

**SMALL ARMS: THE EMERGING COALITION
OF STATES FOR THE UN CONFERENCE IN
2001**

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War has led to the escalation of intra-state conflicts, where small arms and light weapons play a major role.¹ Their proliferation and misuse are a threat to national security and international peace. That is why several initiatives at various levels have been taken. The two major ones are a conference that the UN decided "to convene... on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects no later than 2001" (UN resolution 53/77E, p. 10, December 4, 1998) and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), a coalition of NGOs that was launched at The Hague Appeal for Peace on May 11, 1999.²

Despite the involvement of the UN and NGOs, however, the role of governments is vital to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms.³ It is governments that make the laws, treaties and policies without which little can be done.

The purpose of this paper is to begin the process of identifying those like-minded countries that may be willing to take action on small arms. Such an international group will be very important in the development of the 2001 Conference on Small Arms. To define such a group, government statements and actions (UN First Committee voting records from 1996 to present) will be used as indicators to draw a "political" map of the international community through a "cluster" analysis. This methodology can also identify those countries that so far have taken an ambivalent stand on the issue.

International action on small arms

The international campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines (ICBL) has set a pattern for NGOs. They put the problem on the international agenda and asked for a treaty banning the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines (APL). In December 1997, 122 countries signed such a treaty in Ottawa. So far, it has been signed by 136 and ratified by 89 countries. The Ottawa Process has proven that a diverse coalition, formed by both NGOs and governments, is necessary to successfully create an international instrument such as the APL treaty.

In the ICBL there were three streams of action: NGOs, national governments, and international organizations such as the UN. In the new international action on small arms these

¹ The report of UN Secretary-General (A/52/298) contains the definition of small arms and light weapons: "Broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew" (11). Small arms are revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns. Light weapons are heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns and recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of caliber of less than 100mm. The report also talks about ammunition and explosives, since they "form an integral part of the small arms and light weapons used in conflicts... It is assumed that all countries producing small arms (more than 70) and light weapons are also capable of manufacturing the relevant ammunition" (13). Ammunition and explosives are cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades, landmines, and explosives.

² IANSA has developed a very rich website, whose URL is <http://www.iansa.org>. Its purpose is to contribute to the movement as an international forum. Inter alia, it aims at constituency building, coordinating and mobilizing international NGO action, information sharing, developing culturally appropriate "message" strategies, campaigning and advocacy strategies, identifying research and evaluation needs, and monitoring the international political and social context of small arms (<http://www.iansa.org/action/index.htm>). Recently, IANSA has posted on its website full text statements made during the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee. It was held at the UN headquarters in New York from February 28 to March 3, 2000.

³ From now on, in this paper "small arms" will stand for "small arms and light weapons."

three streams are still present, as well as a fourth one, regional organizations.⁴ This time, the UN is more involved in the movement. It wants to play a more active role after the minor part it took in the anti-personnel landmine efforts. That is why in December 1998 the UN decided to convene an international conference by 2001. In addition, 23 governmental experts on small arms met three times (May 98, February 99, July 99) to assist the Secretary-General in finding ways and means to address the challenge posed by small arms. Their final report was released on August 19, 1999 (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/rep54258e.pdf>).⁵

Emerging Coalition for the United Nations Conference in 2001

The first relevant initiative of the international effort on small arms is the Oslo meeting that took place in July 1998. It was organized under the auspices of Norway and Canada, and attended by a group of 21 like-minded countries to coordinate their efforts to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms.⁶ The result of the conference is a document entitled *An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding*, which addresses the need to control licit traffic and prevent illicit trafficking of small arms.

The short document focuses on prevention and reduction. Prevention aspects (inter alia) are: enhanced accountability, transparency, and improved information exchange on small arms transfers; cooperation and information sharing among police and other forces within and between countries; and respect international humanitarian law in regard to the problem of small arms. Reduction aspects include: support for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants at the end of armed conflicts; attempt to reverse cultures of violence; and the support for efforts to set up fair judicial and penal systems.⁷

On December 6-7, 1999, Oslo hosted another important meeting. This time, the number of participants was smaller. Only 18 countries met: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Germany, Japan, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. Burkina Faso, Colombia, France, Indonesia, the Philippines and Zimbabwe missed this second event. New participants were Australia, Austria, Chile and Finland.

⁴ Regional and national initiatives include: the 12-article EU Joint Action aiming to combat and contribute to ending the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials; the Brussels Call for Action; Mali's moratorium on the production and import of small arms; and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers.

⁵ The panel was created by Secretary-General Kofi Annan upon request of the General Assembly in 1997. The purpose was the compilation of a report on the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations included in the 1997 report. The report of the panel consists of five parts: introduction, overview, progress made in the implementation of the recommendations of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (a list of all the initiatives in the field), further actions recommended to be taken, and the international conference on the illicit trade in all its aspects (objectives, scope, agenda, date, venue, and the preparatory committee).

⁶ The 21 countries are Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the United States, and Zimbabwe.

⁷ For the entire document, see Boutwell, Jeffrey and Michael T. Klare, ed. *Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence*. New York, NY: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1999. The full text of *An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding* is also available on the IANSA website at http://www.iansa.org/documents/regional/2000/jan_00/oslomeeting.htm.

A document called “Elements of a Common Understanding” is the product of the conference. It is more detailed than the one that was released at the end of the first Oslo meeting. This time, the objectives are more specific, especially on arms brokering and the “gray zone” of arms trade. (Sometimes arms trade, although legal, contributes to destabilizing the political situation of a country. This is the so-called “gray area.”) In addition, in the review section more attention is given to UN initiatives, such as the Protocol Against Illicit Firearms Trafficking and the UN Conference on Illicit Trade on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The document also stresses the importance of “exploring possible synergies between the various regional and sub-regional initiatives” to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

Despite the two Oslo meetings, however, the prime occasion for coalition building has revolved around the annual UN General Assembly (GA) resolutions on small arms, with their policy statements, voting records and sponsorships. An analysis of these empirical data can give a rough idea of where countries stand. What is really needed is a method that can ascertain and evaluate a country’s behavior and policy statements, to determine the level of support for preventing and reducing the effects of small arms and light weapons. It is to this exercise that I now turn.⁸

Criteria

Resolutions that pass each year in the UN General Assembly are the final results just mentioned. However, coalition building takes shape in the First Committee and not in the General Assembly. Thus, draft resolutions become more important than the final resolutions themselves. It is in the First Committee that documents have more political weight.

In order to establish which countries are IN the coalition and which ones are OUT of the coalition, I have identified 15 resolutions on small arms that the First Committee voted on and adopted in 1996 (51st session), 1997 (52nd session), 1998 (53rd session), and 1999 (54th session).⁹ These resolutions are:

- 51/45 L, “Assistance to states for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them,” 15 sponsors and 5 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 51/45 N, “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures,” 28 sponsors and 13 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 52/38 C (Draft Resolution: A/C.1/52/L.8*), “Measures to curb the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them,” 14 sponsors and 3 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 52/38 G (Draft Resolution: A/C.1/52/L.18*), “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures,” 52 sponsors and 11 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 52/38 J (A/C.1/52/L.27/Rev.1), “Small Arms,” 44 sponsors and 3 additional sponsors. *Voting Records of Paragraph 5: 120 in favor; 0 against; 23 abstaining. Voting Records of the resolution as a whole: 137 in favor; 0 against; 8 abstaining.*
- 52/38 G (Draft Resolution: A/C.1/52/L.18*), “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures,” 52 sponsors and 11 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 53/77 B (A/C.1/53/L.7/Rev.2), “Assistance to states for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them,” 21 sponsors and 0 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*

⁸ SAND, the Program on Security and Development, for which I am a researcher, is doing a more extensive study on country statements and actions on small arms. This work is in progress. See <http://sand.miiis.edu>.

⁹ All the UN draft resolutions and final resolutions are available at <http://domino.un.org/vote.nsf>.

- 53/77 E (A/C.1/53/L.13/Rev.1), "Small Arms," 48 sponsors and 9 additional sponsors. *Voting Records of Fourth Preambular Paragraph: 127 in favor; 0 against; 11 abstaining. Voting Records of the resolution as a whole: 136 in favor; 0 against; 3 abstaining.*
- 53/77 M (A/C.1/53/L.11/Rev.1), "*", "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures," 64 sponsors and 2 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 53/77 T (A/C.1/53/L.41/Rev.1), "Illicit traffic in small arms," 50 sponsors and 10 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 54/54 H (A/C.1/54/L.20), "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures," 68 sponsors and 5 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 54/54 J (A/C.1/54/L.25), "Assistance to states for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them," 13 sponsors and 17 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 54/54 R (A/C.1/54/L.44*), "Illicit traffic in small arms," 65 sponsors and 20 additional sponsors. *Adopted without a vote.*
- 54/54 V (A/C.1/54/L.42/Rev.1*), "Small Arms," 38 sponsors. *Voting Records of Eighth Preambular Paragraph: 127 in favor; 1 against; 14 abstaining. Voting Records of the resolution as a whole: 143 in favor; 0 against; 3 abstaining.*
- 54/55 F (A/C.1/54/L.51) "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean," 1 sponsor. *Adopted without a vote.*

All the resolutions are very important in evaluating countries' behavior. However, three are particularly relevant to this study. They are 52/38 J (A/C.1/52/L.27/Rev.1), 53/77 E (A/C.1/53/L.13/Rev.1), and 54/54 V (A/C.1/54/L.42/Rev.1*). All three contain a preambular paragraph that is worded in the same way. It refers to the right of self-determination of all peoples: "*Reaffirming also the right of self-determination of all peoples, in particular peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and the importance of the effective realization of this right, as enunciated, inter alia, in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993, A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), Chap. III.*"

The paragraph on self-determination is a "disturbing" element in the small arms question because it puts into doubt the commitment of many UN members to the UN conference of 2001. The paragraph is ALWAYS included in the draft resolutions regarding this UN meeting. When UN member states vote against, abstain on, or are absent during the vote on the principle of the right to self-determination in relation to the small arms conference, they express their reservations on the event.

This paragraph has really made a difference in the way coalition building has occurred. The inclusion of the right to self-determination of all peoples in three draft resolutions has caused a separate vote on it before voting on each resolution as a whole. This long and complex process has consequently led to a wider range of voting records. Therefore, it has been possible to create four "types" of countries: "**yes,**" "**positively ambivalent,**" "**negatively ambivalent,**" and "**no.**"

However, it has been hard to "locate" some countries in the "correct" category relying only on voting records. In fact, the line between "yes" and "positively ambivalent" countries, as well as the one between "negatively ambivalent" and "no" countries, is not always well defined. In these cases, statements made at the UN have played a very important role in giving a clear idea of where these countries stand. Such statements have been taken into consideration ONLY in this scenario.

“Yes” (108) countries are the majority. They have sponsored, additionally sponsored, and/or voted in favor of BOTH the paragraph already mentioned AND the resolution as a whole (for three times). Some of them have become “yes” countries over time.

“Positively ambivalent” (24) are those countries that have expressed reservations on the text(s) of the document(s), but that overall are committed to the issue of small arms. They are “yes” countries with reservations. They have sponsored resolutions, and/or voted in favor of them EXCEPT for the paragraph on the principle of self-determination. However, they are the key actors. They are those who can really make a difference in the coalition of like-minded countries. They have yet to be convinced to join the “yes” group without reservations.

“Negatively ambivalent” (24) countries are those countries that have expressed many reservations on the text(s) of the documents(s). Their reservations (mostly on the paragraph on self-determination) outweigh any possible positive action, such as a vote in favor of the resolution or a sponsorship. This category looks at the OVERALL behavior of each country. They are “negatively ambivalent” because they are harder to convince than the “positive” ones. They may join the “yes” countries, but in a farther future.

“No” (32) countries are those that have expressed no interest in, no concern over the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. They missed all (or almost all) the voting sessions on small arms issues.

Conclusion

This analysis should be considered a preliminary study of the overall behavior and policy statements of countries on small arms issues. This study only aims to define the emerging coalition of countries that would appear to be willing to take positive action at the global level on the occasion of the UN conference in 2001, based on votes taken so far. Policy statements and action in the UN and other fora will provide critical indicators of these coalitions as we approach 2001.

THE FOUR CATEGORIES

<u>YES</u>				<u>POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT</u>	<u>NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT</u>	<u>NO</u>	
<i>Angola</i>	<i>Djibouti</i>	<i>Lao People's Democratic Republic</i>	<i>Republic of Korea</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Andorra</i>	<i>Afghanistan</i>	<i>Tonga</i>
<i>Argentina</i>	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	<i>Latvia</i>	<i>San Marino</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Antigua and Barbuda</i>	<i>Albania</i>	<i>Uzbekistan</i>
<i>Armenia</i>	<i>Ecuador</i>	<i>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Bosnia and Herzegovina</i>	<i>Azerbaijan</i>	<i>Belize</i>	<i>Vanuatu</i>
<i>Australia</i>	<i>Egypt</i>	<i>Liechtenstein</i>	<i>Sierra Leone</i>	<i>Cambodia</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Burundi</i>	<i>Vietnam</i>
<i>Austria</i>	<i>El Salvador</i>	<i>Lithuania</i>	<i>Slovakia</i>	<i>Cameroon</i>	<i>Democratic Republic of the Congo</i>	<i>Central African Republic</i>	<i>Yugoslavia</i>
<i>Bahamas</i>	<i>Eritrea</i>	<i>Luxembourg</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>	<i>Cape Verde</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Comoros</i>	
<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Estonia</i>	<i>Malaysia</i>	<i>Solomon Islands</i>	<i>Chad</i>	<i>Gabon</i>	<i>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</i>	
<i>Barbados</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Maldives</i>	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Congo</i>	<i>Georgia</i>	<i>Dominica</i>	
<i>Belarus</i>	<i>Fiji</i>	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Sri Lanka</i>	<i>Cuba</i>	<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>	
<i>Belgium</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Malta</i>	<i>Sudan</i>	<i>Guatemala</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Gambia</i>	
<i>Benin</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Mexico</i>	<i>Suriname</i>	<i>Guinea</i>	<i>Israel</i>	<i>Grenada</i>	
<i>Bhutan</i>	<i>Ghana</i>	<i>Mozambique</i>	<i>Swaziland</i>	<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	<i>Lesotho</i>	<i>Honduras</i>	
<i>Bolivia</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Namibia</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Liberia</i>	<i>Iraq</i>	
<i>Botswana</i>	<i>Guyana</i>	<i>Nepal</i>	<i>Thailand</i>	<i>Madagascar</i>	<i>Malawi</i>	<i>Kiribati</i>	
<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Haiti</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</i>	<i>Mauritius</i>	<i>Marshall Islands</i>	<i>Nauru</i>	
<i>Brunei Darussalam</i>	<i>Hungary</i>	<i>New Zealand</i>	<i>Togo</i>	<i>Mongolia</i>	<i>Mauritania</i>	<i>Palau</i>	
<i>Bulgaria</i>	<i>Iceland</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Tunisia</i>	<i>Niger</i>	<i>Micronesia</i>	<i>Rwanda</i>	
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	<i>Indonesia</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	<i>Monaco</i>	<i>Saint Kitts and Nevis</i>	
<i>Canada</i>	<i>Iran</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Turkmenistan</i>	<i>Republic of Moldova</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Saint Lucia</i>	
<i>Chile</i>	<i>Ireland</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>	<i>Ukraine</i>	<i>Singapore</i>	<i>Myanmar</i>	<i>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</i>	
<i>Colombia</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Panama</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	<i>Samoa</i>	
<i>Costa Rica</i>	<i>Jamaica</i>	<i>Paraguay</i>	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Romania</i>	<i>Sao Tome and Principe</i>	
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Peru</i>	<i>United Republic of Tanzania</i>	<i>United States of America</i>	<i>Russian Federation</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	
<i>Croatia</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Philippines</i>	<i>Uruguay</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Seychelles</i>	
<i>Cyprus</i>	<i>Kazakhstan</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Venezuela</i>			<i>Somalia</i>	
<i>Czech Republic</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Portugal</i>	<i>Zambia</i>			<i>Syrian Arab Republic</i>	
<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>			<i>Tajikistan</i>	

YES = Countries that have sponsored, additionally sponsored, and/or voted in favor of BOTH the paragraph on the right to self-determination AND the resolution as a whole [(for three times, 52/38 J (A/C.1/52/L.27/Rev.1), 53/77 E (A/C.1/53/L.13/Rev.1), and 54/54 V (A/C.1/54/L.42/Rev.1*)]. **POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT** = countries that have expressed reservations on the text(s) of the resolution(s), but that overall are committed to the issue of small arms. **NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT** = countries that have expressed many reservations on the text(s) of the resolution(s). Their reservations (mostly on the paragraph on self-determination) outweigh any possible positive action. **NO** = countries that have expressed no interest in, no concern over the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

For each country's voting records, see Appendix.

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APPENDIX

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COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Afghanistan</i>	Addit. 51/45				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Albania</i>	53/77M 54/54H	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Algeria</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT ¹
<i>Andorra</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V							52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Angola</i>	51/45N Addit. 52/38G	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Antigua and Barbuda</i>		52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Argentina</i>	52/38G 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R	53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Armenia</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Australia</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

¹ After the vote on resolution 52/38 J, Algeria said that its vote on both the paragraph and the resolution as a whole should not be seen as a commitment to automatic implementation of the recommendations of the Panel of Governmental Experts. For this reason, Algeria is a POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT country.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Austria</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	Addit. 53/77T	53/77E 54/54V			52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	52/38J	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Bahamas</i>		53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	YES
<i>Bahrain</i>		54/54V		52/38J 53/77E		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Bangladesh</i>	Addit. 51/45N 52/38G 53/77B 53/77E 53/77M Addit. 53/77T 54/54H 54/54J 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Barbados</i>		53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	YES
<i>Belarus</i>	Addit. 51/45N Addit. 52/38G 52/38J Addit. 53/77E	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Belgium</i>	52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H Addit. 54/54J 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V						52/38J 53/77E 54/54V		YES

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Belize</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Benin</i>	Addit. 51/45L 52/38G Addit. 52/38J 53/77B Addit. 54/54J 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Bhutan</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Bolivia</i>	54/54H Addit. 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Bosnia and Herzegovina</i>	Addit. 54/54R	54/54V			52/38J 53/77E				52/38J 53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Botswana</i>	53/77T 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES ²
<i>Brazil</i>	53/77E Addit. 53/77T Addit. 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
<i>Brunei Darussalam</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

² During the 8th meeting of the First Committee (53rd session), Botswana said that the proliferation of these weapons does not only depend on the fact that they are in great demand. It also depends on the fact that they are supplied in great quantity. That is why Botswana it would continue to impose controls on those who sell arms within its borders.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
Bulgaria	Addit. 52/38G 53/77E 53/77M 54/54H Addit. 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Burkina Faso	51/45L 52/38C 53/77B 53/77E 54/54J Addit. 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Burundi					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
Cambodia	51/45L 51/45N				52/38J 53/77E				52/38J 53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
Cameroon	51/45L 51/45N 52/38G 53/77B Addit. 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H Addit. 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
Canada	Addit. 51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77B 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54J 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
Cape Verde	51/45L 53/77B	54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
Central African Republic					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
Chad	51/45L 52/38C 53/77B 54/54H Addit. 54/54J	54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
Chile	51/45N 52/38G 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
China		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V							52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT ³
Colombia	Addit. 53/77E 53/77T 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Comoros					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO

³ On the occasion of the vote on Resolution 51/45 N, China said that no agreement had been reached on the definition and scope of the terms “small arms and light weapons.” Moreover, China stated that the draft (on the First Committee) did not well represent the relationship between transparency and security. After the vote on Resolution 52/38 J, the country said that it still disagreed on some recommendations by the Panel of Experts.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
Congo	51/45L 51/45N 52/38C 52/38G 53/77B 53/77M Addit. 53/77T 54/54J 54/54R	52/38J				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V			53/77E 54/54V	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
Costa Rica	51/45N Addit. 52/38C 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Côte d'Ivoire	51/45L Addit. 51/45N Addit. 52/38C 52/38G 52/38J 53/77B 53/77M 54/54H Addit. 54/54J 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Croatia	Addit. 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Cuba		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT ⁴

⁴ After the vote on resolution 52/38 J, Cuba said that its vote on both the paragraph and the resolution as a whole should not be seen as a commitment to automatic implementation of the recommendations of the Panel of Governmental Experts. For this reason, Cuba is a POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT country.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Cyprus</i>	Addit. 52/38G 53/77M 54/54H	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Czech Republic</i>	52/38G 53/77M 54/54H	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Democratic Republic of the Congo</i>	Addit. 51/45L 52/38J	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Denmark</i>	Addit. 51/45N 52/38G 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Djibouti</i>	51/45L Addit. 54/54J	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Dominica</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Dominican Republic</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Ecuador</i>	Addit. 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES ⁵

⁵ During the 8th meeting of the First Committee (53rd session), Ecuador noted that there is a link between small arms and drug trafficking. For this reason, it called on states to control very strictly their imports and exports of arms.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Egypt</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES ⁶
<i>El Salvador</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77M 54/54H Addit. 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Eritrea</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Estonia</i>	53/77M Addit. 54/54H	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Ethiopia</i>	51/45N 52/38G 53/77M 54/54H	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Fiji</i>	53/77B 53/77M 54/54H Addit. 54/54J	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

⁶ In explanation of the vote on Resolution 54/54 V, Egypt said that efforts to curb small arms should not be viewed as measures to curb States' rights to self-defense.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
Finland	52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
France	52/38G 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H Addit. 54/54J Addit. 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V						52/38J 53/77E 54/54V		NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT ⁷
Gabon	51/45L 51/45N 52/38C 52/38G 53/77B 54/54H	52/38J				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V			53/77E 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
Gambia	Addit. 54/54J				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
Georgia	51/45N 52/38G 53/77M 54/54H	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V						52/38J 53/77E 54/54V		NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT

⁷ In explanation of the vote on Resolution 53/77E, France said that the inclusion of paragraph 4 had prevented the country from sponsoring the draft resolution. In the explanation of the vote on Resolution 54/54V, France said it did not believe the eighth paragraph had to be in the draft, as it would cause confusion and seem to introduce idea that the use of armed force might be a way of settling disputes.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
Germany	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Ghana	52/38G 53/77B 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54J 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Greece	52/38G 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H Addit. 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
Grenada					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
Guatemala	51/45N 52/38G 53/77M 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E				52/38J 53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
Guinea	51/45L 52/38C 52/38J 53/77B 53/77E Addit. 53/77T 54/54J 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 54/54V			53/77E	52/38J 54/54V			53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
Guinea-Bissau	51/45L 52/38C 52/38J Addit. 54/54J 54/54R	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
Guyana	52/38J 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Haiti	Addit. 51/45L 54/54H Addit. 54/54J Addit. 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Honduras					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
Hungary	51/45N 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T Addit. 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
Iceland	Addit. 52/38G 52/38J 53/77M 54/54H Addit. 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES ⁸
India		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V						52/38J 53/77E 54/54V		NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
Indonesia		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V						52/38J 53/77E54/ 54V		YES

⁸ Initially, Iceland sponsored Resolution 54/54 V. However, it later withdrew its sponsorship. Ireland is still a YES country due to the pattern of its votes.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
Iran	Addit. 53/77E Addit. 53/77T	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Iraq					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
Ireland	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Israel	Addit. 53/77M Addit. 54/54H	53/77E 54/54V		52/38J				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V		NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
Italy	52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M Addit. 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
Jamaica	Addit. 52/38C 52/38J 53/77E 53/77T Addit. 54/54J Addit. 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Japan</i>	Addit. 51/45L 51/45N 52/38C 52/38G 52/38J 53/77B 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54J 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Jordan</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Kazakhstan</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Kenya</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Kiribati</i>					54/54V				54/54V	NO
<i>Kuwait</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	52/38J 53/77E 53/77T 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Lao People's Democratic Republic</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Latvia</i>	53/77M 54/54H	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Lebanon</i>		54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Lesotho</i>	Addit. 51/45N 53/77M 54/54R	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
Liberia	Addit. 51/45L 52/38C 53/77B Addit. 53/77M 54/54H Addit. 54/54J 54/54V	52/38J				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V			53/77E 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Liechtenstein	Addit. 53/77E Addit. 53/77T 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Lithuania	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Luxembourg	52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
Madagascar	Addit. 54/54J 54/54R 54/54V	53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
Malawi	54/54H	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
Malaysia		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
Maldives		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Mali</i>	51/45L 51/45N 52/38C 52/38J 53/77B 53/77E 53/77M Addit. 53/77T 54/54H 54/54J Addit. 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Malta</i>	Addit. 51/45N 52/38G 52/38J Addit. 53/77E 53/77M Addit. 53/77T 54/54H Addit. 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Marshall Islands</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J		54/54V	53/77E	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Mauritania</i>	51/45L 52/38C 53/77B 54/54J	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Mauritius</i>		52/38J 54/54V			53/77E	52/38J 54/54V			53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Mexico</i>	53/77T	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Micronesia</i>		52/38J 54/54V			53/77E	52/38J		54/54V	53/77E	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Monaco</i>	53/77M 53/77T 54/54H Addit. 54/54J Addit. 54/54R	52/38J 54/54V			53/77E			52/38J 54/54V	53/77E	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Mongolia</i>		53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Morocco</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E			52/38J 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Mozambique</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E				52/38J 53/77E				YES
<i>Myanmar</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E		54/54V	52/38J	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Namibia</i>	54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Nauru</i>					54/54V				54/54V	NO
<i>Nepal</i>	52/38J 53/77E	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Netherlands</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E				52/38J 53/77E				YES
<i>New Zealand</i>	Addit. 51/45N 52/38G 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Nicaragua</i>	51/45N 52/38G 53/77M 54/54H 54/54V	52/38J			53/77E	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Niger</i>	51/45L Addit. 51/45N 52/38C 52/38G Addit. 52/38J 53/77B 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54J 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT ⁹
<i>Nigeria</i>	53/77B 53/77E 53/77T 54/54H Addit. 54/54J 54/54R	53/77E			52/38J	53/77E			52/38J	YES ¹⁰
<i>Norway</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H Addit. 54/54J 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E				52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	YES
<i>Oman</i>		53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES ¹¹

⁹ During the 8th meeting of the First Committee (53rd session), Niger said that it had established a national committee to control illicit traffic of small arms with positive results, and that collected weapons would be destroyed very soon. For this reason, it asked for UN financial support.

¹⁰ After the vote on Resolution 52/38 J, Nigeria said it had intended to vote.

¹¹ Before the vote on Resolution 53/77 E, Oman said it would, this time, vote in favor of the draft. The reason was a different approach to the problem. It viewed the conference as a great occasion for international actors to get together and work together on the problem.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Pakistan</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES ¹²
<i>Palau</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Panama</i>	53/77M 54/54H	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	Addit. 54/54R	52/38J 54/54V			53/77E	52/38J 54/54V			53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Paraguay</i>	Addit. 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
<i>Peru</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V 54/55F	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES ¹³
<i>Philippines</i>	53/77T Addit. 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

¹² Before the vote on Resolution 52/38 J, Pakistan said it would support the draft, but it had reservations on some recommendations by the experts because considered not feasible. Moreover, Pakistan asked to amend paragraph one, by adding at the end of the sentence "Bearing in mind the principles referred to above and the views of member states on the recommendation." In explanation of the vote on Resolution 53/77 E, Pakistan said that the inclusion of the preambular paragraph on the right to self-determination was very important. The country did not understand why some of the member states abstained on it. In explanation of the vote on Resolution 54/54 V, however, Pakistan said that it had reservations about operative paragraph 14. The working process of the panel of governmental experts was not completely transparent. Moreover, the panel did not consist of those countries most affected by the problem of small arms, and its recommendations were imposed on all the other states.

¹³ Peru sponsored Resolution 54/55 F on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are also members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Poland</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Portugal</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Qatar</i>		53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Republic of Korea</i>	52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Republic of Moldova</i>	Addit. 51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 54/54H 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V		54/54V		POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Romania</i>	51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 54/54V		53/77E 54/54V		NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Russian Federation</i>				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V			54/54V	52/38J 53/77E		NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT ¹⁴

¹⁴ After the vote on Resolution 52/38 J, Russia said it abstained because paragraph 5 changed the nature of the entire resolution. In explanation of the vote on Resolution 53/77 E, Russia said that the inclusion of the preambular paragraph prevented the country from supporting the resolution. In the explanation of the vote on Resolution 54/54 V, Russia said that the paragraph “waters down and distorts” the entire text and that the provision could be used as a cover for those forces dealing with illicit traffic in weapons.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Rwanda</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Saint Kitts and Nevis</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Saint Lucia</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Samoa</i>		52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	52/38J			53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>San Marino</i>	54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Sao Tome and Principe</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				NO
<i>Senegal</i>	53/77B 53/77T 54/54J 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	YES
<i>Seychelles</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	52/38J 53/77E Addit. 54/54H Addit. 54/54J 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Singapore</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT ¹⁵

¹⁵ Before the vote on Resolution 52/38 J, Singapore said that it would support measures to stop the illicit trafficking of small arms. However, these measures should not collide with national security concerns. During the 25th meeting of the First Committee (53rd session), Singapore said that it supported the measures to limit the proliferation of small arms. However, this should not collide with national security concerns, including the purchase of weapons for national security and the right of self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Slovakia</i>	Addit. 52/38G 53/77M 54/54H	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Slovenia</i>	52/38G 53/77M Addit. 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Solomon Islands</i>	54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Somalia</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>South Africa</i>	52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77T 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Sri Lanka</i>	52/38J 53/77E 53/77T 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Spain</i>	52/38G 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V			NEGATIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Sudan</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Suriname</i>	Addit. 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Swaziland</i>	52/38G 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Sweden</i>	Addit. 51/45N 52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R Addit. 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
<i>Syrian Arab Republic</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	NO
<i>Tajikistan</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Thailand</i>	Addit. 53/77E 53/77T Addit. 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</i>	52/38G 52/38J 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
<i>Togo</i>	51/45L 52/38C 53/77B Addit. 53/77E 53/77T 54/54J 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Tonga</i>					54/54V				54/54V	NO
<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Tunisia</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V			52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	YES

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Turkey</i>	Addit. 52/38G 53/77E 53/77M 54/54H 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Turkmenistan</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
<i>Uganda</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Ukraine</i>		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES
<i>United Arab Emirates</i>		53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</i>	52/38J 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J		53/77E 54/54V		POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT ¹⁶
<i>United Republic of Tanzania</i>	54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>United States of America</i>	52/38G 52/38J 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V						52/38J 53/77E 54/54V		POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT ¹⁷
<i>Uruguay</i>	Addit. 51/45N 52/38G 53/77E 53/77M 53/77T 54/54H 54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				53/77E 54/54V		52/38J		YES

¹⁶ The UK withdrew its sponsorship of Resolution 52/38 J after the draft was orally amended to avoid caveats referring to the Panel on Small Arms. However, the UK is overall a POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT country due to the number of resolutions sponsored.

¹⁷ The USA withdrew its sponsorship of Resolution 52/38 J after the draft was orally. However, the USA is overall a POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT country due to the number of resolutions sponsored.

COUNTRY	RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE					PARAGRAPH ON THE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION				CATEGORY
	Sponsor	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	In Favor	Against	Abstain	Absent	
<i>Uzbekistan</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Vanuatu</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Venezuela</i>	54/54H Addit. 54/54R 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES
<i>Viet Nam</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	52/38J 53/77E			54/54V	NO
<i>Yemen</i>		54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	54/54V			52/38J 53/77E	POSITIVELY AMBIVALENT
<i>Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)</i>					52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V	NO
<i>Zambia</i>	54/54R 54/54V	53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	53/77E 54/54V			52/38J	YES
<i>Zimbabwe</i>	54/54R	52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				52/38J 53/77E 54/54V				YES