, at the expense of the holistic approach that leads to a more effective execution of DDR programs.

The 2008 BCPR annual report on DDR concluded with the following lessons learned. They are a direct result of the growing role of UNDP in DDR programming, which in turn results from the evolution of DDR from a traditional security approach (mainly DPKO) to a broader comprehensive security and development approach.

“Lessons learned

DDR should be carried out within a wider recovery framework. The disarmament of ex-combatants can only be sustainable if these ex-combatants are given the means to reintegrate back into their communities and the society at large. DDR should therefore be conducted within a broader recovery framework; this includes areas such as local governance, community security and livelihood creation.

Address gender issues from the start. Addressing gender from the outset of DDR efforts lead to more effective and sustainable results. This requires the early involvement of gender expertise. For example, in Sudan, the early involvement of a gender expert led to DDR programming and policies that better address the needs of women.

Long-term success requires greater resources. More predictable and dedicated resources are needed to ensure successful long-term reintegration of ex-combatants, a key factor for lasting peace.”⁵⁶

2.4. Security sector reform and governance

A fourth challenge in providing comprehensive human security is developing and maintaining national and local security providers who are effective and respectful of human rights and the rule of law. Surveys and assessments of civilians in fragile states have indicated for a long time that insecurity and fear are their primary concerns. They also indicate that most often they fear the military and police sworn to protect them and their human rights. The civilian population of fragile states seeks freedom from fear, freedom from the negative effects of SALW, landmines and ex-combatants who engage in criminal armed violence.⁵⁷ The global community has been attempting to create this freedom since the advent of human security in the 1990s. UNDP has been involved since the beginning.⁵⁸

In the beginning, SSR primarily involved police training and reform. UNDP played a major role in El Salvador.

⁵⁵ . Interview with UNDP New York staff.

⁵⁶ . *BCPR Annual Report 2008*, 23.

⁵⁷ . For a thorough literature review of the research that demonstrates the link between security, justice and development see Olawake Ismail and Dylan Hendrickson. *What is the case for a security and justice focus in development assistance programming? An assessment of existing literature and evidence?* University of Birmingham, 2009. http://www.ssrnetwork.net/publications/security_a.php

⁵⁸ . For the history of SSR during the Cold War through 2006, see Nicole Ball and Alan Hendriksen. *Trends In Security Sector Reform (SSR):Policy, Practice And Research*. <http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/11393310961BallHendrickson.doc>.

“Police reform in El Salvador has occupied a central place in UN efforts for more than 12 years, ever since the San Jose Peace Accords of 1991. A major challenge was to transform a police force that had trained for war and now had to treat people with respect. UNDP and OHCHR have devoted enormous resources and much time to training, creating modules and helping local police leadership develop police doctrine. They have produced key documents, including a Code of Conduct, Operating Procedures for various specialist police divisions (Border Police, Ports and Airports, Interpol Division, Mounted Police, Technical and Scientific Police, Public Order or “Riot” Police), Citizen Complaint Forms for instances of alleged police misconduct and Forms for Police Units to record and pursue citizens’ complaints. This reflects an emphasis on “capacity building” to enable the prime “duty bearers” to fulfill obligations to respect human rights. Training trainers and enhancing the knowledge base at the police academy- both the trainers and the library and other pedagogical tools- received much attention from the UN and other actors.”⁵⁹

UNDP established itself as a credible and effective provider of security sector transformation, through the specific technical assistance described above, its willingness to provide funds for such work (gap-filling), and its effective collaboration with all relevant organizations from NGOs to UNOCHR. As the El Salvador work increased in intensity and scope there was a major problem with multiple donors going their own way. The UNSG designated the UNDP representative in El Salvador to coordinate all the SSR efforts. In one final note, the UN peacekeeping mission ONUSAL was being pushed to leave in 1995. Their exit was made more feasible due to the effective role being played by UNDP, and the security sector work continued without interruption upon the disbanding of ONUSAL.

By the year 2000, it was clear that many peace operations had failed, despite successful police reform. The report of the UNSG’s Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (referred to as the Brahimi Report) squarely addressed this issue.

39...United Nations civilian police monitors are not peacebuilders if they simply document or attempt to discourage by their presence abusive or other unacceptable behaviour of local police officers — a traditional and somewhat narrow perspective of civilian police capabilities. Today, missions may require civilian police to be tasked to reform, train and restructure local police forces according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights, as well as having the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for self-defence.... The modern role of civilian police needs to be better understood and developed. In short, a doctrinal shift is required in how the Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations, as well as the need for an adequately resourced team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights, through judicial, penal, human rights and policing experts working together in a coordinated and collegial manner.⁶⁰

Based on the findings of this panel’s report the UN system and the SSR epistemic community began a major overhaul of security sector reform, starting with the police. (See next section for the addition of rule of law and access to justice to SSR). First, the Report noted that one of the keys to successful peace operations is working at the local level, the primary *modus operandi* of UNDP. This has become a global standard for police reform. “Local history, traditions and culture must be acknowledged in all police reforms; failing to anchor programs in local realities means that the programs, too, will fail. Broad-based expertise is required.”⁶¹ This transition was

⁵⁹ . William G. O’Neill. *Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What we know and what we still need to Know*. International Peace Academy, 2005. p. 57.

⁶⁰ . Brahimi report paras 39-40.

⁶¹ . O’Neill, p. 5

also straight-forward given UNDP's emphasis on human security which effected its police training in the 1990s (See El Salvador experience above).

In 2003 UNDP/BCPR formed a Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice (JSSR) team to provide technical support and assistance to Regional Bureaus and Country Offices.⁶² The 2003 JSSR report developed two matrices which outline what this new approach would look like in terms of UNDP programming: one for the law enforcement sector and the other for the judicial sector.⁶³

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) began to address security sector reform as a follow-on to the Brahimi Report. UNDP was a major player as OECD-DAC developed their initial *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*,⁶⁴ published in 2005. This has led to the *OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*⁶⁵ in 2007, which is viewed as the culmination of a decade research and practice.

The *Handbook* first defines the actors and institutions that are addressed.

The OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance agreed by ministers in 2004 defines the security system as including: core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia).⁶⁶

It is a global consensus document designed to:

1. Create a more coherent strategy for SSR
2. Enhance the capacity of SSR actors and institutions
3. Enhance oversight and cross-government training
4. Take a strategic approach to SSR assessments
5. Design SSR support programmes that build ownership and balance capacity and governance needs
6. Promote whole-of-government approaches to SSR implementation

In 2008 the UNSG delivered the report *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform*. It reinforced much of the work done by OECD, cited UNDP studies in El Salvador and Guatemala which show the “significant negative impact that prolonged insecurity can have on national economic growth,” and cited UNDP expertise in supporting institutional development in the areas of justice and security, as well as in legislative and civil society oversight.⁶⁷

⁶² . UNDP/BCPR. *Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice*. March 2003

⁶³ . UNDP JSSR report pp. 21-22.

⁶⁴ . *Security System Reform and Governance*.2005 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>

⁶⁵ . *OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*. OECD-DAC 2007.

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>

⁶⁶ . *OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*,, p. 5.

⁶⁷ . *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform* A/62/659–S/2008/39, paras. 25-28. 23 January 2008

It stated that UNDPKO has a different role than UNDP. “In most cases, however, the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations includes assisting national authorities in restoring and reforming their security arrangements. ... (On the other hand) UNDP plays an active role in crisis and post-conflict situations and supports the implementation of capacity-development programmes tailored to put in place foundations for recovery and development. UNDP assistance entails both justice and security and is geared towards long-term development and sustainability. At the request of Governments, UNDP emphasizes the protection of civilians, access to justice and the rule of law and democratic governance in recovery and peacebuilding environments.”

There is some preliminary evidence from implementing SSR in the UN integrated missions.⁶⁸ A DCAF study of SSR in Kosovo, DRC, Burundi and Haiti shows that in “all four case studies.....integrated missions prioritise certain aspects of SSR to the detriment of others, or leave key dimensions of SSR under- or even unaddressed. For example, support for overarching activities such as security sector reviews and the development of SSR strategies which should precede any specific SSR activity are still the exception rather than the rule, although some integrated missions have recently been assigned with such tasks (e.g. UNMIK, UNMIT).⁶⁹ In both documents and interviews, this study revealed concern by BCPR that having UNDP involved in security sector reform creates inherent problems, regardless of the new people-centered development approach. It appears that the term SSR itself evokes memories of the old approach that focused on traditional “national security.” The 2008 annual report of the RoL, Justice and Security Unit reported

“apparent disagreements between UN member states on both the scope and the method of SSR as well as on the role of the UN and member states in SSR processes. Those disagreements have been expressed during the C34 and the SC discussions on the SG report and led to the non-endorsement of the SG recommendation to create an interagency SSR unit. Many UN agencies are also still reluctant to adopt the concept and repeatedly made the point that the SSR agenda cannot be separated of the better-established UN rule of law agenda. Moreover, some member states have raised concerns about the mandate of UNDP to work on SSR.”⁷⁰

The most recent effort by UNDP to address Security Sector Reform is in Timor Leste. In the excerpt from the June 2008 Project Document below, note the justification (in bold) used by UNDP to continue playing a major role in security sector reform.

UNMIT has been mandated by the UN Security Council Resolutions 1704 (2006), 1745 (2007) and 1802 (2008) to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) in conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector. This process already underway builds upon recent and current analytical and planning work. Additionally, the Millennium Declaration identifies conflict prevention as a key peace and security challenge. **Decision 2001/1 on the role of UNDP in crisis and post crisis situations recognizes that ‘crisis prevention and disaster mitigation are integral parts of sustainable human development strategies’.** This project document sets out the nature and modalities of UNMIT/UNDP assistance to RDTL as it conducts a comprehensive security sector review,

⁶⁸ . *Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo*. DCAF

⁶⁹ . See also Robert Muggah. “Great Expectations: disintegrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti” *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*. March 2007

⁷⁰ . *2008 Annual Report UNDP Strengthening*, p. 26.

which would ultimately define technical assistance and capacity development needs in the areas of security sector transformation, crisis management and recovery.

The Emerging Concept of Security Governance

The term “security governance” was initiated in a major work in 2005 by DCAF, *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. The book covers security governance in the sectors of SSR, SALW, mine action and RoL, in an effort to assess the possibility of an overarching security governance regime for peacebuilding. The conclusion is that there is an “emerging security sector governance agenda, which offers important opportunities to link, sequence and reorganize the various elements of post-conflict peacebuilding. The fundamental message of these contributions calls for integrated, holistic and long-term approaches to interventions in post-conflict states.”⁷¹

UNDP has begun to apply this concept as its work becomes more multidimensional and inclusive of the seven security sectors analyzed in this study.

UNDP has been engaged in security sector reform (SSR) since 2002. UNDP defines the aims of SSR as institutionalizing a “professional security sector that is effective, responsive, efficient, legitimate, apolitical and accountable to the citizens whom it is duty-bound to protect...Put differently, security sector reform is at its core an attempt to make the military and police accountable to laws, democratic oversight and checks and balances, rather than subject to the discretion of individual commanders or police chiefs. Impunity in the security sector weakens legitimacy and perpetuates human rights violations.”⁷²

In broadening the SSR concept to Security Sector Governance (SSG), UNDP cites its mandate to transform institutions as well as the lives of people.

From these experiences, UNDP has learned some key lessons: that SSR plays a vital role in breaking the vicious circle of conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment, and that:

*Such issues as normative and consultative frameworks, institutional management, and oversight mechanisms are often neglected in a security sector reform process, which can undermine the objectives, intended to be achieved by such reform and result in a net decrease in security.*⁹

Consequently, UNDP understands SSR as fundamentally a governance issue whether in conflict, post-conflict or developing country contexts. As a result, UNDP’s contribution to SSR is to provide support to Member States and regional organizations to enhance the governance of security institutions. Subsequently, for UNDP SSG is an institutional framework, set of standards and practices conducive to providing effective and responsive security services to the people and ensuring security institutions’ are accountable under the law. This contributes to an enabling environment for real improvements in people’s lives and in the choices and opportunities open to them. It also builds and consolidates the rule of law.⁷³

The UNDP-Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat report *Enhancing Security Sector Governance in the Pacific Region: A Strategic Framework* represents a major step forward in clarifying SSG conceptually, operationally and empirically. Conceptually the report describes the key elements of SSG as:

⁷¹ . *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, 257.

⁷² . *Enhancing Security Sector Governance in the Pacific Region: A Strategic Framework*. UNDP Pacific Centre, 2010. p. 18 http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/jssr/ssg_pacific.pdf

⁷³ . SSG Pacific p. 21. Also see Figure 2 on page 22: Security Sector Governance.

- Legal Frameworks
- Executive – Strategic Security Policy Direction and Decision Making
- Democratic Oversight – Legislature, Judiciary, Accountability Institutions, Civil Society and the Media
- Gender and Governance of Security Institutions⁷⁴

The study then examined the security governance situation in the Pacific States of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. This research produced a set of deficiencies in the region which are then translated into operational programmes:

- The lack of and weak or outdated legal frameworks to deal with security concerns;
- The lack of overarching security policies, including the appropriate role of security institutions, which are agreed through public consultation;
- Institutional and capacity constraints within line ministries responsible for security policy formulation and management;
- Executive dominance and limited capacity amongst MPs and within parliamentary secretariats to engage with security matters;
- Weak and overlapping mandates and internal capacity constraints within accountability institutions to deal with complaints against and maladministration of security institutions; and
- A lack of critical mass within civil society that has expertise on security issues and their continued exclusion from formal discussions on security matters.⁷⁵

The report ends with a set of examples of successful security sector governance. In effect it can serve as the model for SSG in any area where SSG is weak, especially the fragile states.

Security Sector Governance in Fragile States

In fragile states, security governance is a useful concept to bring together the seven security sectors that are the subject of this study. Governance is the process by which the full range of actors manages an issue (e.g., human security): agenda-setting, policymaking, negotiating, and dealing with non-compliance with the norms and standards applicable to that issue.

In the fragile states examined in this study, UNDP and other actors entered the country when national governance had collapsed or was never there in the first place. Much of the “governance” that existed, and in most of these states still exists, resembles global governance. There is a plethora of actors external to the state providing security in these seven sectors, in a manner that can lead to capacity development that leads to national governments becoming capable of and responsible for security governance. There is a horizontal dimension- interaction among the plethora of actors- as well as a vertical dimension- the state interacting with lower levels of government down to the local community. Mine action provides an example. Governance is first subject to an accepted set of norms regarding anti-personnel landmines, i.e.,

⁷⁴ . SSG Pacific pp. 13-14

⁷⁵ . *Ibid*, p. 27.

the landmine ban treaty. Norms exist regarding demining, destruction of stockpiles, treatment of victims, and mine risk education. The insecurity created by landmines is governed by a set of actors, external and internal to a state, which are bound by these norms and a set of processes (Mine Action Standards) accepted as common practice. External actors build capacity at the national level, and then that is transmitted down and developed at the local level. As this study has indicated, mine action tends to be very one-dimensional and it is not very well integrated with the other security and development structures and processes.

DDR is governed in a similar fashion, although much less successfully. DDR is inherently political, as seen in the case of Sudan. The international community is working to develop DDR standards (IDDRS) to govern these programs but these norms are subject to criticism when they seem like one-size fits all. Colletta and Muggah argue that there is more than one way to address ex-combatants.⁷⁶

Security governance of issues related to the availability and misuse of SALW is fairly well developed and also integrated with other post-conflict security regimes, e.g., DDR, CPM (e.g., conflict mapping as part of the CSAC in Sudan), SSR (e.g., UN standards on use of firearms by police), and RoL and justice (firearms laws restricting access of civilians to SALW). Global initiatives such as the UNPoA and regional SALW protocols have established norms, governmental focal points, and a strong civil society element that allow for a moderate level of governance.

As for the issues and problems related to the need for security sector reform, RoL and access to justice and conflict prevention and management, there is significantly less governance. One reason is that unlike the more technical areas of SALW, mine action, and DDR, the global standards needed to provide the glue for security governance, in SSR, for example, is not developed as of yet. (See the UNDP Pacific Islands study discussed above). The confusion that reigns in SSR makes the point. Until we are further along in this regard, the overall governance of an integrated security sector in fragile states is far off.

2.5 RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE

In the previously cited publication *What is the case for a security and justice focus in development assistance programming?* there were three major findings.

- The poor consider security and justice needs as priorities
- Security and justice are necessary to meet the Millennium Development Goals e.g., the effect which insecurity has on development, etc.
- Actual examples of the effect on the poor when security and justice needs are not met (e.g. armed violence statistics, etc.)

Evidence such as this has led to the conclusion that providing security, as part of development must be based on the rule of law and access to justice, the primary purpose of the United Nations.

⁷⁶ . See Nat J. Colletta and Robert Muggah, “Rethinking Post-War Security Promotion,” *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (2009), 1-25. .

“To strengthen protection, we must reassert the centrality of international humanitarian and human rights law. We must strive to end the culture of impunity—which is why the creation of the International Criminal Court is so important. We must also devise new strategies to meet changing needs.” This quote from the UNSG’s Millennium Report, along with the Brahimi report, was the start of the global movement to base all peacebuilding efforts on the rule of law.

“Rule of Law is “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”⁷⁷

As with SSR, each UN agency had a different history and approach to post-conflict peacebuilding, and this inevitably led to different approaches in responding to the call for integrating the rule of law into all UN programming.

UNDPKO

“The [Department of Peacekeeping Operations](#) (DPKO) and the [Department of Field Support](#) (DFS), are responsible for the establishment and management of fifteen UN peacekeeping operations and two political missions functioning around the world. In the context of these increasing challenges, one of the main priorities is to ensure sustainability by supporting, amongst others, reforms in the rule of law of the host countries. In addition, DPKO is the designated United Nations lead entity in strengthening legal and judicial institutions and guiding security sector reform where there are peacekeeping operations. DPKO is the UN lead entity for police and corrections issues and the system-wide coordinator of inter-agency efforts for mine action.”⁷⁸

The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) was created within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 2007 to provide an integrated and forward-looking approach to United Nations post-conflict assistance in the areas of rule of law and security institutions.

UNDP

“UNDP is the UN’s global development network – an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. On the ground in 166 countries, UNDP works to assist national counterparts on their own solutions to global and national development challenges, considering rule of law an indispensable factor for the enhancement of human development and the reduction of poverty.

⁷⁷ . *Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*” 2004

⁷⁸ . *United Nations Rule of Law website*. <http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?n=dpko>

Rule of Law is a core pillar of UNDP's work – falling within the Focus Areas of both Democratic Governance and Crisis Prevention & Recovery.⁷⁹ The Executive Board of UNDP has established that the rule of law constitutes one of UNDP's core businesses in support of democratic governance in crisis and post-conflicts situations.⁸⁰ With an in-country presence before, during and after a conflict, UNDP is increasingly expected to assume a substantive role in providing rule of law assistance to countries threatened or affected by armed conflict.

In 2008 UNDP rolled out its Global Programme on *Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict- and Post- Conflict Situations: A Global UNDP Programme for Justice and Security 2008-2011*.⁸¹ The Global Program forms the blueprint for UNDP's engagement on rule of law, based on justice and security. It establishes close linkages between protection and the rule of law, and between humanitarian action and development principles. On the basis of the 2004 Report of the Secretary-General⁸² UNDP's support to rule of law addresses UN system-wide priorities in a sequenced manner. Assistance endeavours to respond to urgent needs for justice and security, and also lay early foundations for recovery and long-term development.

“Through a sequenced approach tailored for both conflict and post-conflict situations, the Global Programme focuses on 5 key programme areas: i) strengthening the rule of law within an early recovery framework; ii) addressing women's security and access to justice; iii) supporting capacity development of rule of law, justice and security institutions; iv) facilitating transitional justice; and v) promoting confidence building and reconciliation.”⁸³

In addition the Global Programme specifically links its work to other UNDP security sectors such as Community Security and Social Cohesion, Conflict Prevention, DDR and Armed Violence Prevention.

Consolidated or emerging programmes have been developed in Somalia, Sudan, Timor Leste, Colombia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Iraq, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. With over 20 priority countries under the global programme, UNDP is now building a strong portfolio and credibility on rule of law programming in conflict and post-conflict situations.

UNDP also has a considerable justice system reform portfolio in development contexts, and in 2008 76 country offices were implementing initiatives to enhance the system of rule of law and access to justice. To support ongoing and new programming initiatives UNDP has launched a new Global Programme *Accelerating Access to Justice for Human Development* that focuses on non-crisis countries. This Global Programme provides support to national stakeholders, including both the state and the civil society, to develop strategies and programmes to strengthen the capacity of their justice systems. The initiatives are anchored in national development plans and

⁷⁹ . *UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011/DP/2007/43*, 16 July 2007, paragraphs 84 and 102.

⁸⁰ . *Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations*, DP/2001/4 of 27 November 2000

⁸¹ . www.undp.org/cpr/documents/jssr/rule_of_law_final.pdf

⁸² . UNSC. *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*. S/2004/616* 23 August 2004.

⁸³ . *Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations*, p. 6.

are implemented by national partners. The Programme also responds to immediate justice needs in the field of both civil and criminal justice by supporting public legal aid, including both pro-bono services by attorneys and para-legals; increasing legal awareness and strengthening women's rights. The Programme also addresses grave challenges such as inhumane prison conditions, lengthy pre-trial detention, and impunity for perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence.⁸⁴

UNDP publications such as *Making the Law Work for Everyone*⁸⁵ and *Programming for Justice: Access for All*⁸⁶ established itself as the organization playing a critical role in the rule of law effort as peacebuilding takes on a more human rights and development focus. This “access to justice” approach is in clear contrast to that of UNDPKO. Their 2006 publication, *Primer For Justice Components In Multidimensional Peace Operations: Strengthening The Rule Of Law* is oriented to the national level within a peacekeeping focus. Only the last four pages are dedicated to Increasing Access to Justice—Developing Legal Aid, Indigent Services and Civil Legal Education and Promoting Gender Justice and Victim's Rights.⁸⁷

This new approach is sorely needed. A 2008 study on rule of law in the integrated mission in Liberia shows that “UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts continue to focus on increasing the capacity of the state and on the technical improvement of the legal system, and not on the impact and access to justice. Although there has been some debate on UN legal reforms in post-conflict contexts, the UN approaches to legal reform can still be characterized by a “rule of law orthodoxy”.⁸⁸

The UNSG's 2008 report *The rule of law at the national and international levels*⁸⁹ is a review of the roles that each UN agency plays in rule of law activities. It contains an “Inventory of the current activities of the various organs, bodies, offices, departments, funds and programmes within the United Nations system devoted to the promotion of the rule of law at the national and international levels.”⁹⁰ Entries (activities) for each organization are below:

UNDP-143
OHCHR- 104
UNPKO- 50
UNDPA-43
UNODC- 42
UNHCR-37
UNICEF-29

⁸⁴ . http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=13. Also see UNDP/BCPR's 2008 annual report

⁸⁵ http://www.undp.org/publications/Making_the_Law_Work_for_Everyone%20%28final%20rpt%29.pdf

⁸⁶ . http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Justice_Guides_ProgrammingForJustice-AccessForAll.pdf

⁸⁷ . http://fr.unrol.org/files/UNDPKO_justiceinmultidimensionalpeaceop.pdf

⁸⁸ . Till Blume.” Implementing the Rule of Law in Integrated Missions: Security and Justice in the UN Mission in Liberia. *Journal of Security Sector Management*. July 2008, 1-18.

⁸⁹ . *The rule of law at the national and international levels*. A/63/64. 12 March 2008.

⁹⁰ . <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48da30bf2.pdf>

The staff of the UNDP/BCPR's Rule of Law, Justice and Security Unit takes the position that rule of law and justice should be the basic organizing principle for all UNDP security programs. In that regard they interact with the various UNDP security programs on the ground (SALW, DDR, etc) in an attempt to reshape existing and future programs to reflect the rule of law focus. An excellent example of a successful transformation in this regard is Kosovo. UNDP's first entry point in the UN's state- and peacebuilding was SALW, which ended in abject failure, as the civilian population was in no mood to give up their weapons. The second project was called Kosovo Small Arms Control (KOSSAC), much smaller than the first and more modest. This was replaced by KOSSAC II in 2008, which still retained a SALW focus but had the stated outcome of "Effective judicial and policing institutions established and contribute to increased personal security." Finally, the renamed RoL, Security and Justice Unit worked with the country team to develop the current project: Kosovo Justice and Security Program 2009-2011. Its outputs include reducing gender-based violence, improved access to justice, strengthened capacity of justice institutions, development of an effective, democratically-controlled Kosovo security sector, SALW control through armed violence reduction, and promotion of social cohesion.⁹¹

2.6 CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND REDUCTION

The Brahimi Report stressed the need for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

"The Panel wishes to commend the United Nations ongoing internal Task Force on Peace and Security for its work in the area of long-term prevention, in particular the notion that development entities in the United Nations system should view humanitarian and development work through a "conflict prevention lens" and make long-term prevention a key focus of their work, adapting current tools, such as the common country assessment and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), to that end."⁹²

In 2001 the report *Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in Analysis and Programming: A review of CCA/UNDAF Processes*⁹³ showed that there was a real need for integrating conflict prevention into development planning. "The purpose of this study was to carry out a review of Common Country Assessment (CCA) United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) to assess the degree to which conflict risk factors and conflict prevention concerns are incorporated in current UN system assessments and strategies..... The CCA/UNDAFs (in the study) are evaluated on whether they acknowledge and explain situations of conflict and whether they provide any analysis of conflict, its causes and dynamics." The study concluded that "the integration of conflict issues in the CCAs range from very good to poor. While there are strong examples such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, Rwanda and others, there are also striking examples of CCAs which either do not mention or mention cursorily the very obvious fact of war or conflict..."⁹⁴

91 .

92 . Brahimi Report paragraph 30

93 . http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/prevention/integrate/CCA_and_UNDAF_Review.doc

94 . Ibid p. 11

In 2008, UNDP had three pillars of work in preventing managing and reducing violent conflicts taking place in 26 countries:

- (1) preventing electoral violence and supporting political transitions;⁹⁵
- (2) engaging in dialogue and peacebuilding; and
- (3) promoting conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming.⁹⁶

“UNDP has a vast array of conflict prevention and recovery tools at its disposal. Yet to maximize the effectiveness and usefulness of these tools, UNDP must ensure that the full range of services – among them the rapid deployment of expertise – is readily available to countries in need. As part of this effort, in 2008, UNDP, together with the Department of Political Affairs, scaled up the number of Peace and Development Advisers in the field. These advisers are the first and only such UN group of experts actively engaged in conflict prevention initiatives. There are currently 26 experts deployed in 21 countries.⁹⁷”

UNDP’s assistance includes: improving local capacities to resolve conflict through both traditional and modern mediation mechanisms; facilitating dialogues to help build consensus on divisive issues; strengthening the skills of key stakeholders for negotiation and consensus-building; ensuring higher education institutes have the ability to teach this area of work; and supporting women’s networks engaged in peacebuilding activities. A strong focus on gender equality is an important part of all UNDP’s programming, particularly in the area of conflict prevention, as women and girls are not only the greatest victims of violence, but also, in many cases, the strongest proponents for dialogue and peace.⁹⁸

An example of the focus on conflict analysis as prevention was the 2008 UNDP supported “conflict analysis exercise in North Kivu, whose main findings were presented to the provincial authorities, civil society organisations and the international community in Goma in April 2009. This exercise, undertaken in partnership with the Provincial Government, gave voice to communities, both men and women, on what they see as development and peacebuilding priorities in North Kivu.”⁹⁹

Conflict prevention, management and reduction are at the heart of UNDP’s recent focus on Community Security and Social Cohesion. In August 2009 UNDP produced a draft study, which defined CSSC as follows:

“CSSC is a programmatic approach that integrates security and development interventions. It brings together a wide range of State and civil society actors to identify the causes of insecurity and develop a coordinated response to them at the community level, and an enabling environment at the national level. It emphasizes participatory assessments, planning and

⁹⁵ . For a recent overview of UNDP’s work on elections and conflict prevention in seven countries see *Elections and Conflict Prevention: A guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming*. UNDP. Democratic Governance Group. Bureau for Development Policy.

⁹⁶ BCPR 2008 Report

⁹⁷ . BCPR Annual Report 2008

⁹⁸ . *Fast Facts: Conflict Prevention*. http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/fastfacts_conflict_prevention_final.pdf

⁹⁹ . *Peacebuilding in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo*.
http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_work/drc_peacebuilding.shtml

accountability and seeks to improve service delivery, reduce social exclusion, enhance relations between social groups and strengthen democratic governance.”¹⁰⁰

CSSC approaches therefore typically include the following key pillars:

- Enhancing local governance and strengthening local institutions.
- Strengthening the rule of law and security sector governance.
- Preventing conflict and supporting peacebuilding.
- Providing alternative opportunities for employment and better livelihoods.
- Improving the community environment and enhancing service delivery.
- Addressing the proliferation of the tools of violence and the demand for weapons.
- Taking a public health approach to crime and violence.

The CSSC paper directly addresses conflict prevention and peacebuilding:

63. Enhancing community security and social cohesion requires a *preventive approach* that addresses a broad range of risk factors. Multi-stakeholder dialogue is used as a peacebuilding tool to bring together different social groups to develop common approaches to community problems. Emphasis is put on strengthening local capacities for peace, such as community forums and district/provincial peace committees that can play a role in conflict resolution as well as provide early warning information about potential conflict issues. CSSC approaches can play a role in facilitating reconciliation processes and seeking to cross ethnic divisions through, for example, supporting Inter-Ethnic Councils.

Examples of the CSSC in action include the Ituri district of the DRC, Kosovo, Liberia and recently Somalia. In the latter case it is the only viable option for providing comprehensive security, given that there is no state to provide meaningful security.

2.7 GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE.

UNDP’s gender programming is based on the 8 Point Agenda adopted in 2007.

1. Stop violence against women
2. Provide justice and security for women
3. Advance women as decision-makers
4. Involve women in all peace processes
5. Support women and men to build back better
6. Promote women as leaders of recovery
7. Include women’s issues on the national agenda
8. Work together to transform society

Examples related to reducing gender-based violence include:

1. STRENGTHEN WOMEN’S SECURITY IN CRISIS: Stop violence against women

UNDP in Action: Kosovo - UN Administrated Territory under UNSC 1244

UNDP’s Women’s Safety and Security Initiative seeks to improve the security environment for women in the UN-administered territory of Kosovo. Since 2007, working with government ministries and civil society organizations, the project has helped establish and equip interview rooms for survivors of

¹⁰⁰ . *Community Security and Social Cohesion (CSSC): Towards a UNDP Approach*, p. 22

trafficking and domestic violence in six regional police stations. UNDP has supported the Ministry of Internal Affairs in developing the Kosovo strategy and national action plan against trafficking of humans. The project has also funded local organizations that provide shelter to victims of domestic violence; rallied women parliamentarians to the cause; and conducted research and consultations of the draft law on domestic violence and the accompanying national action plan.

2. ADVANCE GENDER JUSTICE: Provide justice and security for women

UNDP in Action: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rape and other forms of sexual violence persist on a large scale in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where many perpetrators enjoy effective impunity. UNDP's Access to Justice project works to stem the social epidemic of rape in the region. The project has trained paralegals, advisors who aid survivors of sexual violence in their interactions with the police and courts; organized community-based religious and civil groups to recognize the warning signs of impending sexual violence; worked with university faculty in Goma to establish a legal aid clinic; and engaged with traditional community leaders to help reintegrate survivors of sexual violence into society.¹⁰¹

In Sudan the UNDP-supported Darfur Rule of Law project launched a major campaign to increase awareness of a key legal system amendment removing a major obstacle to survivors who seek treatment and attempt to file criminal reports. The ongoing initiative focuses on actively taking the simple but critical messages directly to the population, including internally displaced people and isolated communities. For example, in October 2008, UNDP, in collaboration with the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), presented them to more than 50 police officers and inspectors in Darfur.¹⁰²

In Liberia, UNDP supported a large-scale effort to encourage women to testify before the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Working through local non-governmental organizations (including women's groups), the joint effort reached over 11,200 women and conducted workshops preparing hundreds of women to testify. Although some of these women did not eventually testify (due to Commission time constraints and/or their choice not to) Commission records indicate that 217 did (representing 38 percent of all witnesses).¹⁰³

In Afghanistan in November 2009, UNDP supported the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women in a ceremony in Herat. It was jointly sponsored by the Department of Women's Affairs (DoWA) of Herat province and UNDP Gender Equality Project in joint collaboration with Afghan Independent Human Right Commission (AIHRC), Municipality, Governor's Office and Civic Society Organizations (CSOs).

In 2007 UNDP published *Gender Sensitive Police Reform in Post Conflict Societies*. It was based on lessons learned from UNDP's work in gender-sensitive police reform in Kosovo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. "The study's findings show that gender-sensitive police reform constitutes a vital instrument in advancing the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, and implementing women's human rights entitlements under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ . http://www.undp.org/cpr/how_we_do/8pa_2009.shtml

¹⁰² . *BCPR Annual Report 2008*, 53.

¹⁰³ . *Ibid*, 54.

¹⁰⁴ . http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/Gender_Sensitive_Police_Reform_Policy_Brief_2007.pdf

In partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Designmatters (Pasadena, California) and Art Center's Graphic Design program led a Fall 2008 studio to develop research directions in support of messaging for the “Partners for Prevention” program, a joint initiative of UNDP, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and United Nations Volunteers (UNV). “Students were challenged to develop core branding elements for campaigns to provoke positive behavior change amongst boys and men to combat prevailing cycles of violence against women.”

2.8 Summary Of Section 2

Section One of this study describes how UNDP programmes in each security programmatic sector became linked to development. This section has provided abundance of evidence that the paradigmatic shift to human security made UNDP a natural participant and in some cases the leader in security programmes. As the section demonstrated UNDP is well-leveraged to assume this role. First, through its programs, funding and consultative work, UNDP has demonstrated effectiveness and expertise in each of the security sectors. See Table below:

UNDP Programs in Human Security

Program	AFG	BUR	CAR	DRC	HAI	IRQ	LIB	KOS	SL	SOM	SUD
SALW Control	+	+			+		+	+	+		+
Mine Action						+				+	+
DDR	+		+				+				+
SSR	+	+			+	+		+	+	+	+
Rule of law, access to justice	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gender-based violence reduction	+					+		+	+		
Conflict prevention, management resolution				+	+			+	+	+	+

Second, the current established multi-sector approach to security programming and capacity-building in fragile post-conflict states came about due in no small part to UNDP's effort to transform the traditional approach to providing security into one that reflects developmental goals. UNDP was among the first global actors to demonstrate that is not enough to collect weapons, demine, demobilize ex-combatants, etc. These approaches must be linked together and comprehensive in scope, and governed by the establishment of the rule of law and access to justice.

2.9 Toward Comprehensive Security: The Community Security and Social Cohesion Approach

The above review of the seven sectors of security reveals a steady evolution linking security with development. In addition it reveals that synergies between these separate sectors have evolved. For example, SALW control and DDR programmes are very linked. The same would be true between DDR and GBV.

In order to better integrate the seven sectors into “comprehensive security,” UNDP has initiated the Community Security and Social Cohesion approach.¹⁰⁵ In fragile states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo and others the approach is to focus first on a community's security needs and then design an integrated program to address these needs. The objective is to go beyond the Arms for Development project and address all seven security dimensions in a holistic fashion, if necessary, especially rule of law and access to justice, conflict between rival groups, lack of effective policing, etc. This approach builds on UNDP lessons learned from several Arms for Development programs (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo) that assumed that every community needed to disarm to improve security. In reality these communities needed much more, and resisted starting with disarmament.

In February 2010, UNDP/BCPR Geneva hosted a Community of Practice workshop to review progress to date. Over 60 senior managers, experts and practitioners met to exchange knowledge, experience, and examples of good practice globally. The draft report from that meeting moved the CSSC concept forward by “highlighting examples of good practice, identifying programmatic entry points, and drawing out lessons from practical experience of applying the CSSC approach in crisis contexts.”¹⁰⁶ Interviews with several attendees indicated that there was some uncertainty about the CSSC. Was it a new concept or rather putting a new label on what they were doing already? However, overall the report illustrates that the CSSC concept is growing and succeeding in approaching “comprehensive security” as a global standard.

One contribution of the report is to justify the new approach based on a new security environment which now includes violent urban areas, gangs, drug trafficking radical political violence and the increase in fragile contexts. The CSSC approach is designed to address these new challenges by “working with authorities in different contexts of fragility, targeting new and challenging actors (gang members, militia, community defence forces), working with local

¹⁰⁵ . *Community Security and Social Cohesion (CSSC): Towards a UNDP Approach*. Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. UNDP August 2009. UNDP Draft Paper.

¹⁰⁶ . *Community Security and Social Cohesion Community of Practice* UNDP Draft 5 May 2010.

institutions and non-state actors, operating in remote and insecure environments, and using different approaches for urban and rural areas.¹⁰⁷

The report contains many sections on the way forward for the CSSC approach. These include deepening good practice in UNDP's CSSC work: enhancing the social cohesion dimensions of programming, enhancing the security dimensions of programming (taking stock of "community policing" experience, balancing security and justice, and engaging with the military and non-state armed groups), youth focused programming and gender dimensions of violence. The Report also develops the synergies between the CSSC approach and UNDP's existing thematic programming areas. Entry points for the CSSC approach include livelihoods and economic recovery, DDR, governance, conflict prevention and peace-building, rule of law, security and justice, armed violence reduction, SALW control and mine action.

The Report contains 11 brief case studies of CSSC in action, which include Results and Lessons. These include:

- State-building and stabilization in Afghanistan
- Building trust between Palestinian and Lebanese communities
- Linking baseline assessment, prioritization and M&E in Croatia
- Social cohesion and livelihoods in Nepal
- Community-based reintegration of former combatants in northern Uganda
- Developing accountability of local services in Jamaica
- Strengthening peace committees in Kenya
- Strengthening local security and justice in Southern Sudan
- Reducing SALW in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Joint assessment and coordinated responses in DRC
- Coordination within the UN system in Liberia

3. OVERALL FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

The review of UNDP's work in these seven sectors, based on documents and interviews, produced some overall findings and lessons learned.

3.1 SALW Control

- Led by UNDP, tackling the problems associated with the availability and misuse of SALW has evolved from a strictly arms control paradigm to one of human security and development. By the time the Brahimi Report was published in 2001, calling for SALW to be addressed as part of the wider development agenda, UNDP had already moved in that direction.

- UNDP action on SALW and now AVPP/AVR has demonstrated that its leverage for delivering security programs goes well beyond the normal leverage that comes with a people-centered development mandate.

¹⁰⁷ . *CSSC CoP Draft Report*, pp. 4-5.

- The UNDP's signature Weapons for Development program was put into place in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In both cases the lack of capacity for development project management led to less than fully successful outcomes. More importantly the assumption was made that the excessive availability of arms were making the Chiefdoms insecure. Few diagnostic assessments took place at the local level to test this assumption, and those surveys which were conducted were not used by the State in planning programmes. Rather, it was a top-down decision greatly influenced by the emerging global norms in the UN Program of Action on SALW and the momentum it generated.

- UNDP has developed significant expertise in technical assistance related to the control and management of small arms. Many former military experts now work for UNDP in this area, with many more available through UNDP's Express Roster. This enables the organization to cover both the security and development aspects of armed violence reduction. As a result UNDP played a major role in the OECD-DAC document *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development* as well as the founding of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development and its follow-on projects in four states.

- Forced disarmament always fails. UNDP developed a voluntary disarmament plan for Jonglei state in South Sudan. It was based on the Arms for Development model. The government did not accept this approach and forcibly disarmed some communities. The result was that there are more armed civilians in South Sudan today than there were at the signing of the CPA.

- The sustainability of programs such as arms for development depends on enforceable laws controlling civilian access to weapons. In most cases the fragile states in this study have not done so due to the lack of political will. As a result citizens have stopped turning in weapons and a new culture of a disarmed and peaceful community has yet to take hold. One exception is Kosovo, which early on established laws on access to weapons for hunters, sports shooters, etc. Only recently has a firearms law passed, and this is due to the basic reluctance to engage in civilian disarmament as a formal program, given the ethnic conflict that still exists.

- Dealing with the negative impacts of SALW has evolved from collection from individuals to collection from communities in exchange for development (Arms for Development-AfD) to a Community Security and Social Cohesion focus (DRC, Kosovo).

3.2 Mine Action

- The five pillars of mine action, while a necessary precursor to development in former mine impacted areas, is also an obstacle. The mine action community has been wedded to the five pillars since the early days of promoting the landmine ban convention. Specific development objectives linked to mine action has been slow to develop.

- UNDP has promoted integrating economic and social development into this security sector, especially by collaborating with the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining. They have developed prioritization methodologies which if implemented will insure that those areas demined are those that can create the potential for quick and high-impact development.

- This *promotional* role has yet to translate into mine action that significantly impacts on peacebuilding and development. UNDP has a great deal of leverage in delivering comprehensive

security, one main reason being that they focus on people and are on the ground. In this case they need to take advantage of this leverage and become more active at the local level.

- Regarding the UNDP mine action mandate to insure that mine action is integrated into national development plans, UNDP has had an impact on at least three of the fragile states by providing support at the national level: Sudan, Iraq and South Sudan. However, the author did not gain access to any evidence that the link between these national development plans and actual linkage with mine action has taken place at the local level. UNDP is not suited to perform this task as UNDP representation in these three countries is at the national level and does not allow much time to visit actual projects.¹⁰⁸

3.3 DDR

- As with SALW, UNDP has developed a credible operational and technical assistance capability, as a result of years of experience with traditional DDR programs as part of formal peace agreements.

- UNDP now leads a host of non-Peace Agreement DDDR programs, which are not funded with assessed funds as in the case of DPKO's DDR programs associated with peace agreements. Therefore UNDP's significant experience in managing trust funds insures a vital role for UNDP.

- UNDP has been a leader in the development of those International DDR Standards that go beyond the tradition disarmament and demobilization aspects of DDR. This includes pushing hard for mainstreaming gender into DDR operations.

- Once formal DDR programs associated with peace agreements conclude, the peacebuilding that follows faces hundreds of thousands of weapons that were not collected and are now diffused into society. UNDP is the lead agency in developing and implementing programs to reduce armed violence in this type of context.

3.4 Security Sector Reform

- UNDP has established itself as a credible and effective provider of security sector transformation, through specific technical assistance (e.g., police training based on human rights), its willingness to provide funds for such work (gap-filling), and its effective collaboration with all relevant organizations from NGOs to UNHCR.

- Security sector (system) reform has been transformed from focusing on reforming military forces as part of a peacekeeping mission to a broader approach that now involves a long-term and sustainable approach that justice, development and human rights. UNDP has the mandate and capacity to play a leading role in new SSR.

- This new approach to SSR requires early intervention. BCPR's early recovery mandate matches this requirement.

- UNDP and UNDPKO collaborate in SSR but come at it from different perspectives. UNDPKO's work is restricted to formal peace agreements and is focused on the national level. They also do not conduct programs. UNDP focuses both on the national level as well as the access to justice

- The only other UN agency involved in major SSR is UNPKO, and they are

¹⁰⁸ . Interview with BCPR mine action staff.

limited to SSR in a peacekeeping context. Peacebuilding is all UNDP, with contributions from UNIFEM (who work closely with UNDP) and UNODC.

- Despite UNDP's efforts to integrate security, justice and rule of law, to include renaming the relevant bureau unit and developing a \$60 million dollar budget for their programs, the term "security sector reform" remains linked in the minds of many developing countries, in effect UNDP's clientele, to traditional security. UNDP's clients question UNDP's involvement in this work.

- UNDP has conducted landmark work in operationalizing the concept of Security Sector Governance. It is best illustrated in the joint study with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

4. . THE UNDP COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SECURITY: FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

The previous section of the study demonstrates that UNDP has successfully developed and implemented programmes in all of the components of the security sector. It demonstrates that over time these dimensions of security have become linked to development. In this section we address how well these security programmes have been integrated into the new United Nations approach to comprehensive security, by addressing the questions guiding the report.

As described in Section 1, the concept of "comprehensive security" was born in the Brahimi Report. The Executive Board of UNP was quick to note that UNDP had just become a major player in the new definition of security.

The most recent and far-reaching statement on the peace and security roles of the United Nations can be found in the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305 – S/2000/809)* to the Secretary-General (henceforth referred to as the Brahimi Report after the panel chairman). The report calls for a radical overhaul of the United Nations peace missions and points to the overdue need for an integrated approach to the development and implementation of conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-building activities, the latter "in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict" (paragraph 44). The reforms proposed in the Brahimi Report envision a holistic approach by the United Nations to peace missions, one that goes well beyond traditional peace-keeping and singles out the untapped potential of UNDP as a partner in this area and identifies UNDP as "best placed to take the lead in implementing peace-building activities" (paragraph 46) in cooperation with other United Nations organizations. ...In specific terms, it mentions the reintegration of former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law and promoting democratic development, improving respect for human rights, and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques as examples of peace-building activities (paragraph 13). More generally, the report calls for a more systematic addressing of the root causes of conflict and the promotion of equity and sustainable development as a necessary foundation for peace. These activities lie at the core of UNDP development work. ¹⁰⁹

The remainder of the study examines how well UNDP is living up to the call by the global community to bring together the various strands of security into a comprehensive whole. To do

¹⁰⁹ . Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund First regular session 2001 29 January-6 February 2001, New York. DP/2001/4

this UNDP's comprehensive security programming was evaluated in the eleven fragile state covered in this study.

4.1 Leverage

What is the leverage that UNDP brings to the table in delivering human security to the people of these fragile states?

- UNDP has demonstrated that it can act in the full range of capacities in all seven security areas.
- Providing security means providing programs, the basic *modus operandi* of UNDP.
- Programming in these sectors relies heavily on local culture, capacities and context. This remains UNDP's strongest suit, being on the ground early and at the local level.
- UNDP has demonstrated the willingness to do the "hard" jobs and fill gaps where other organizations don't go. For example, in Kosovo officially the EU's RoL arm EULEX is responsible for RoL programs. UNDP has significant RoL programming as well. When asked if this created any friction, the UNDP RoL staff member said "quite the opposite. They were delighted that we took on all the tricky political things, such as establishing and supporting Ombudsmen." Another difficult task that UNDP took on when there was no one to do it was assisting in providing violence-free elections (e.g., Sierra Leone).
- In the DRC few NGOs in Kinshasa know of UNDP. It is a different story in the eastern district of Ituri, where UNDP established a field office in 2007 and has been operating at the community level since then.
- UNDP gained a great deal of leverage in effectively organizing the Internal Security Sector Review in Kosovo. That is also the case in Timor Leste.

4.2 Risks

What are the risks associated with close engagement with this sector?

- Clients will perceive UNDP as mainly a development agency and reject advice, assistance and programs in the seven security sectors.
- As a development, long-term agency, UNDP may lack credibility as an agency that can bring much needed security to a place in great need of services of all kinds. People being raped, wounded, threatened, etc. expect quick action, many times in the form of armed organizations to prevent or reduce violence.
- Given the desirability of an integrated security approach, UNDP may not be able to deliver security in a timely fashion, creating frustration and eventually a lack of the cooperation needed for sustainable development. This risk is most likely to apply to clients used to a DPKO quick fix solution.
- Risks in UNDP's SSG work were spelled out in the Project Document for its work in Timor-Leste to improve SSG. These risks apply to many of UNDP's programs and include:
 - Decrease in political support.
 - Conflicting interests and agendas among different stakeholders
- Lack of participation of CSOs and non-state actors
 - Poor representations and inclusiveness of the process
 - Donor support being used politically
 - Volatile security situation
 - Failure to include disenfranchised groups such as youth and women
 - Political intervention in project staff and interventions

- Different contexts in districts and sub-districts
- A solution to the grievances of the petitioners is not found.¹¹⁰

4.3 UNDP-UN Collaboration

- UNDP collaborates effectively with the UNDPKO in the vital areas of Rule of Law and DDR, at the strategic/planning level as well as operationally.
- UNDP and UNIFEM work closely together on reducing GBV.
- UNDP and UNICEF are natural partners on DDR, CPM, and SALW programs.
- While UNDP is part of the UN Mine Action network, it is not very present at the local level where it could make a big impact on integrating mine action and development. This is mainly due to a long-standing organizational cultural gap between UNDP and the mine action community.

- In many fragile states, the UNDP role is dictated by the international political history and context. In Sierra Leone, a former British Colony, the reforming of the police force has been a British show from the beginning. UNDP staff feel the pressure to stay “hands off.” This has an impact at the local level (e.g., community policing). In Kosovo, it has been clear from the beginning that the international community and Kosovo itself is moving to make Kosovo a European State. This means, for example, that OSCE is responsible for community policing, the EU’s rule of law unit EULEX is responsible for RoL, etc. Coordination and collaboration, always a challenge in the UN environment due to differing organizational cultures, becomes all the more difficult.

- In the view of New York staff, the financial downturn and subsequent budget cuts has meant that much of the joint work between UNDP and other partners (e.g., DDR) has disappeared. As in most organizations, jointness is hard to achieve when funding gets scarce.

- The CSSC approach has as a basic premise that UN agencies collaborate in an integrated effort, at the local level. (See previous discussion of CSSC in section 1.9). The CSSC Draft Report of the Community of Practice Workshop refers to the “growing recognition of the need for the UN system to deliver together... While some of the drivers of violence identified through CSSC Assessments can be addressed by building on existing UNDP programmes, often the issues identified are beyond UNDP’s capacity or mandate to respond. Box 5 of that Report illustrates UN collaboration in addressing armed violence.

Box 5. Complementary approaches of UN agency partners

DPKO	Community violence reduction approach
IOM	Community based reintegration and stabilization
WHO	Public health responses to violence
UN-Habitat	Safer cities approach
World Bank	
UNIDIR	Security needs assessment protocol
UNICEF	Protecting children from violence
UNFPA	Women’s security ¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ . *Security Sector Review in Timor Leste: Financial Arrangements*, June 2008. p. 3.

4.4 Civilian Oversight

How does UNDP work with civilian institutions to support the civilian oversight of security forces?

Prior to the major involvement of UNDP in delivering comprehensive human security, the major focus of security sector reform was working with governments to provide oversight of military forces, through a top-down national level approach. The Geneva-based DCAF remains dedicated to this aspect of civilian oversight, mainly of the armed forces. In the case of Kosovo, UNDP was responsible for the organization and management of the Internal Security Sector Review in 2006, where civilian oversight was a major topic. In those states where UNDP plays a role in police reform e.g., Somalia, Afghanistan, UNDP will be involved in civilian oversight. The human security approach requires that civil society also play an oversight role. The analysis of this effort in the eleven fragile states revealed that UNDP only rarely gets involved in civilian oversight at the state level. (One significant exception is in Timor Leste where UNDP is partnering with the government of Timor Leste, the EU, and the UN integrated mission (UNMIT) to conduct a security sector review and a Capacity Development Facility to support the work plan developed in the Review).¹¹² Rather it is at the local level that UNDP is assisting in creating institutions such as Community Safety Centers, where the people meet directly with the national security apparatus (e.g., police, judges, etc.) The most ambitious work currently being conducted by UNDP in civilian oversight is taking place in Timor Leste. (See previous discussion of this project.)

4.5 Security Governance

What is the role of security governance in reestablishing and sustaining stability and security in a post-conflict environment? (See previous discussion)

UNDP has played a role in security governance in several states. One of the most significant was in Kosovo, where in 2006 UNDP organized and managed the Internal Security Sector Review.¹¹³ Currently, UNDP is partnering with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat to develop a security governance framework for the Pacific Islands.¹¹⁴

4.6 Integrating Conflict Prevention and Management into UNDP Security Programming

¹¹¹ . *Community Security and Social Cohesion Community of Practice* UNDP Draft 5 May 2010, p. 40.

¹¹² . *Security Sector Review in Timor Leste*. Government of Timor-Leste, European Commission, UNMIT and UNDP-Project Document. June 2008;
http://www.tl.undp.org/undp/what%20we%20do/Crisis%20Prevention%20and%20Recovery/On%20going%20projects/SSR/SSR_ProDoc_%20Signed.pdf .

Security Sector Review in Timor Leste- Capacity Development Facility. Government of Timor-Leste, European Commission, UNMIT and UNDP. December 2008.

¹¹³ . *Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review*. UNDP 2006.

http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/ISSR_report_eng_ver2.pdf

¹¹⁴ . *Enhancing Security Sector Governance in the Pacific Region: A Strategic Framework*. UNDP Pacific Centre, 2010. http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/jssr/ssg_pacific.pdf

There is some evidence that conflict prevention and management programming is being integrated into the other UNDP security sector work. For example, as stated in this study, it is now central to both the AVPP/AVR and CSSC approaches of UNDP/BCPR. In Ituri district in the DRC, the CSSC project has started with a diagnostic assessment of existing conflicts and subsequently needs of the community. In Sudan, the CSAC project contains a major component of CPM, where UNDP funded trainers teach conflict resolution and mediation techniques to its target communities, before any security services are provided.¹¹⁵

4.7 Integration of UNDP's CPR programs: Rule of Law, DDR, SALW, Mine Action, and CPM

- The best examples of CPR programs being integrated in fragile states are Kosovo and the CSSC programs in DRC, Kosovo and Somalia.
- Staff interviews revealed that there is very little collaboration across sectors, in New York as well as in the field. Meetings of the CPR units in New York are rare. One staffer suggested that there be a weekly teleconference between the CPR programs in New York (DDR, SALW, Mine Action, and RoL, Justice and Security) with their counterparts in the field. At a minimum it would allow for an evaluation of such collaboration.
- Another suggestion was that UNDP create an information-sharing unit. Currently no one has time for this. It will be difficult to develop a comprehensive approach to security without shared data. A first step might be making the many lessons learned collections more available, even in their raw form. They would be for internal use only. A good place to start would be the three DDR programs in Sudan.

4.8 Institutional Capacity Development in the Security Sector

How have capacity development approaches contributed to strengthening institutional capacity in the security sector?

- UNDP's development of early warning systems allows an excellent entry point for capacity building. Clearly the local population must do this and programs such as the Violence Observatory in Somalia and the Early Warning System in Kosovo have been successful
- In Somalia, UNDP staff have restricted access to the territories where UNDP programs are in place. As a result, the local population must do Monitoring and Evaluation. Local NGOs have come forward to bid for M and E contracts. As they must meet UNDP standards, the result is a growing capacity for M and E and by extension other aspects of security and development.
- In mine action, UNDP's primary contribution is building capacity. In this regard UNDP funding has created an effective information system to collect data relevant to mine action (e.g., location of mine-impacted areas). It also can be used for collecting any type of data related to the broader definition of security. This does not appear to be the case however. More effort should be made to explore this option.
- In most interviews staff indicated either a lack of knowledge of how capacity development works or viewed it as an add-on. This reflects the well-known tendency for field international staff to do it themselves. Where staff did talk about capacity, it was more capacity *building*, as defined in the UNDP guidelines on capacity development. Mobile teams that

¹¹⁵ . *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, 267.

conduct workshops on capacity-development would bring more success in this regard (teleconferencing?)

- UNDP programs on gender-sensitive policing have added capacity where none previously existed.
- After a very slow start, the Capacity Development Facility project in Timor Leste is now delivering the inputs that it is hoped will improve SSG in Timor Leste.¹¹⁶

5.0. GENERAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- As a general recommendation UNDP should pay more attention to improving collaboration with other organizations (within and external to UNDP) by addressing differing organizational cultures and improving understanding. This goes beyond the competition for roles and funding that characterizes most joint efforts. To be successful comprehensive security involves a wide variety of organizational cultures and focus, creating a serious challenge for collaboration. This study demonstrated many examples of this. We shouldn't expect child advocates, lawyers, NGOs, military institutions, police, deminers and a host of other organizational cultures to work together just because a plan dictates such. For many years military organizations (e.g., the US Army) have been conducting training sessions with actual NGOs as participants, in an effort to bridge that organizational cultural gap. Evidence from the DDR efforts in Sudan and Haiti demonstrate a serious cultural divide between the UNDP development ground-up approach and the UNDPKO military, top-down approach. It clearly affected the start-up of the DDR program in the Sudan. In short, UNDP work is collaborative by definition. Some workshops on organizational or strategic partnering might help, even within UNDP itself.

- In a post-conflict situation, especially in fragile states, the vetting of personnel for reformed security institutions, especially at the local level, is a critical task. In the words of a UNDP staff member, "I need to know what my budding community leaders did during the conflict."

- Mine action and development

In a sense the situation with demining resembles that of the early days of SALW control. It was all about the guns. Section I of the study showed how this approach has involved into Armed Violence Reduction, where the guns are only one aspect of the problem. The demand (perpetrators, institutions and victims must also be addressed. No such development has occurred with demining. Section I shows how UNDP as an organization has attempted to do by introducing socio-economic analysis to demining planning. There is little evidence that the demining community (e.g., NGOs, UNMAS, etc.) has taken this aboard in a significant way. From the beginning this community has taken a "go-it-alone" approach. They were clearly threatened by the sudden attention to SALW in the late 1990s. There have been several attempts to combine demining with other security programs, given the extensive network of mine action centers. More importantly, on the ground the demining effort is only loosely connected to UNDP's other programs. UNDP mainly operates on the fringes or not at all. Expanding mine action centers to become "security action centers" would provide a big part of the infrastructure if a truly comprehensive security approach is to become a reality.

¹¹⁶ . *Annual Progress report. Security Sector Review: Capacity Development Facility.*

- Another basic element that could enhance a comprehensive approach is to focus on developing capacity to generate data useful for all security programs. An example of this is the several survey research centers that have developed in fragile states. In Afghanistan in December 2009 the

UNDP released the first ever survey on police perception today. In recognition of the fact that no comprehensive survey on police performance has been conducted to date, UNDP undertook the project of a public survey of the police, "Police Perception Survey 2009 - The Afghan Perspective." The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) provided facilitation for the project. The survey was conducted by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), which has established itself as a major provider of quantitative and qualitative research in Afghanistan.¹¹⁷

- The concept of disarmament should be restricted to DDR, where it is justified as symbolic of the end of a conflict. In other situations AVR should prevail, where the instruments of violence are only part of the problem and entry point.
- The evolving UNDP approach to comprehensive security can be seen in the project documents. For example, the first project document for DDR in Sudan (2006) was outdated before it was issued. It contained a major civilian disarmament component, and did not reflect any of the new international DDR standards. The most recent DDR plan (January 2009) contains the full menu of UNDP goals, such as conflict analysis, capacity development, etc. All CSSC programs would also serve as evidence. AVPP is moving forward with new programs in five countries. Results are yet to be seen but the new strategy appears to be taking hold.

¹¹⁷. http://www.undp.org.af/News/2009/081209_PR_PolicePerceptionSurvey.pdf